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ASSESSING THE STATUS OF URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION: A CASE SURVEY APPROACH
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LINEAGE OF 
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Introduction
On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court officially declared 
that the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
would no longer be tolerated. In the now famous case of Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka (1954: 495) the Court, based on the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, delivered the unanimous 
opinion that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate 
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal." In order to enforce its mandate, one year later in Brown II 
the Court, again unanimously, ordered local school authorities to 
comply with its earlier decision and desegregate public schools "with 
all deliberate speed" (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1955: 301).
More than 25 years have passed since the second Brown 
decision, and efforts to desegregate American public schools still 
continue. While considerable desegregation progress has been made,
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especially in the South, a recent U.S. Civil Rights Commission (1979: ii) 
report indicates segregation in many school districts "remains at 
discouragingly high levels." The Commission's survey of 47 districts 
reveals that almost 4.9 million or 47 percent of all minority children 
still attend schools considered at least moderately segregated. The 
dismantling of dual school systems in America continues to be a vital 
but unrealized national goal.
But what strategies can the courts mandate, or local school 
officials initiate to desegregate local school systems effectively and 
equitably? "There are well over 1,000 articles, books, and circulated 
papers which present some form of empirical evidence on school deseg­
regation" (Crain and Hawley, 1981: 3). Despite this mass of information, 
much of the research on desegregation remains in such a form that it 
does not provide very useful policy guidance for the courts or local 
school officials. Or, as one federal district court judge commented, 
"much of the current research replies to precise policy based questions 
with the ambiguity of a Delphic oracle. . . . (quoted in Hawley and 
Rist, 1977: 414). Continued efforts must be forthcoming to remedy 
this policy-oriented information lacuna. The research presented here 
is intended to contribute to that end.
The present study attempts to go beyond previous research in 
two important respects. First, in general, previous studies of school 
desegregation have used either an aggregate, comparative research 
design involving a large number of cities or have taken the form of 
case studies. While the former approach facilitates the use of 
various bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques and enhances
generalizability of research findings, it often masks or fails to account 
for unique or unusual conditions found in individual cities' desegrega­
tion efforts. For example, most aggregate school desegregation studies 
do not employ as explanatory variables what might be referred to as 
"desegregation process variables"— e.g., superintendent and school 
board support, desegregation resistance, citizen participation, elite 
support, etc. In contrast, case studies usually devote considerable 
attention to the politics and process of school desegregation, but 
extreme caution must be taken in generalizing research findings across 
cases (see Meier and Brudney, 1981: 133).
This study employs a relatively new technique called the case 
survey method, which combines certain features of aggregate analysis 
and case studies. The central purpose of the case survey method is to 
aggregate and generalize across a number of case studies (McClintock, 
et al., 1979: 626). The approach requires that an analyst-reader 
record information about individual cities' desegregation efforts on a 
closed-ended questionnaire (see Appendix A) so that these experiences 
can be quantified, aggregated, and subjected to systematic analysis.
In one sense, the case survey approach can be viewed as a compromise 
methodology which facilitates the comparative (quantitative) analysis 
of location-specific case study findings. The method has been used 
successfully in two recent studies. Yin and Yates (1975) utilized the 
case survey approach to analyze local government decentralization.
And Yin, Heald, and Vogel (1977) employed the method to assess the 
state and local government innovation process.
For present purposes the case survey method is used to collect 
vital information needed to investigate three sets of questions.
o Which desegregation strategies are most commonly
employed across school districts? What is the relation­
ship between the type of desegregation strategy 
employed by a district and the district’s success in 
reducing racial isolation? 
o What are the "determinants" of school desegregation 
success? Do certain external influences, school 
district characteristics, desegregation process 
variables, and desegregation strategies facilitate or 
impede the school desegregation process?
0 What factors explain white enrollment declines? Is 
desegregation success a good predictor of the white 
exodus of students from the school system?
This study extends previous research in a second important 
way. Desegregation scholars frequently lament the lack of "theory" 
in the school desegregation literature. For example, Fitzgerald 
(1975: 1) states: "The principal impediment to systematic empirical 
research on the politics of education has been the lack of a broad 
integrating theoretical framework." Similar sentiments are echoed by 
Crain and Hawley (1981: 5): "The key to enhancing the productivity of 
desegregation research is the development of theory to guide research 
design and analysis." Accordingly, in this study considerable attention 
is devoted to developing a theoretical base from which school deseg­
regation as a public policy/process can be viewed.
In sum, employing a relatively new data collection and 
aggregation technique known as the case survey method and a theoretical 
framework that conceptualizes school desegregation as a public policy 
that must be implemented at the local level, an attempt is made to 
assess the impact of three types of influences— external forces, school 
district characteristics, and desegregation process variables (including 
desegregation strategies)— on two school desegregation outcomes: the 
success of school districts in ending racial isolation (desegregation 
success) and white enrollment decline (generally referred to as "white 
flight").  ̂ The 52 school districts included in the study represent 
those for which written information was available among the total of 
261 districts with a 1976 enrollment of 20,000 or more students. Two 
other limitations were imposed on the selection process. First, the 
desegregation effort must have taken place between the years 1968 and 
1976 (the measure of school desegregation used in the study is limited 
to that period). Second, the district must have had a minimum enroll­
ment of 10 percent during at least part of the 1968-1976 time frame.
The study is organized into seven chapters. The remainder 
of this chapter traces the historical and legal foundations of public 
school desegregation in the United States. Chapter 2 attempts to 
develop an appropriate theoretical framework for the understanding of 
school desegregation as a national public policy. In Chapter 3 the 
research design employed in the study is presented. Chapters 4 through 
6 summarize the results of three sets of data analyses: Chapter 4 
examines the effectiveness of commonly employed desegregation techniques 
in reducing racial isolation; Chapter 5 presents the "determinants" of
desegregation success; and Chapter 6 is devoted to explaining white 
enrollment declines. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses 
the findings and implications of the study.
Historical/Legal Foundations 
of School Desegregation^
. . .  no state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any persons of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws (United States Constitution, 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section I).
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has plagued judges 
since its adoption in 1868. What does it mean to guarantee that the 
states will deny no person the equal protection of the laws? The 
answer to this question is, of course, quite complex and has changed 
over time. For example, in 1880 the Supreme Court surmised that one of 
the chief purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was "to assure to the 
colored race the enjoyment of all of the civil rights that under the 
law are enjoyed by white persons" (Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880: 
306-307). Sixteen years later in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Court 
accepted the "statutory formula of 'separate but equal' as an adequate 
legislative response to the command of the Constitution that no person 
should on the account of race be deprived of the equal protection of 
the laws" (Polsby, 1977: 69). While the Plessy decision did not 
directly involve the issue of school segregation, the Court's separate 
but equal doctrine condoned the practice.
Over 50 years later the Supreme Court officially ushered in 
the modern interpretation of equal protection of the laws as it applies
to schools. In the now famous case of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka (1954: 494-495) the Court ruled:
. . .  to separate them [children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Therefore, we hold 
that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom 
the actions have been brought are, by reason of the seg­
regation complained of, deprived of the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Kluger (1975: xii) the Brown decision "marked the turning
point in America's willingness to face the consequences of centuries
of racial discrimination." Before assessing the impact of consequences
of the 1954 Supreme Court mandate to dismantle dual school systems in
America, a brief historical overview of school segregation prior to
1954 is presented.
Public School Desegregation Efforts : Pre-1954
Historically, state and especially federal courts have been 
charged with the responsibility of deciding whether racial isolation in 
public schools is permissible. And prior to 1954, in general, the 
posture of the courts dictated that segregation of the races was 
acceptable. In fact, in 1896 the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson 
officially condoned the practice of segregation, as long as public 
facilities for both races (blacks and whites) were equal.
While the Court's decision in Plessy seems antithetical to 
the democratic norms upon which this nation was founded, it is important 
to remember that the decision was handed down by a "conservative" court 
responding to a perceived national public mood. A brief overview of 
events leading to the decision will illustrate this point.
In 1849, the father of a five-year-old black child brought
suit against the City of Boston (Roberts v. City of Boston, 1849). On
her way to the "black school" young Sarah Roberts was required to walk
past five white schools. After repeated efforts to enroll her in a
white school closer to home failed, Sarah's father hired the future
senator and abolitionist Charles Sumner to represent him and went to
court. Sumner argued that "segregated schools violated state law which
hold all persons, 'without distinction of age or sex, birth or color,
origin or condition,' to be equal before the law. . . . segregation
'brand[s] a whole race with the stigma of inferiority and degradation'"
(Gottron, 1979: 590). Roberts and Sumner lost the case. Massachusetts
Chief Justice Lemanuel Shaw in his decision commented:
It is urged, that this maintenance of separate schools 
tends to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction 
of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public 
opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not created 
by law, and probably cannot be changed by law (Roberts 
V. City of Boston, 1849: 206).
Nineteen years and the Civil War passed before minority groups 
had a strong constitutional case for calling for the end of dual school 
systems. Following the conclusion of civil strife, a series of three 
amendments were added to the U.S. Constitution. Generally referred to 
as the "Civil War Amendments," the Thirteenth (1865), Fourteenth 
(1868), and Fifteenth (1870) Amendments prohibited respectively—  
slavery and involuntary servitude, the states from denying to any 
person the equal protection of the laws, and abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.
The Supreme Court, interpreting the intent and scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, handed down two major decisions in 1873 and 1883 
that set the stage for their forthcoming ruling in Plessy. In the
3Slaughterhouse Cases (1873: 74) a 5 to 4 divided court ruled:
It is quite clear . . . that there is a citizenship of 
the United States and a citizenship of a State, which 
are distinct from each other. . . . the entire domain of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States 
lay within the constitutional and legislative power of 
the States. . . .
The Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to the privileges and immunities 
of national citizenship protected citizens from state-imposed restrict­
ions on, for example, the right to petition the federal government and 
the right to vote in federal elections. Other privileges and immunities 
that were granted as part of state citizenship were outside the purview 
of federal protection. In short, the decision of the Court in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases sustained state autonomy in establishing local 
privileges of residents.
In 1883, the Court condoned segregative acts by private
businessmen. In the Civil Rights Cases^ the Court nullified the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 which required equal access and enjoyment, regardless
of race, of public transportation, inns, theaters, etc. The Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court surmised:
. . . does not invest Congress with power to legislate 
upon subjects which are within the domain of state legis­
lation; but to provide modes of relief against state 
legislation or state action. . . .  It does not authorize 
Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regu­
lation of private rights. . . . [to do so] would be to 
make Congress take the place of the State Legislatures, 
and to supercede them. . . . (Civil Rights Cases, 1883:
11, 13).
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The significance of the Supreme Court declaration in 1883 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as passed by Congress was unconsti­
tutional cannot be ignored. For as Swisher (1957: 176) reminds us:
• . . the majority of the Supreme Court not only disposed 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 but also removed from 
Congress in future years any sense of obligation it might 
otherwise have developed for enactment of broad civil 
rights legislation by its holding that Congress had not 
such constitutional power. As a result, gradual changes ' 
in public sentiment in favor of protection of the rights 
of the Negro have found their limited expression not 
through Congress, where political matters should have 
their fullest consideration and where the democratic 
process is supposed in the main to be worked out, but 
rather in the executive and judicial branches.
In fact, over 80 years would pass before the Congress would once again
attempt to pass a broad, sweeping civil rights package (Civil Rights
Act of 1964; Voting Rights Act of 1965). In retrospect, however, the
decision of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases reflected popular
public sentiment:
[T]he mood of disillusionment and weariness with pro­
tection of Negro rights proved too ephemeral to serve 
as an adequate basis for a statement of constitutional 
law. . . . Other than Negroes themselves and a minority 
of faithful friends, the people were tired of giving 
special protection to the former slaves. It was felt to 
be time for the return to power of the dominant factions 
in the several communities (Swisher, 1957: 175, 174).
It is against this historical backdrop that the Supreme Court decided
in 1896 that "separate but equal" was an adequate response to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal protection of the law.
On May 18, 1896, in an 8 to 1 vote the Supreme Court upheld a 
Louisiana law requiring railroads operating in the state to provide 
separate cars for whites and blacks. "If one race be inferior to the 
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them
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upon the same plane" (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896: 551-552). In the lone 
dissenting vote Justice Harlan warned that the decision would "in time, 
prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
in the Dred Scott Case.̂  . . . [the law] is inconsistent with the 
personal liberty of citizens, white and black . . . and hostile to 
both the spirit and letter of the Constitution. . . . "  (Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 1896: 559-563). In the decision the Court stated that as 
long as facilities provided blacks were equal to those provided whites, 
state-imposed segregation laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court also ruled that segregation was not construed as a form of 
slavery, and therefore did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
As a result of the Plessy decision, discrimination based on 
race was officially sanctioned. For example, as late as 1954 the 11 
states of the original Confederacy, six border states (Delaware,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia), had state 
laws, and the District of Columbia had a local law requiring the 
separation of races with respect to the use of public facilities (e.g., 
transportation, water fountains, schools, restaurants, etc.). The 
constitutionality of requiring separate schools for whites and minorities 
did not go unchallenged. In three major cases (Cumming v. Richmond 
(Ga.) County Board of Education, 1899; Berea College v. Kentucky, 1908; 
and Gonglum v. Rice, 1927) originating in three different states 
(Georgia, Kentucky, and Mississippi), efforts were undertaken to over­
turn the decision. In all three cases, however, the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the states; The individual states and not the federal govern­
ment would determine local school policy.
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While efforts to attack the "separate" half of the separate but
equal doctrine proved unsuccessful, efforts to challenge the "equity"
of segregated facilities were more successful. Aided by an organization
founded in 1909 known as the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), in the early 1930s a frontal assault on the
equality of segregated schools was begun. Plaintiffs began to show the
fallacy of separate but equal by documenting disparities in educational
expenditures among black and white schools. For example:
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi were spending 
five times as much on the education of every white child 
as on every black child. Maryland, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia were spending twice as much 
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1981: 5).
In 1939, the first of four major court decisions which would
ultimately lead to a reinterpretation of the federal government's role
in school desegregation was rendered. In Missouri Ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada (1938) the Supreme Court ruled that Lloyd Gaines, a black, should
be admitted to the all-white University of Missouri Law School. Missouri
school officials denied Gained admission on the basis that the University
did not operate a separate law school for blacks and even offered to
pay his tuition if he gained admission to an adjacent state law school.
Commenting on the decision Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes stated:
. . . The question here is not of a duty of the state to 
supply legal training, or the quality of the training 
which it does supply, but of its duty when it provides 
such training to furnish it to the residents of the state 
upon the basis of an equality of right. By the operation 
of the laws of Missouri, a privilege has been created for 
white law students which is denied to Negroes by reason 
of their race (Missouri Ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938: 
349).
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In short, the Supreme Court ruled that "if separate but equal meant any­
thing, it meant that the state was obliged to deliver on the promise of 
equality within its own borders" (Polsby, 1977: 71).
The Gaines decision set the context for three more court cases 
of a similar nature. In Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma (1948) the Court ordered a black law student be admitted into 
the University of Oklahoma law school. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950), 
the Supreme Court overruled a state court decision and ordered the 
University of Texas to enroll a black law student. Finally, in McLaurin 
V. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education (1950) the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional the segregative acts of the University. McLaurin, 
an education Ph.D. student, was admitted to the University but was 
required to sit in a special chair in the classroom, library, and cafe­
teria. The Court ruled such restrictions "impair and inhibit [McLaurin's] 
ability to study, to engage in discussion and exchange views with other 
students, and, in general, to learn his profession" (McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 1950: 641). The deseg­
regation pendulum had begun to swing. Separate but equal as official 
court policy would stand for only four more years.
Brown I and II
In 1954, the Supreme Court overturned the separate but equal 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). The decision, generally known 
as Brown I, established school desegregation as a national public 
policy. In essence, the Court ruled that segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
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facilities and other tangible factors may be equal, deprived children 
of minority groups of equal educational opportunities.
Brown I was actually a combination of five different school 
desegregation cases which the Court ruled on collectively in 1954. The 
original case was filed in 1951 by Oliver Brown. Mr. Brown's daughter, 
Linda, was required to walk 20 blocks to her black school even though 
a white school was located in her neighborhood. In 1951, a federal 
district court ruled that while segregation was detrimental to black 
children, the schools (black and white) in Topeka were substantially 
equal.
The second case (Briggs v. Elliott) involved students in 
Clarendon County, South Carolina. In 1950, black parents filed suit 
seeking an end to segregated schools in the district. A federal 
district court denied the request but ordered the equalization of 
county schools; black schools were found to be of inferior quality.
The parents appealed the district court decision to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court in 1952 returned the case to the federal district 
court for a status report on the equalization process. Upon finding 
that the equalization mandate was substantially completed the case 
returned to the Supreme Court for further consideration.
The third case (Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward 
County, Va.) was almost identical in nature to Briggs. A district 
court ordered equalization of schools but refused to integrate schools 
during the interim period. New Castle County, Delaware, was the 
setting for the fourth case (Gebhart v. Belton). Black plaintiffs 
documenting the inferiority of local black schools in comparison to
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white schools filed a desegregation lawsuit. A state court ordered 
desegregation; the state supreme court upheld the desegregation decree, 
but the school board appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Finally, the fifth case (Bolling v. Sharpe) concerned schools in the 
District of Columbia. Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the 
states from denying citizens equal protection of the laws, plaintiffs 
in the nation's capital claimed that segregated schools violated the 
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. After a federal
court dismissed the case the Supreme Court granted review of the
dismissal.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I, lower courts 
had ruled that educational facilities were approximately or soon to be 
equal across white and black schools in all five school districts.
Thus, the overriding, primary question the Court was asked to decide 
"was whether public school desegregation per se was unconstitutional" 
(Gottron, 1979: 593). The five cases were argued in December, 1952, 
and due to the importance of the cases reargument was begun in June, 
1953. Thurgood Marshall, who was at the time director of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund and who in 1967 became the first
black men to be seated on the Supreme Court, served as the primary 
counsel for the plaintiffs. John W. Davis, former U.S. Representative 
and ambassador to Great Britain, argued the cases for the anti­
desegregation faction.
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Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated:
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and 
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children 
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? 
. . .  We believe that it does. . . . (Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, 1954: 493).
With respect to public school segregation in the nation's capital the
Court also ruled:
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits 
the states from maintaining racially segregated public 
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Consti­
tution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern­
ment (Bolling V. Sharpe, 1954: 499-500).
Given its directive to desegregate, one year later in Brown II, 
the Court addressed the issue of implementation. In general, the Court 
placed primary responsibility for implementation with federal district 
courts and local school authorities. The Court did, however, provide 
some guidance for their lower court counterparts :
(1) Local school authorities have the primary responsibi­
lity for implementation.
(2) The function of the federal court is to decide whether 
a local school board's response constitutes good 
faith implementation.
(3) The district court is to be guided by equitable 
principles, 'characterized by practical flexibility' 
in shaping remedies, with the pointed reminder that 
the principle of equal educational opportunity espoused 
in Brown I is not to yield simply because of disagree­
ment with that principle.
(4) Although the district court should take into account 
the practical problems of implementation, the local 
school authorities must make a 'prompt and reasonable 
start,' and thereafter the court should insure that 
desegregation proceeds with 'all deliberate speed'
(Read, 1977: 10).
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Although the Supreme Court declared segregated schools 
unconstitutional in Brown I and ordered school officials to desegregate 
with all deliberate speed in Brown II, one key component was needed to 
effectuate the desegregation decree— compliance. And compliance was 
particularly difficult to achieve, especially in the South. For 
example, in 1956 a tract, known as the "Declaration of Constitutional 
Principles," was signed by 101 of 128 members of Congress from 11 
southern and border states. "The signers called the Brown decisions a 
'clear abuse of judicial power,' and commended those states that 
intended to 'resist enforced integration by any means'" (Gottron, 1979: 
596). Thus, the struggle to fulfill the letter and spirit of the law 
as expressed in the Brown decisions began.
Public School Desegregation Efforts: Post-1955
According to Read (1977: 10-11) post Brown II desegregation 
efforts can be divided into four historical periods: (1) token desegrega­
tion efforts— 1955 to 1963; (2) evolution of desegregation standards and 
breakdown of entrenched local resistance— 1963 to 1967; (3) judicial 
revolution and massive integration in the Deep South— 1968 to 1972; and
(4) non-southern desegregation efforts and confusion over the future of 
desegregation— 1972 to present.
Token Desegregation. The only area of the country initially 
affected by the Brown decisions was the South. State-imposed or de jure 
public school segregation was specifically forbidden by the Court. 
Obstruction, delays, and even massive resistance characterized the 
southern response to school desegregation orders. For example, the
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NAACP was barred in some states. Citing state police powers, states 
required school segregation in order to protect public health and 
morals. Children were assigned to schools on the basis of aptitude 
tests or were allowed to attend the school of their choice. Because of 
years of inferior educational opportunities few blacks could compete 
scholastically with whites and even fewer opted to enter hostile, 
predominantly white schools.
Since the Court in Brown II placed primary responsibility for
school desegregation with local school officials and delegated to the
lower courts a monitoring "good faith implementation" role, it was these
two groups who guided early desegregation efforts. And while local
school officials, prompted to a large degree of public sentiment, were
unsympathetic to the desegregation process, southern courts initially
proved even more unsympathetic. In the first major school desegregation
case following Brown, a three-judge federal district court in South
Carolina ruled:
[I]t is important that we point out exactly what the 
Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided in 
this case. It has not decided that the federal courts 
are to take over or regulate the public schools of the 
states. It has not decided that the states must mix 
persons of different races in the schools or must require 
them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right 
of choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, 
and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny 
to any person on account of race the right to attend any 
school that it maintains. . . . Nothing in the Constitution 
or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from
the people freedom to choose the schools they attend.
The Constitution, in other wards, does not require 
integration. It merely forbids discrimination (Briggs v. 
Elliott, 1955: 777).
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The last sentence of the above ruling became known as the 
"Briggs V. Elliott dictum" and was used to justify the initial approach 
to school desegregation orders— freedom of choice or voluntary desegrega­
tion. Freedom of choice as a desegregation strategy, however, only 
resulted in token desegregation. Ten years after Brown only "1.2 per­
cent of black students in 11 southern states attended schools with 
whites" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1981: 12).
"Spurred by the quickening pace of the civil rights movement 
and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, new plaintiffs embarked on 
the choppy seas of litigation, with new case filings increasing almost 
geometrically" (Read, 1977: 17-18). The time had come for "footdragging 
public schools to move with celerity toward desegregation. . . . "  
(Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 1965: 729).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, under the 
leadership of Judge John Minor Wisdom, and the Office of Civil Rights 
in HEW, took the lead in trying to establish guidelines which school 
officials and district courts could apply in assessing the adequacy of 
desegregation attempts.
The Evolution of Desegregation Standards. Passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ushered in a new approach to school desegrega­
tion. Rodgers and Bullock (1972: 81) label this approach "administrative- 
judicial." Instead of a slow and costly process where litigants had to 
pursue desegregation in the courts on a case-by-case basis, the adminis­
trative-judicial approach required broad desegregation policy guide­
lines and cooperation between court and HEW officials. In the words of 
Judge Wisdom, there should be a "close correlation . . . between the
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judiciary's standards . . . and the executive's department's standards 
in administering [desegregation] policy" (Singleton v. Jackson Municipal 
Separate School District, 1965: 731).
To aid district court and school officials in assessing the
adequacy of school desegregation plans, in 1965 the Fifth Circuit Court
declared that it would attach "great weight" to HEW guidelines^ that had
been established pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
. . .  by assisting the courts in their independent evalua­
tion of school desegregation plans, and by accelerating 
the progress but simplifying the process of desegregation 
the HEW Guidelines offer new hope to Negro school children 
long denied their constitutional rights. A national effort, 
bringing together Congress, the executive, and the judici­
ary may be able to make meaningful the right of Negro 
children to equal educational opportunities. The courts 
acting alone have failed (United States v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education, 1966: 847).
The "bringing together" of the Congress, the executive, and 
the judiciary had a significant impact on school desegregation policy.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 as passed by Congress contained three major 
titles that involved federal bureaucracies in the process of school 
desegregation. Title IV of the Act authorized the attorney general to 
sue segregated school districts on behalf of complainants if a person 
or persons were unable to bear the expense of the litigation. Title IX 
authorized the Justice Department to intervene in a private school 
desegregation court case if, in the opinion of the attorney general, 
the case was of "general public importance." Finally, Sections 601 and 
602 of Title VI of the Act prohibited discrimination based on race, 
color, or natural origin under any program or activity that received 
federal financial assistance and granted power to administrative agencies
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to issue rules and regulations that could be followed to cut off federal 
funds for noncompliance.
Title VI became the major tool used by the Office of Civil 
Rights to force recalcitrant school officials to desegregate southern 
schools. And while Title VI implementation and enforcement activities 
"bounced around, from, among, between, and through the strategic 
approaches of voluntarism, warfare, confusion, bluffing, and avoidance" 
(Radin, 1977: 208), the activities and desegregation policy guidelines 
issued by the Office of Civil Rights were successful in forcing com­
pliance with the Brown mandate. "By the end of 1966 the Department of 
Justice 'had filed or joined its 93rd desegregation suit.' By February 7, 
1967, HEW had cut off Federal funds to 34 school districts and had 
initiated final termination proceedings against 157 more. During the 
next 11 months funds to 122 school districts were terminated" (Rodgers 
and Bullock, 1972: 83).
According to Radin (1977: 92), it might have been easier for 
school officials to simply give up "minimal federal support" than to 
acquiesce to federal enforcement pressure. But with the passage of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the financial 
penalties for noncompliance were greatly increased. In 1970, the 
Justice Department made noncompliance even more costly. In United 
States V. Georgia the Justice Department sued 81 Georgia schools and 
threatened to cut off state funds to education if by the fall of 1970 
the districts did not prepare plans to eliminate all-black schools.
"The threat to impound state money was too severe to be ignored since, 
on the average, fifty-five percent of local school district's money came 
from the state" (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a: 21).
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In short, the decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit Court in 
Singleton and Jefferson in conjunction with enforcement activities by 
the Office of Civil Rights and Justice Department were instrumental in 
breaking down entrenched southern resistance to school desegregation.
Over 3,000 school districts were affected by the enforcement efforts of 
HEW's Office of Civil Rights, "by any reckoning, an extremely impressive 
enforcement achievement" (Rabkin, 1980: 338). In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, primary school desegregation enforcement responsi­
bility began to swing back to the courts (Bullock and Rodgers, 1975: 658); 
ultimate Title VI enforcement had been shifted from the Office of Civil 
Rights to the Justice Department under orders from President Nixon.
Massive Integration. In the late 1960s the Supreme Court took
another major action to desegregate schools in the South. On May 27,
1968, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Va. the
Court ruled the "freedom-of-choice" desegregation plan utilized to
desegregate schools in Kent County was unacceptable. Noting that no
white student had chosen to attend predominantly black schools and that
only 15 percent of the county's black students were enrolled in white
schools, the Court surmised:
. . . the affirmative duty [of school officials is] to 
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a 
unitary system in which racial discrimination [is] elim­
inated root and branch. . . . The burden on a school board 
is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically 
to work, and promises realistically to work now (Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, Va., 1968: 437, 439)
The decision of the Court in Green marked the end of freedom-of-choice
as an adequate response to desegregation orders.
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Following the Green case the Supreme Court demonstrated that 
it expected desegregation results. In Alexander v. Holmes County Board 
of Education (1969), the Court vacated a lower court decision that had 
granted school officials a three-month desegregation delay and ordered 
immediate desegregation. This decision was followed by one of the most 
important Supreme Court cases since Brown— Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
County Board of Education (1971).
In Swann the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality 
of specific (and controversial) desegregation strategies. After school 
officials failed to present an "adequate" desegregation plan, District 
Judge James McMillan appointed Dr. John Finger, a well-known desegrega­
tion expert, to develop a plan for the desegregation of Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg school district. The plan, referred to as the "Finger Plan," 
required that the enrollment in as many of the 107 schools in the dis­
trict as practically possible should reflect a 71/29 percent white-to- 
black student ratio. The 71/29 ratio was the same proportion of whites- 
to-blacks in the entire district. In order to achieve this racial 
balance, extensive busing of secondary students and the pairing and 
clustering of elementary schools was approved. The plan aroused con­
siderable public opposition and, upon appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court 
remanded the district court’s decision for reconsideration. According 
to the Fourth Circuit Court the busing and pairing/clustering components 
of the plan placed an undue hardship upon the school board and children 
of the district.
When the Supreme Court was asked to settle the case, four 
specific issues were to be addressed:
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o Can the lower courts use "racial quotas" to 
effectuate school desegregation? 
o Are one-race schools permissible?
o Is the remedial altering of school zones permissible? 
o Is the busing of students to achieve school desegrega­
tion permissible?
With respect to racial quotas the Court ruled, " the consti­
tutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school 
in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the 
school system" (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, 
1971: 24). On the other hand, the Court did rule that:
Awareness of the racial composition of the whole school 
system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping 
a remedy to correct past constitutional violations. In 
sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was 
within the equitable remedial discretion of the District 
Court (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of 
Education, 1971: 25).
Are one-race schools permissible? The Court held "that there 
was a presumption against one-race schools, but it refused to hold that 
the existence of one-race schools constituted a per se violation of the 
Constitution" (Read, 1977: 36). The Court also stated that "gerry­
mandering of school district . . . [and] pairing, 'clustering,' or 
'grouping' of schools with attendance assignments made deliberately to 
accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly segregated 
Negro schools and the transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro 
schools" were acceptable desegregation strategies (Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 1971: 27).
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Perhaps the most politically sensitive issue the Court was
asked to address concerned busing. The Court approved busing as a
remedial desegregation tool and stated that busing had been an "integral 
part of the public education system for years, and was perhaps the 
single most important factor in the transition from the one-room school- 
house to the consolidated school" (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County 
Board of Education, 1971: 29).
According to Read (1977: 38) "Swann was an opinion for all
litigants." While the Court ruled that-mathematical ratios were permis­
sible, they were to be used as a starting point in shaping a remedy.
The Court refused to directly deal with the issue of one-race schools; 
rather, it ruled that there was a presumption against them. Finally, 
the altering of school attendance zones and busing were authorized as 
valid remedial school desegregation strategies. But busing as a remedy 
was limited with respect to "time and distance of travel." Nevertheless, 
between 1968, the year the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Green, and 1972, one year after Swann, massive integration had come to 
the South. For example, in 1968, 68 percent of the black students in 
the South^ attended schools comprised of 100 percent minority students.
In 1972, only 8.7 percent of black students in the South attended all­
minority schools (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970: 118; 1974: 124).
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Swann, judicial 
attention began to shift from the South to the North and West. The 
courts through a series of decisions had resolved the major issues 
surrounding the desegregation of southern schools. State-imposed or 
de jure segregation was clearly unconstitutional. Remaining issues
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(after Swann) in the South largely concerned methods of implementation.
But what about school segregation that resulted from settlement patterns 
or segregative actions which, while not officially mandated by state and 
local law, were supported or ignored by local officials— de facto segrega­
tion? The courts began to answer this question in 1973.
Non-Southern School Desegregation. Desegregation efforts in 
the North and West, at least from a judicial standpoint, are complicated 
by the fact that school segregation did not result from governmental 
(state) action. "Racial unbalance alone is not unconstitutional. . .
To find a constitutional violation in any school desegregation case, a 
court must find that segregation currently exists and that it was caused 
by deliberate governmental actions" (Von Euler and Parham, 1978: 17, 4).
In short, a distinction exists between de jure (by law) segregation and 
segregation that occurred by accident (de facto segregation).
Until 1973, the courts primarily focused on de jure school 
desegregation in the South. In 1973, in Keyes v. Denver School District 
No. 1, however, the Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standards 
for school desegregation in the North and West. The Court ruled that 
de jure segregation is "a current condition of segregation resulting 
from intentional state action . . . .  the differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . .  is purpose 
or intent to segregate" (Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 1973:
189, 205, 208). In Keyes the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs' 
contentions that local school authorities had intended to create a dual 
school system in Denver by manipulating school attendance zones, 
selecting school sites which would separate races, and following a
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neighborhood school policy that coincided with existing residential 
segregation.
The Keyes case originated in 1969. The Denver School Board 
had adopted three resolutions aimed at desegregating the predominantly 
black Park Hill area of the city. A new school board was elected and 
voided the resolutions. A group of plaintiffs sued and won their case; 
Park Hill was ordered to desegregate. Pleased with victory, the plain­
tiffs then sued for the desegregation of the entire school district.
A federal district court ruled, however, that intentional segregative 
actions by school officials could only be proven in the Park Hill area; 
segregation in the other sections of the district were de facto in 
origin. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court 
decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Keyes case and
handed down its decision in June, 1973: The Denver school district was
to be desegregated: The Court ruled:
We have never suggested that plaintiffs in school deseg­
regation cases must bear the burden of proving the 
elements of de jure segregation as to each and every 
school or each and every student. . . . [C]ommon sense 
dictates that racially inspired school board actions 
have an impact beyond the particular schools that are 
the subject of these actions (Keyes v. Denver School 
District No. 1, 1973: 200, 203).
The Court's ruling in Keyes was viewed as a victory by pro­
desegregation forces. De jure segregation could be distinguished from 
de facto segregation by "showing of intent to segregate" (Keyes v. 
Denver School District No. 1, 1973: 208). But as would soon become 
evident, the Keyes decision also meant that "plaintiffs would have to
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present convincing evidence of official action responsible for dual 
school systems on a case-by-case basis" (Von Euler and Parham, 1978: 5).
One year and one month after the Keyes decision, in Milliken 
V. Bradley (1974), the Supreme Court reversed a district court-ordered 
metropolitan desegregation plan for Detroit. According to Yudof (1978: 
93), the Court's decision in Milliken "signalled that the days of 
unanimity or near unanimity in desegregation cases in the Supreme 
Court were over."
Acting on a school desegregation case originally filed in 1970,
district court Judge Stephen J. Roth ordered 53 schools located in
three counties surrounding Detroit to be joined with Detroit in order
to achieve a unitary school system. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the decision stating:
[A]ny less comprehensive . . . plan would result in an 
all black school system immediately surrounded by practi­
cally all white suburban school systems. . . . the only 
feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the 
boundary lines between the Detroit School District and 
adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited pur­
pose of providing an effective desegregation plan 
(Milliken v. Bradley, 1973: 245, 249).
The decision of the Sixth Circuit was appealed to the Supreme
Court and in a 5 to 4 decision the Court held that the district court
had overstepped its remedial powers— an interdistrict or metropolitan
plan was not justified in the case of Detroit. The court declared:
. . . the nature of the violation determines the scope of 
the remedy. . . . [T]he notion that school district lines 
may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administra­
tive convenience is contrary to the history of public 
education in our country. . . . Before the boundaries of 
separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside 
by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes
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or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be 
shown that there has been a constitutional violation 
within one district that produces a significant segrega­
tive effect in another district. Specifically, it must 
be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state 
or local school districts, or of a single school district 
have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segrega­
tion. . . .  In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy 
would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict 
segregation directly caused by the constitutional viola­
tion. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and 
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong 
calling for an interdistrict remedy (Milliken v. Bradley, 
1974: 738, 741, 744-745).
The decision of the Court rested on the fact that there was no evidence
of segregation in the suburban districts and that there was no evidence
that the segregated schools in Detroit proper was caused by actions
originating from outside the district (Read, 1977: 45). In a dissenting
opinion Justice Thurgood Marshall lamented the Court's decision to
abdicate the interdistrict plan: "Negro children in Detroit will receive
the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they
have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past" (Milliken v. Bradley,
1974: 782).
Taylor (1978: 38) states that in handing down the Milliken
decision the "Court began a retrenchment, from which it has not yet
emerged, that appeared to be responsive to the drumbeat of criticism
from the Administration and Congress." Justice Marshall in his
dissenting opinion expressed similar sentiments :
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a 
perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in 
enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice 
than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In 
the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to 
allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up 
each into two cities— one white, the other black— but it 
is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret 
(Milliken v. Bradley, 1974: 814-815).
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Since 1974, the Supreme Court's position concerning inter­
district or metropolitan desegregation plans has largely been guided by 
the "Milliken dictum"— the scope of the remedy is determined by the 
nature and extent of the violation. In 1977, the Court ruled that a 
metropolitan remedy for Dayton, Ohio, schools was too harsh (Dayton 
Board of Education v. Brinkman). But by explicitly approving a lower 
court decision or implicitly granting approval by refusing to grant a 
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld metropolitan desegregation 
plans in three cases.
A metropolitan plan was created for Louisville-Jefferson 
County in 1975. Schools in Wilmington, Delaware, and surrounding suburbs 
in New Castle County were officially consolidated in the fall of 1978. 
Finally, in October, 1980, the Supreme Court refused to grant review 
of Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis v. Metro­
politan Development Commission of Marion County. The refusal let stand 
a metropolitan school desegregation remedy for Indianapolis-Marion 
County schools.
The use of metropolitan plans to desegregate central city- 
suburban schools will continue to capture the attention of the courts.
For as a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977b: 6, 11, 12) report 
indicates :
To a very great extent the remaining problems of segrega­
tion by race and national origin in public schools are
problems that exist in big cities......... [W]e have come
to a point where substantial integration of public schools 
can be accomplished only if the area covered is larger 
than the city itself. . . . There is no other approach 
that will deal promptly and effectively with racially 
isolated schools in metropolitan areas.
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Busing, White Flight, and Resegregation:
Other Current Desegregation Issues
In addition to metropolitan desegregation plans, three other 
current desegregation related issues continue to arouse controversy and 
capture court attention— busing, white flight, and resegregation.
Bus ing
"The most vocal objections to school desegregation plans, 
whether of the intra- or interdistrict variety, usually concern busing" 
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1977b: 51). And as a recent Gallup 
poll indicates, whites tend to oppose busing more than do blacks. The 
opinion survey revealed that whites opposed busing for purposes of 
desegregation 4 to 1, while blacks were 2 to 1 in favor of busing as a 
means to achieve racially balanced schools (Gallup Report, 1981: 28).
Despite busing's negative connotations, it is important to 
remember that school officials have been transporting students for years. 
For example, after approving of busing as a remedial desegregation 
strategy in Swann, the Supreme Court noted that the "Charlotte school 
board had bused children for years in order to maintain a dual school 
system" [emphasis added] (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board 
of Education, 1971: 29-30).
Figure 1 charts the growth of the proportion of public 
elementary and secondary school children transported at public expense 
since 1960. As the figure shows, in 1960 approximately 37 percent of 
public school students rode public-supported transportation. The rider- 
ship figures in 1968, the first year of the period Read (1977: 28) 
labels "massive integration," and 1972, the year when most southern
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FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS 
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SOURCE: U.S. Statistical Abstracts, 1970 and 1980 and Digest of
Education Statistics 1981. Percentage based on average 
daily attendance.
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desegregation efforts were completed, are respectively, 42 and 46 per­
cent. In 1973, the year that the Supreme Court ordered the desegrega­
tion of a non-southern city (Denver in Keyes v. School District No. 1), 
the percent of students being transported at public expense was approxi-
g
mately 48 percent. By 1978, over 50 percent (52.8%) of students rode 
public-sponsored transportation.
But how much of this increase in busing is attributable to the 
desegregation process itself? A national survey of school superintendents 
performed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977a: 46) suggests 
that desegregation-related busing increases are relatively small.
Based on a sample of 229 school districts that reported pre- and post­
desegregation busing figures between the years 1966 and 1975, the survey 
revealed that the percentage of minorities bused increased from 47.1 
to 55.9 (9% increase). The number of white students transported before 
and after desegregation increased only about 3 percent, from 50.0 to 
53.2 percent. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, increases in busing 
due to school desegregation while not insignificant are not astronomical. 
And minorities tend to bear a disproportionate burden of the increase.
Due to the controversial nature of school busing, the courts 
have been cautious in issuing busing decrees. For example, while the 
Supreme Court in Swann upheld the use of busing where "feasible," the 
Court also ruled that the remedy was limited with respect to time and 
distances that would "either risk the health of the children or signi­
ficantly impinge on the educational process" (Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 1971: 30-31). Based on these vague 
Supreme Court guidelines, lower courts have exempted various school
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sub-groups from being bused. In Thompson v. School Board (1974), the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a district court order that "a desegregation plan 
that involved long bus rides for first and second grades was not 
'feasible'" (Levin, 1978: 3). Similarly, in United States v. School 
District of Omaha (1976), after expert testimony from a local pediatri­
cian and the assistant superintendent of schools, first graders were 
exempted from the local desegregation plan.
While the busing of students, and especially young children, is 
highly unpopular per se, another commonly offered argument against the 
use of busing is that busing precipitates the withdrawal of white 
students from the school system. Research has shown that greater busing 
distances are associated with greater white flight during the implementa­
tion year of a desegregation plan (see Giles, Gatlin, and Cataldo, 1974; 
Giles and Gatlin, 1980; Rossell, 1980). In addition, in order to avoid 
busing of their young children, parents may not enroll them in local 
schools when they reach school age (a phenomenon known as "nonentrance") 
(see McConahay and Hawley, 1978).
White Flight
White flight from public schools may take two forms: Parents 
may remain in the school district and enroll their children in private 
schools of they may move out of the district. In either case the 
consequences of white flight pose problems for school officials.
Declining enrollments signal the decline of monetary support for local 
schools. While controversy surrounds the exact nature of the effect 
of school desegregation on white flight (see Chapter 6), Armor (1978: 8)
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suggests the following three points are generally agreed upon:
(1) desegregation efforts are associated with white enrollment loss in 
some instances; (2) such loss is conditional; it occurs under some 
conditions but not others; and (3) the effect most often takes place 
the year that desegregation efforts are begun.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of 
white flight. In two cases the Court has, however, touched upon the 
issue. In Wright v. Emporia City Council (1972), the Supreme Court 
prohibited a city from withdrawing from a county school district. The 
Court's rationale was that since the district court had ruled that the 
city-county as a unit had operated a dual school system, the unit as a 
whole should be desegregated. Excluding the city and thereby allowing 
for the exodus of white students from the county system into the 
proposed city school system "would actually impede the process of 
dismantling the existing dual system" (Wright v. Emporia City Council, 
1972: 466). And in United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Educa­
tion (1972: 491) the Court ruled that "while [white flight] may be 
cause for deep concern . . .  it cannot . . .  be accepted as a reason 
for achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public 
school system."
The extent to which white flight as an issue has influenced 
lower court decisions is mixed. On the one hand the courts have 
refused to consider white flight in formulating desegregation strategies 
for schools in Louisville, Boston, and Indianapolis. On the other hand, 
the courts have considered white flight evidence in developing appro­
priate strategies for ending dual school systems in Chattanooga and 
Dallas (see Levin, 1978).
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White flight as an unintended impact of school desegregation 
efforts will continue to arouse controversy and capture court attention. 
Ultimately the Supreme Court will be required to rule on white flight 
per se and suggest desegregation strategies that will help to minimize 
white student outmigration (e.g., metropolitan plans). White flight 
can negate the effects of the best conceived and implemented desegrega­
tion plan. In fact, white student losses can lead to the resegregation 
of a previously desegregated school district.
Resegregation
Resegregation of schools marks a "reversal or diminuation of 
a district's or school's desegregation status toward greater racial 
isolation" (Hawley, et al., 1981: 2). Due to white student outmigration, 
changing birth and residential patterns, and enrollment in private 
schools, district officials who had previously achieved significant 
desegregation success may over time find that once again local schools 
are segregated.
The Supreme Court’s position on resegregation is similar in 
nature to its policy on metropolitan desegregation plans. Substantial 
proof is required to show that resegregation of schools is the result 
of official governmental action and not a product of changing demo­
graphic patterns (Von Euler and Parham, 1978: 8). Lower courts in 
monitoring desegregation actions over time are guided by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Swann (1971: 31-32).
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It does not follow that communities served by unitary 
systems will remain demographically stable, for in a 
growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school 
authorities nor district courts are constitutionally 
required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial 
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty 
to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina­
tion through official action is eliminated from the system. 
This does not mean that Federal courts are without power 
to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a 
showing that either school authorities or some other 
agency of the state had deliberately attempted to fix or 
alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composi­
tion of the schools, further intervention by a district 
court should not be necessary.
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler (1976) the 
Supreme Court was asked to specifically address the problem of reseg­
regation. Finding unconstitutionally segregated schools, in 1970 a 
federal district court ordered the desegregation of Pasadena schools.
The desegregation plan required that no school in the district be 
comprised of a majority of minority students. In 1974, the Pasadena 
School Board petitioned the Court for one of two actions : Either it 
approve a new plan, on the contention that the old plan had been com­
pleted, or the Court relinquish jurisdiction of the case. Plaintiffs 
opposed both requests. They claimed that school officials had 
satisfied the "no school comprised of a majority of minority students" 
criterion in only one year— 1970. School officials, however, protested 
that after 1970 the criterion was not met because of changing residen­
tial patterns in the city and not because of school board policy. The 
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs— student assignments 
should be adjusted on a year-to-year basis. The decision was affirmed 
by the court of appeals.
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After granting review of the case the Supreme Court vacated
the district court order and remanded the case for further consideration.
Speaking for the Court, Justice William Rehnquist stated;
Having once implemented a racially neutral attendance 
pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional 
violations . . . the District Court had fully performed 
its function of providing the appropriate remedy for 
previous racially discriminatory patterns (Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler, 1976: 436-437).
In sum. Court policy concerning resegregation much like those 
concerning metropolitan plans, busing, and white flight, is still largely 
undefined and is developing on a case-by-case incremental basis. Until 
the Supreme Court provides firm, clear guidelines on these four important 
desegregation issues, school officials and lower courts will continue 
to grapple with the difficult task of devising effective, equitable, 
and long-lasting desegregation strategies.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to trace the evolution of 
public school desegregation efforts from a historical/legal perspective. 
Historically, federal courts and in particular the Supreme Court as the 
highest court of the land have been levied with the unenviable job of 
developing a national school desegregation policy. And while the 
history of school desegregation is studded with notable decisions—
Brown I and Green, Swann, Keyes— "the promise of Brown remains 
unfulfilled for many students. In the 1978-79 school year, 6,218,024 
minority students (60.2%) attended schools that were at least 50 per­
cent minority, and 37 percent attended schools that were at least 80 
percent minority" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1981: 31).
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In short, school desegregation efforts are not over.
Additional guidance is required from the Supreme Court detailing the 
uses and limitations of busing and metropolitan plans as desegregation 
strategies. Court clarification is also needed concerning the weight 
white flight evidence should be given in formulating desegregation 
techniques and the evidence lower courts should examine in considering 
resegregation law suits.
While the courts and the enforcement activities of the Office 
of Civil Rights have played a major role in setting school desegregation 
policy and have forced some school districts to desegregate, "explaining 
desegregation change by referring to only federal pressure is not 
sufficient" (Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980; 197). As a U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights (1976) survey of 1,300 districts reveals, approximately 
37 percent of districts desegregating did so under state or local 
initiative. And even in those districts where there is federal coercion 
to desegregate, a host of local environmental factors may also influence 
the level and spirit of compliance. Chapter 2 is devoted to developing 
a theoretical framework which facilitates the understanding of the 
dynamics of school desegregation as a public policy/process.
NOTES
1. According to Hawley (1981: 146) there are five primary objectives 
of school desegregation: (1) ending racial isolation among and 
within schools; (2) increasing racial tolerance and understanding 
among children and adults of all races; (3) improving the academic 
performance of low achievers; (4) enhancing the self-concept and 
aspirations to achieve among minorities; (5) increasing social 
equality through increased access for minorities to higher educa­
tion, higher status jobs, and higher incomes. Achievement of 
these objectives, so it is argued, will hopefully lead to the 
ultimate goal of school desegregation and civil rights legislation 
per se, integration— a condition where minority groups are accepted 
on a completely equal basis (Pettigrew, 1971). The scope of this 
study only allows investigation of two desegregation outcomes— the 
degree to which school districts are successful in reducing racial 
isolation among schools and explaining an unintended outcome of 
desegregation efforts, white enrollment decline.
2. In tracing the chronology of important court cases as well as 
gathering factual information about the various cases, four 
references were extensively employed— Polsby, 1977; Read, 1977;
Von Euler and Parham, 1978; and Gottron, 1979.
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3. The Slaughterhouse Cases were originated by a group of New Orleans 
butchers in response to a Louisiana law granting one company the 
exclusive right to operate a slaughterhouse in New Orleans.
4. The Supreme Court ruled on five separate cases collectively in the 
Civil Rights Cases : United States v. Stanley (Kansas); United 
States V. Ryan (California); United States v. Nichols (Missouri); 
United States v. Singleton (New York); and Robinson v. Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad Co. (Tennessee).
5. In Scott V. Sandford (1857) a black slave in Missouri named Dred
Scott claimed that because of his trip to Illinois and other states
where blacks were viewed as "free men," he was no longer a slave.
The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Tanney, ruled 7 to 2 against
Scott. Tanney's opinion was:
. . . they [slaves] are not, and that they are not included 
and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' 
in the Constitution, and can, therefore, claim none of the 
rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and 
serves to citizens of the United States (Scott v. Sanford,
1857: 404).
6. The 1966 desegregation guidelines proposed by the Office of Education 
of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required:
1. Substantial achievements under free choice desegregation 
plans,
2. Significant progress in desegregation of teachers and 
staff,
3. Progress in closing of small, inadequate schools 
established for Negro students or other minority groups,
4. Simplified procedures and periodic reports from school 
districts to measure progress in implementing desegrega­
tion plans (Blaustein and Zangrando, 1968: 590).
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In addition, each school system was responsible for selecting the 
plan best suited to accomplish desegregation as quickly as possible 
and making its plan work. On December 29, 1966, the Fifth Circuit 
Court in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education upheld 
the constitutionality of the HEW guidelines.
7. South equals the 11 states of the original Confederacy: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.




In a recently completed comprehensive study of school deseg­
regation, Robert Crain and Willis Hawley, two of the nation's preeminent 
desegregation scholars, set forth an agenda for future school desegrega­
tion research. According to Crain and Hawley (1981: 1, 5) in order 
that social science research may be converted into action in the "real 
world": (1) "research aimed at influencing policy needs to be developed 
and presented with policy makers and practitioners as the consumers";
(2) research should attempt to capture the complexity of the desegrega­
tion process as well as the factors (determinants) that affect different 
types of desegregation outcomes; and (3) theory should "guide research 
design and analysis."
The rationale for this research agenda is based on three 
characteristics of the desegregation literature. First, "technically 
sophisticated research is [usually] designed and conducted by persons 
who see other researchers [and not policy makers] as the most signifi­
cant judges of their work" (Crain and Hawley, 1981: 1). Second, almost 
without exception desegregation scholars study school desegregation
43 .
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following one or two approaches: they describe the process of desegrega­
tion implementation (case studies), or they attempt to systematically 
identify those factors affecting desegregation success (comparative 
studies), but not both. Third, most desegregation studies are marked 
by their "virtual absence of relatively comprehensive conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks" (Crain and Hawley, 1981: 5).
The present study attempts to address Crain and Hawley's 
research agenda in three ways. First, in order to provide policy makers 
with information regarding the effectiveness of various desegregation 
techniques in reducing racial isolation, the range of desegregation 
strategies used across 52 large school districts is systematically 
determined, commonly employed strategies by school level (elementary 
and secondary) are identified, and the relationship of the techniques 
with desegregation success is assessed (see Chapter 4). Second, an 
attempt is made to systematically identify those factors that affect 
school desegregation implementation and white student enrollment decline 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, while no grand theory of school 
desegregation is offered, the research is placed within the context of 
implementation theory.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conceptual 
framework employed to guide the research design and analysis. In 
section one school desegregation as a policy implementation process is 
discussed, and the types of factors which may influence the implementa­
tion process are identified. A critical appraisal of previous efforts 
to explain school desegregation is presented in section two. Finally, 
in the third section a desegregation implementation research model is
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offered, proposed relationships are discussed, and a methodology that 
will facilitate empirical testing of the model is offered.
Implementing School Desegregation Policy 
"The history of efforts to combat segregation in America has 
been one of raising the level at which decisions [are] made" (Altshuler, 
1970: 20). Such is the case with efforts to desegregate American public 
schools, for it was the Supreme Court in 1954 that established the 
dismantling of dual school systems as a national public policy. But as 
with any policy, implementation and compliance are required before the 
intent of a policy becomes a reality.
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 458) suggest that implementation 
success is contingent upon the type of policy to be implemented. They 
classify policies according to two distinguishing characteristics: "the 
amount of change involved and the extent to which there is goal consensus 
among the participants in the implementations process" (see Figure 2). 
According to the researchers, of the four types of policies shown in 
Figure 2, policies of the "major change/low consensus" variety are the 
most difficult to implement since they require extensive change without 
normative commitment to the goals of the policy.
School desegregation policy is of the "major change/low 
consensus" type. School desegregation required major change; it upset 
a way of life, a traditional view of the relationship between people 
based on race. Blacks (and other minorities) simply should not attend 
local white schools. As a result school desegregation efforts are:
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FIGURE 2




















SOURCE: Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 460).
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. . . rife with examples of the nonimplementation of 
judicial orders and executive decisions, of the failure 
to carry out policies of effective desegregation at the 
community, school system, building, and classroom levels. 
Even the best administrative rhetoric and policy seldom 
is translated into effective programs at the local school 
level. We see examples of nonimplementation, and of 
resistance to racial and educational change, written in 
bold relief across the past 25 years of national history. 
They can be identified in the southern "massive resistance' 
of the 1950s and early 1960s and the northern "passive 
resistance" of the late 1960s and 1970s; in attempts at 
compliance with the letter but not the spirit of federal 
laws and judicial orders; in white flight, fright, and 
fight; in constant delay, dismay, and decay ; and in the 
ways innovative desegregation programs and educational 
leaders have been ignored, sabotaged, coopted, or even 
fired and assassinated in character or person (Crowfoot 
and Chesler, 1981: 275).
If Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975; also see Yudof, 1981: 252) 
contention is true that successful implementation depends upon consensus 
or at least acquiescence on a policy, then the nonimplementation of 
school desegregation orders should have come as little surprise. For 
as Cataldo, et al. (1978: xiv-xv) remind us:
School desegregation involves ordinary citizens as 
key policy actors to a far greater extent than most pub­
lic issues. The outcome of school desegregation relies 
on compliance with the law. For officials compliance is 
mandatory; for citizens it is voluntary. The facts of a 
particular desegregation case may result in a decision 
requiring the school board to desegregate. The board 
then has no legal choice but to respond affirmatively. 
Citizens, however, may respond in ways extending beyond 
the coercive power of the law. People who live in a 
desegregated district are not required to remain there 
or to enroll their children in the public schools, but 
only to send their children to some school or to provide 
an equivalent educational opportunity. It is difficult 
to think of a more important or far-reaching policy issue 
in which the ability of citizens has been greater to 
avoid the law without breaking it. Citizens may avoid 
desegregation through the entirely legitimate expedients 
of making a residential move or choosing the private 
school alternative.
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In sum, the Supreme Court's desegregation mandate was not 
perceived by many as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. Southern 
reaction, the only region of the nation initially affected by Brown, 
was generally unfavorable. Thus, in order to implement desegregation 
policy, coercion was required. In fact, Rodgers and Bullock (1976a) 
characterize desegregation implementation as a process of "coercion to 
compliance." Before reviewing the various approaches employed to 
implement desegregation policy, a brief introduction to implementation 
theory is presented.
Implementation Theory
The study of public policy has shifted from a focus on 
policy formulation and enactment to the implementation of policy. The 
rationale for this change of focus is relatively straightforward; there 
may be considerable slippage between policy outputs and policy impacts 
(see Nachmias, 1979: 3). Or, as Dye notes, "No longer do we assume 
that once we pass a law, establish a bureaucracy, and spend money, . . . 
the purpose of these acts will be achieved and the results will be what 
we expect them to be (Dye, 1976: 95).
Implementation theory is still in the developmental stage.
In fact. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 449) state that "at present we 
know relatively little about the process of policy implementation."
In the past few years, however, efforts to provide conceptual frameworks 
to guide the study of the policy implementation process have been made. 
Bardach (1977: 40) attributes the earliest attempt to "conceptualize 
the 'implementation process' as a distinctive social and political
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phenomenon" to Bunker (1972). Bunker characterized the implementation 
process as occurring in a three dimensional space defined by issue 
salience, power resources, and agreement. In order to achieve success­
ful implementation, the "massing of assent" among key actors is required.
Based upon a review of three general bodies of literature—  
organizational theory (e.g., Kaufman, 1971; Etzioni, 1964), judicial 
impact studies (e.g., Krislov, 1965; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971), and 
studies of intergovernmental relations (e.g., Bailey and Mosher, 1968; 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 463) have 
developed a model that identifies six types of factors that may affect 
implementation success. The six factors include: policy standards and 
objectives; policy resources; interorganizational communication and 
enforcement activities; characteristics of the implementing agencies; 
economic, social, and political conditions; and the disposition of 
implementors. While the authors acknowledge that their "model is 
relatively complex," they argue that "an examination of its several 
linkages will lead to more systematic explanations of policy perfor­
mance. . . . assuming satisfactory indicators [can] be constructed 
and appropriate data collected" (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 478, 462).
Sabatier and Mazmanlan (1980: 540) are critical of Van Meter 
and Van Horn's implementation framework. They state the framework 
"suffers from some of the traditional defects of abstract systems models. 
Many of the factors in [the] 'model,' while useful in orienting one's 
thinking, are essentially amorphous categories rather than variables 
that can be easily operationalized." Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 540) 
argue that "second-generation" implementation frameworks should:
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(1) place more of an emphasis on "exploring the linkage between indivi­
dual behavior and the political, economic, and legal context in which 
it occurs," (2) consider the capacity of a statute to determine the 
actors involved in the implementation process and the "probable policy 
predispositions of implementation officials," and (3) address the 
"'tractability' or solvability of the problem(s) addressed by a public 
policy."
Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) analysis of the Economic 
Development Administration's (EDA) employment effort in Oakland is 
perhaps one of the best known case studies detailing the complexity 
of the policy implementation process. According to Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1973: xv):
Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly 
or not, policies point to a chain of causation between 
initial conditions and future consequences. If X, then Y. 
Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, 
the initial conditions are created. X now exists. Pro­
grams make the theories operational by forgoing the first 
link in the causal chain connecting actions to objectives. 
Given X, we act to obtain Y. Implementation, then, is 
the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain 
so as to obtain the desired results.
The authors note, however, that three factors may create 
"knots" in this causal chain and impede implementation success: 
multiplicity of participants, multiplicity of perspectives, and multi­
plicity of decision points. These problems are especially troublesome 
in implementing school desegregation policy. A complex cast of actors 
defines the desegregation milieu, and each group of actors may view 
desegregation from a different perspective. For example, the courts 
are charged with the responsibility of making sure the letter of the
51
law as espoused in Brown is realized. Federal bureaucracies are respon­
sible for judging the adequacy of local plans and based on their evalua­
tion either granting or withholding federal monies. Local school offi­
cials are responsible for the formulation and/or implementation of 
desegregation orders within the classroom. Finally, parents are respon­
sible for the safety of their children and securing for them a "quality 
education." The "Achilles Heel" of desegregation implementation is 
that the values held by one group of actors may not coincide with those 
held by another group. School officials attuned to the "general will" 
of the populace or community elites may resist desegregation efforts and 
resort to delaying tactics in implementing court imposed desegregation 
orders. Desegregation thus becomes a political process, a process 
where values are authoritatively imposed and compliance is forced.
Crowfoot and Chesler (1981: 227-291) have identified four 
specific desegregation related implementation problems— problems of 
mission, power, structure, and resources. Problems of mission primarily 
concern the role and purpose of education. From a broad normative 
perspective our educational system can be viewed either "as an instru­
ment of mass democracy, as a way of freeing all our people from the 
constraining limitations of social birth and background," or as an 
"instrument of continuing elite rule, as a covert way of channeling 
and maintaining inequities of birth across succeeding generations" 
(Crowfoot and Chesler, 1981: 277). At a more micro level, educational 
professionals may view the educational process from different per­
spectives— from a strong emphasis on teaching basic skills, to keeping 
youth off the streets, to institutionalizing innovative and novel
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teaching methods. School desegregation produces a new "mix" of 
students and teachers. And competing cultural values as well as 
conflicting ideas about the purpose of education are likely to emerge 
in this new more heterogeneous population.
School desegregation is a racial as well as an educational 
process. Thus, community racial attitudes and local power structures 
may affect desegregation implementation. Historically, local school 
systems have been largely controlled by community elites. These 
community elites "typically represent the dominant coalition in school 
boards and other groups that have substantial power to decide on school 
policies. . . . Segregation has resulted from well-organized groups 
exerting their will on school policies" (Crowfoot and Chesler, 1981:
280).
The third school desegregation-related implementation problem 
identified by Crowfoot and Chesler (1981: 285-286) is structure:
The school organization is a highly complex and 
differentiated structure, with many different hierarchical 
levels. In the case of authoritative decisions, for 
instance, the decision must pass from the school board to 
the local superintendent, to central office staffs, to 
principals, to teachers, to its final impact on students.
At each step a policy decision may be reinterpreted and 
modified, implemented or not implemented. Furthermore, 
the number of steps in this command system blurs the 
responsibility for carrying out official orders.
As a result, remedial actions required to correct implementation problems
are difficult to formulate since the source of or level at which non-
compliance is occurring is hard to isolate.
Finally, "many observers of school desegregation processes 
indicate that educators and communities do not have the requisite
53
resources to make a success of desegregation. Money, good will, energy, 
materials, personnel, and skill are all part of the resource base that 
often is lacking" (Crowfoot and Chesler, 1981: 289). Without appropriate 
resources, both fiscal and human, school desegregation may be viewed as 
merely "symbolic," a policy that serves only to placate those denied 
equal educational opportunities. Given these problems in implementing 
school desegregation as a public policy, a brief review of approaches 
employed to effectuate school desegregation is appropriate.
Implementation Approaches
Several approaches to foster compliance and implement school 
desegregation policy are available. Yudof (1981) identifies four 
approaches. The first approach is labelled organizational development 
and is typical of the initial strategy followed to implement the Brown 
decision. Rather than a strong emphasis on coercion, the organizational 
development approach was based on consensus and a normative commitment 
to school desegregation. A "bottom-up" strategy which required coopera­
tion among key policy makers such as judges, lawyers, interest groups, 
and local school officials was viewed as the appropriate strategy for 
achieving school desegregation. Unfortunately, the approach proved 
only slightly productive in reducing racial isolation. General citizen 
disapproval of the school desegregation process was too strong. Local 
school officials as well as many southern judges simply did not have 
the will to challenge overt community resistance.
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ushered in a 
new approach to school desegregation implementation— systems management.
54
The systems management approach was aimed at achieving one primary goal, 
the mixing of races in local schools. No longer was the goal to create 
a consensus among key policy makers; "goal-directed behavior, account­
ability, strategic planning, and decision rules" became the key words of 
the day (Yudof, 1981: 252-253). In order to reduce racial isolation, a 
"top-down" strategy was followed. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 a federal bureaucracy was created in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare to formulate desegregation guidelines, file discrim­
ination suits on behalf of litigants, and evaluate the adequacy of local 
desegregation plans. The bureaucracy had the power to withhold federal 
monies if school districts failed to comply with desegregation orders.
In 1965 and 1966, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a 
series of decisions that required southern school districts to follow 
HEW guidelines when formulating desegregation plans. Finally, in 1968, 
the Supreme Court in Green declared that "freedom-of-choice" as a 
desegregation strategy was generally unacceptable; school boards were 
ordered to develop plans that resulted in redefining the racial composi­
tion of schools and were ordered to develop plans that promised to 
work immediately. This top-down approach to school desegregation 
was based to a large degree on coercion. Noncompliance could result 
in loss of financial resources, court-imposed desegregation plans, a 
court appointed consultant to formulate a plan, and/or the issuing of 
contempt of court charges against local school officials.
The systems management approach was instrumental in breaking 
down entrenched southern school desegregation resistance and was 
successful in achieving one of the basic goals of school desegregation.
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racial balancing (the letter of the law). But the approach, which is 
a commonly employed strategy followed by the courts today, falls short 
in facilitating the achievement of more nebulous goals such as improving 
race relations or facilitating within-school desegregation (the spirit 
of the law).
Overlapping systems management was another implementation 
approach— bureaucratic processes. This approach is based on the premise 
that judges act as political referees and possess considerable discre­
tionary power. For example, with its decision in Swann (1971), the 
Supreme Court began to place a heavier emphasis on the remedial powers 
of lower court judges and advanced the notion that different local condi­
tions may require different types of remedies. Yudof (1981: 257) 
suggests that because of the discretionary power of the Court, "tremen­
dous variation in remedies in factually indistinguishable circumstances" 
has resulted.
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980: 99-100) highlight the discre­
tionary power lower court judges may exercise in implementing school 
desegregation policy. They compare the approach taken by Judge Weigel 
in San Francisco and Judge Garrity in Boston. Judge Weigel "left 
implementation in the hands of those formally charged with the respon­
sibility for running the school system" (p. 99). In contrast. Judge 
Garrity created a special Department of Implementation in Boston that 
was directly accountable to the Court. "In effect. Judge Garrity 
and his appointees became both the desegregation policy-makers and 
implementors for the Boston schools" (p. 100).
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The application of the bureaucratic processes model is per­
haps best typified with respect to court rulings on metropolitan deseg­
regation plans. In Milliken v. Bradley (1974: 738) the Court ruled that 
"the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." The 
courts, therefore, have considerable latitude in tailoring and requiring 
plans that fit local conditions and perceived inequities.
The final approach to implement school desegregation is con­
flict and bargaining. Instead of a top-down process where decisions are 
made at higher levels and forced upon sub-national actors, the conflict 
and bargaining model assumes that:
A series of complex bargains is a manifestation of the 
implementation process, and no single set of purposes and 
no single definition of success is adopted. The process 
is one of mutual adjustment, as the parties bargain within 
legal constraints (Yudof, 1981: 257).
The process of implementation is largely incremental in nature as deseg­
regation actors struggle to achieve school desegregation through a 
series of bargains and compromises.
S u m m a ry
In order for school desegregation to be realized a conversion 
process must take place, a policy must be implemented. And implementing 
school desegregation policy is not an easy task. The nature of the 
policy— major change/low consensus— impedes policy goal success. The 
review of general factors associated with policy implementation as well 
as the discussion of four specific approaches followed to implement 
school desegregation policy suggests that three types of influences 
may bear directly upon desegregation success. First, Van Meter and
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Van Horn (1975: 466) suggest that "successful implementation often 
requires institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher 
authorities . . . may increase the likelihood that implementors . . . 
will act in a manner consistent with a policy's standard and objectives." 
In other words, "incentives to promote compliance with policy decisions" 
are often required (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980: 540). Yudof's (1981) 
review of approaches to implement school desegregation policy found that 
after early attempts to develop a normative commitment to the school 
desegregation process failed, incentives to desegregate came in the form 
of coercion, both from the Office of Civil Rights through enforcement 
activities and from the courts. This "top-down" strategy was success­
ful in achieving the first goal of school desegregation— eliminating 
dual school systems in the South. Thus, extralocal pressure may be 
considered one of the primary factors affecting school desegregation 
implementation efforts.
Second, Yudof (1981) suggests that after Swann, the Supreme 
Court as well as lower courts began to consider with increasing 
frequency local environmental conditions when formulating desegregation 
strategies. In Sabatier's and Mazmanian's (1980: 541) words, the 
"tractability" or solvability of the school desegregation process came 
to the forefront: Different local conditions could require different 
types of remedies. School districts differ in size, organizational 
structure, percentage of minority students, etc. In short, school 
district characteristics may affect desegregation implementation.
Finally, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980), and Yudof (1981) suggest that general public opinion
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and implementor attitudes may impinge upon the implementation process. 
For example, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 472) find that implementa­
tion may be affected by:
(1) the extent to which social conditions are affected by 
the implementation of a policy;
(2) the nature of public opinion and the saliency of a 
policy issue;
(3) the extent to which private interest groups mobilize 
in support or opposition to a policy;
(4) whether local elites favor or oppose policy implem­
entation; and
(5) opposition or support for a policy on the part of 
policy implementors.
Similarly, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 542) delineate 
several "non-statutory" variables related to the implementation process: 
media attention, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency 
groups, and commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials.
With respect to school desegregation, these influences 
identified by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Sabatier and Mazmanian
(1980) might be viewed as "mediating" or "process" variables. That is, 
given external and school district constraints, desegregation actors 
such as school officials (desegregation implementors), community elites 
(media, interest groups), and the general public at large must struggle 
to implement school desegregation through a series of bargains and 
compromises (Yudof, 1981).
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In sum, implementing school desegregation policy is a complex 
process. And this review of the implementation literature suggests that 
a number of factors may affect the process. Specifically, external 
pressure in the form of coercion, local environmental influences, and 
community and elite reaction may help define implementation success. A 
number of desegregation studies have attempted to describe or explain 
the relationship between these factors and desegregation success. The 
following section provides a critical assessment of these studies.
The Desegregation Literature:
A Critical Appraisal
The school desegregation literature primarily consists of two 
types of studies: case studies^ and comparative analyses. "A case study 
is an in-depth examination of a particular instance of something. This 
is in contrast to an aggregation of characteristics of many instances" 
(Hofferbert, 1974: 89). While both types of studies enhance our under­
standing of school desegregation efforts, singularly neither approach 
adequately captures the complexity of the desegregation process.
Case Studies
According to Rist (1979: 6-7) "the mosaic of school desegrega­
tion in the United States confounds efforts at grand generalization."
He argues that to a large degree desegregation studies "have not been 
grounded in the analysis of the day-to-day working out of school deseg­
regation." As a remedy, Rist advocates the use of case studies to 
capture the "realities" of school desegregation implementation.
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Social scientists have performed case studies for years. In 
fact, Edwards (1980: 7) notes that "most implementation studies have 
been of the case study variety." The primary purpose of a case study 
is to describe a phenomenon or event. The typical desegregation case 
study provides some or all of the following types of information:
o the stimulus for the initiation of local desegregation 
actions;
o a historical account of desegregation litigation and 
race relations in the district; 
o a description of the local socioeconomic environment;
o school board, local elite, black and white community
reaction to desegregation efforts; 
o an assessment of what happened as a result of deseg­
regation action.
The major advantage of the case study lies in its richness of 
detail (Labovitz and Hagedorn, 1976: 79). The major limitation of the 
case study is inherent in the approach itself, "it is logically invalid
to generalize on the basis of a particular case" (Garson, 1971: 70).
Nevertheless, case studies are particularly useful in suggesting 
hypotheses for further research (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976: 42).
For example, after reviewing the effects of nine demographic, socio-
2economic, and political variables on school desegregation across 27
3desegregation case studies, Fitzgerald (1975: 35-39) suggests that 
several tentative propositions emerge from a review of the case study 
literature.
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o The single most important factor explaining school 
desegregation is the local school board. Assertive 
school boards facilitate the desegregation process, 
weak school boards impede progress, 
o School superintendents play a similar role; if they 
exert leadership, desegregation success is enhanced, 
o Other factors which facilitate desegregation progress 
include: supportive political and local elites, favor­
able communitywide attitudes, black activism, and extra­
local pressure, 
o Factors impeding desegregation success are: a hostile 
local climate, a large black population or school 
enrollment, low community social status, and community 
residential segregation.
Fitzgerald (1975: 87, 39) notes, however, that "cumulatively 
they [the case studies] fail to provide reliable, systematic, generaliz- 
able information concerning public school desegregation across the United 
States. . . . [E]ach of the nine factors needs to be taken out of the 
case study context which has made a preliminary determination of its 
utility and subjected to the more rigorous test of systematic compara­
tive inquiry."
C o m p a r a t i v e  S t u d i e s
In contrast to the case study where the basic goal is to 
describe the school desegregation implementation process, a comparative 
desegregation study attempts to explain desegregation success. A
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comparative approach to the study of political phenomena has its roots 
in the "behavioral" (scientific movement) that developed following World 
War II (see Charlesworth, 1967). As applied to school desegregation, a 
comparative study attempts to test hypotheses and discover patterned 
regularities among a group of cases (school districts); an attempt is 
made to identify those factors (determinants) that impede or facilitate 
desegregation success.
Three types of variables related to school desegregation 
emerge from comparative analyses: community and school district char­
acteristics, local political influences, and extralocal pressure.
With respect to community and school district characteristics, previous 
research suggests, for example, that residential segregation (Farley, 
1975b; Taeuber, 1979), large proportions of black pupils (Dye, 1968; 
Farley, 1975a), and a large school enrollment (Giles, 1975a; Giles and 
Walker, 1975; Coleman, 1976), impede desegregation progress. In 
addition to these community and school district influences, local 
political structure and climate may affect desegregation efforts. For 
example, supportive local elite attitudes (Kirby, et al., 1973), lack 
of public opposition to desegregation (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a), 
insulated school boards (Crain and Vanecko, 1968; Dye, 1968), and the 
hiring of a new school superintendent (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a) 
have been found to enhance desegregation success. Finally, the signi­
ficant impact of federal pressure on the desegregation process, 
especially in the South, has been well documented (see Farley, 1975a; 
Giles, 1975a; Fitzgerald, 1975; Rodgers, 1974-75; Rodgers and Bullock, 
1976a, 1976b; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b; Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980).
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Critical Assessment of the Literature
While case studies provide rich detail about the process of 
implementing school desegregation policy, "case studies of implementation 
have not systematically identified or analyzed the factors that are 
critical in the implementation of public policy" (Edwards, 1980: 7). 
Rather, findings are impressionistic, speculative, and idiosyncratic.
In contrast, a comparative aggregate approach to the study of school 
desegregation facilitates the systematic identification and analysis 
of factors that may affect school desegregation, but for the most part 
comparative studies have failed to capture the complexity of the 
desegregation implementation process (Crain and Hawley, 1981: 5). An 
example will illustrate this point.
Fitzgerald's (1975) comparative analysis of desegregation 
change in 205 U.S. cities between the years 1968 and 1972 is one of the 
most theoretically sound attempts to explain public school desegregation. 
Based on a "penetrated systems framework" (see Figure 3), Fitzgerald 
conceptualized the school desegregation implementation process as 
being affected by five components: federal, state, local environmental, 
local political, and local school influences. And while Fitzgerald's 
modelling efforts should be applauded, since most comparative studies 
are not based upon relatively comprehensive conceptual frameworks"
(Crain and Hawley, 1981: 5), his research effort is deficient in two 
important respects. First, many of the 205 school districts included 
in the analysis did not formally initiate desegregation efforts during 
the 1968-1972 time span (for example, Denver, Baltimore, Boston, Lansing, 
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FIGURE 3. FITZGERALD'S PENETRATION SYSTEMS MODEL 
Source: Fitzgerald, 1975: 138.
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dependent variable which he calls "policy implementation" (see Figure 3, 
Block VI), is actually comprised of two separate dimensions, racial 
mix that occurred or did not occur as a result of planned desegregation 
and racial mix that occurred or did not occur for reasons other than 
planned change. Crain and Hawley (1981: 7-8) discuss the importance of 
keeping the two dimensions conceptually separate:
It is important to note that much of the research 
that asserts that it is about desegregation is about 
racially mixed schools and we do not know whether the racial 
mix was the consequence of planned desegregation. Indeed 
many of the best known studies (Coleman, et al., 1966;
St. John, 1975) do not distinguish between formal deseg­
regation and otherwise racially mixed schools. Desegrega­
tion is an identifiable social process that has a parti­
cular starting point and carries with it, in one measure 
or another, assumptions that change is required or 
desirable. To consider the experiences children, teachers 
and parents have in such a process to be the same as 
those they have in schools 'integrated' because of resid­
ential patterns or school district consolidation is a 
precarious assumption.
In brief, if one is interested in explaining the school desegregation
implementation process, cases included for analysis should be limited
to those actually involved in implementing a local school desegregation
plan.
Second, despite Fitzgerald's inclusion of three blocks of 
"local components" that are hypothesized to affect desegregation 
implementation, and over 70 indicators used to measure these influences, 
those factors that desegregation case studies specifically suggest 
affect desegregation implementation are not included for analysis.
For example, indicators of superintendent and school board desegregation 
support, citizen participation in the desegregation process, desegrega­
tion resistance, and community elite attitudes are absent. In addition.
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the effects that various desegregation strategies employed in school 
districts have on desegregation success are not tested.
The omission of these variables, however, can be understood on 
two accounts. First, traditional or standard data sources (e.g., U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Office of Civil Rights) simply do not provide such 
data. Second, "most comparative studies . . . [provide] little or no 
information as to which features of a desegregation plan can be mani­
pulated in order to minimize negative effects and maximize positive 
effects" (Rossell, 1978b: 158). Rossell (1978b: 162-177) also insists 
that white community attitudes and perhaps protest actions and leadership 
statements can affect desegregation implementation. Once again few 
comparative studies tap these potential influences (see for example.
Dye, 1968; Farley, 1975a; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b; Morgan and 
Fitzgerald, 1980). In short, the second criticism of the Fitzgerald 
model can be generalized to most comparative studies, but not all.
Perhaps the most notable exception is Rodgers and Bullock's
(1976a) study of school desegregation compliance in 31 Georgia school
districts. In this study the authors argue that school desegregation
implementation can best be understood using cost-benefit/compliance
theory. They state:
Citizens obey most laws because they perceive that the 
utilities of compliance outweigh the utilities of non- 
compliance. However, when citizens perceive that the 
utilities of the situation favor disobedience, they 
break the law (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a: 3).
Within the context of a cost-benefit interpretation of 
compliance, Rodgers and Bullock proceed to determine the predictors of 
school desegregation change (see Chapter 3). Using 1965-66 to 1973-74 
desegregation change measures the authors test five hypotheses:
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Progress in school desegregation was influenced by 
federal action.
Progress in school desegregation was associated with 
black pressure for compliance.
Progress in wchool desegregation was not impeded by 
organized white opposition.
The establishment of a private, segregated school 
was associated with progress in school desegregation. 
School superintendent change was associated with 
progress in school desegregation (Rodgers and 
Bullock, 1976; 37-40).
The results of their analyses support hypothesis one, three, 
and five. Contrary to expectations "black activity proved to be an 
indication of segregation rather than desegregation" (hypothesis 2; p. 
41) and "private schools were associated with segregation rather than 
desegregation" (hypothesis 4; p. 43). Rodgers and Bullock (1976a: 44) 
conclude :
Our findings yield support for a cost/benefit theory of 
compliance. School officials obeyed desegregation edicts 
only when the costs of noncompliance became high enough 
to outweigh other considerations. Change primarily 
occurred when federal coercion created pressures severe 
enough to compel desegregation. As one of our respondents 
said: 'We did just enough to stay out of jail. That's 
why segregation lasted so long.'
Rodgers and Bullock's contribution to the study of school 
desegregation is not limited to their research findings. In fact, the 
importance of their study transcends research findings in two ways. 
First, the authors develop a broad, integrative conceptual framework
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for understanding the school desegregation process (compliance theory). 
Second, the authors include in a comparative research design variables 
whose relationship with desegregation success had only been speculatively 
examined in case studies (black activism and organized white opposition). 
Rodgers and Bullock, therefore, were able to bridge the gap between what 
had previously been two disparate approaches to the study of school 
desegregation— case studies describing influences that may affect 
desegregation implementation and comparative studies systematically 
isolating the determinants of desegregation success.
The present study is based on the assumption that in order to 
understand more adequately the school desegregation implementation 
process, the research approach followed by Rodgers and Bullock is 
required. That is, those variables that desegregation case studies 
and aggregate analyses suggest may affect desegregation implementation 




As discussed above, for the most part previous desegregation 
research has failed to capture the complexity of the desegregation 
process. Comparative analyses have focused primarily on the impact 
that federal coercion and school district characteristics have on 
desegregation success. Desegregation case studies on the other hand 
detail the process of implementing school desegregation policy in 
school district X or Y, but the independent effects of those variables 
which case studies suggest affect desegregation implementation remain
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tentatively defined. A primary purpose of this study is to develop a 
research framework that will allow for the systematic, comparative 
analysis of variables that both previous case and aggregate studies 
suggest bear directly upon desegregation success.
Previous desegregation research as well as the implementation 
literature reviewed above suggests that school desegregation success 
may be affected by three types of general influences : external factors, 
school district characteristics, and a group of variables referred to 
here as desegregation process variables (implementor attitudes, community 
and elite attitudes). Figure 4 depicts the relationships among these 
fundamental forces and shows the indicators used to measure each type 
of influence.
The diagram suggests that two principal exogenous influences 
provide the impetus for desegregation action: (1) external pressure or 
conditions and (2) school district characteristics. These two basic 
elements not only affect school desegregation success directly but 
also may affect the process of implementing desegregation (e.g., 
degree of support or resistance from various community and elite actors, 
the type of desegregation strategy used to foster compliance and 
implement school desegregation). These three blocks of variables then 
are all presumed to help determine the degree to which a school 
district will be successful in reducing racial isolation. Likewise, 
this same group of factors, for the most part, plus desegregation 
change should contribute directly and indirectly to an assumed school 
desegregation outcome— white student enrollment decline. A discussion 
of the expected relationship of each predictor shown in Figure 4 with 
desegregation success and white enrollment change follows.
FIGURE 4. HEURISTIC MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION SUCCESS AND WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT CHANGE
III A
DESEGREGATION PROCESS VARIABLES
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Predictors of Desegregation Success
External Influences. Since southern school districts were 
the initial targets of school desegregation court orders and HEW 
enforcement activities and since previous research has shown that 
districts in the South have achieved greater desegregation success (see 
Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b):
Desegregation success will be greater in southern 
than in nonsouthern school districts.
Federal coercion represents the second basic external 
influence hypothesized to affect desegregation progress. And previous 
research suggests that federal coercion is an important predictor of 
desegregation success (see Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a; Farley, 1975a; 
Giles, 1975a). Thus,
Hg The greater the federal coercion the greater the 
reduction in racial isolation 
School District Characteristics. Previous research also 
suggests that certain school district characteristics may affect 
desegregation success. Specifically, since districts which are county- 
wide in area tend to experience less white student outmigration than 
do citywide districts, desegregation success may be enhanced (see 
Hawley, et al., 1981; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1977a). In 
addition. Dye (1968) and Farley (1975a) have found that large proportions 
of black students impede desegregation success, and Giles (1975a) and 
Fitzgerald and Morgan (1977b) suggest that large districts (based on 
enrollment) experience less success in reducing racial isolation than 
do smaller ones. Therefore:
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Countywide school districts will experience greater 
desegregation success than will noncountywide 
districts.
Districts with lower percentages of minority students 
will achieve greater desegregation success than 
districts with high minority enrollments.
Small districts (based on enrollment) will achieve 
more desegregation success than large districts.
Desegregation Process Variables. The implementation literature 
reviewed above (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
1980) as well as desegregation case studies (see Fitzgerald, 1975) also 
suggests that support and attitudes of policy implementors (e.g., 
school superintendents, school board members), community elites, and 
the general public at large may impinge on the implementation process. 
Thus :
H g D e s e g r e g a t i o n  s u c c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  g r e a t e r  i n  d i s t r i c t s  
w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  a n d  s c h o o l  b o a r d  
s u p p o r t  f o r  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  e f f o r t s .
Desegregation success should be greater in districts 
where community elite attitudes favor desegregation 
actions.
H g D e s e g r e g a t i o n  s u c c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  g r e a t e r  i n  d i s t r i c t s  
w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  a c t i v e  c i t i z e n  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  
i m p l e m e n t i n g  a  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  p l a n .
In addition, Rodgers and Bullock (1976a) have found that the hiring of 
a new school superintendent and school board insulation facilitates 
desegregation success. Therefore,
73
Hg Districts that hire a new superintendent immediately 
before desegregation activities begin should 
experience greater desegregation success.
H^q The greater the insulation of school board members 
the greater the desegregation success.
Finally, while systematic research on the effectiveness of 
various desegregation strategies (e.g., open enrollment, rezoning, 
pairing/clustering, etc.) in reducing racial isolation is quite limited, 
research by Wegner and Mercer (1975) has found that the number and kinds 
of desegregation strategies employed by a district are unrelated to 
desegregation success. Thus,
The use of one kind of desegregation technique is
not associated with a greater degree of desegrega­
tion success than the use of another kind.
Predictors of White Enrollment Change
A question that also receives considerable attention in 
comparative desegregation studies concerns the relationship between 
desegregation efforts and white student enrollment decline: Does 
school desegregation lead to the exodus of white students from a 
school district? The data collected here provides an excellent 
opportunity to test the relationship between desegregation efforts 
and white flight as well as to determine the effects of external,
school district, and desegregation process variables on this unintended
impact of school desegregation. The expected relationship of the 
variables shown in Figure 4 with white enrollment decline are as 
follows.
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External Influences. Four types of external influences are 
hypothesized to affect white enrollment decline— region, federal 
coercion, suburban escape, and pre-implementation white school enroll­
ment decline. While Rossell (1981: 36) suggests that the "evidence 
is inconclusive as to whether southern city school districts have 
greater white enrollment decline than northern school districts," 
research by Coleman, et al. (1975) has found that white student loss is 
greater from southern than from northern school districts. Thus,
Southern districts will suffer more white enroll­
ment decline than nonsouthern districts.
Armor (1980: 197) argues that court-ordered desegregation plans 
may result in more white flight than board-ordered plans, primarily 
because court-ordered plans normally require more extensive pupil 
reassignments. Therefore,
E g  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f e d e r a l  c o e r c i o n  t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  w h i t e  e n r o l l m e n t  d e c l i n e .
Suburban escape is an indicator of the availability of suburban 
neighborhoods to which white families can flee. The hypothesis is that.
T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s u b u r b s  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  w h i t e  f l i g h t .
Finally, pre-implementation white school enrollment decline 
is included as a measure to control for pre-desegregation white enroll­
ment declines. The expectation is that.
D i s t r i c t s  l o s i n g  w h i t e  s t u d e n t s  p r i o r  t o  d e s e g r e g a ­
t i o n  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  w i l l  s u f f e r  m o r e  w h i t e  s t u d e n t  
o u t m i g r a t i o n  t h a n  d i s t r i c t s  w h e r e  p r e - i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
l o s s e s  a r e  s m a l l e r .
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School District Characteristics. The second group of 
influences includes school district characteristics— type of school 
district (noncountywide/countywide), minority enrollment (percentage), 
and size of school district (total student enrollment). Previous 
research suggests that white enrollment decline should be greater from 
(1) noncountywide districts, (2) large school districts, and (3) districts 
with high minority enrollments (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1977a; 
Giles, 1978; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977d). Rossell (1981: 48), in 
particular emphasizes the continuing loss of white students suffered by 
big city school districts with large minority enrollments. Therefore,
W h i t e  s t u d e n t  l o s s  w i l l  b e  g r e a t e r  f r o m  n o n c o u n t y w i d e  
t h a n  f r o m  c o u n t y w i d e  d i s t r i c t s .
Hg L a r g e  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t s  w i l l  e x p e r i e n c e  m o r e  w h i t e  
s t u d e n t  l o s s e s  t h a n  w i l l  s m a l l e r  o n e s .
Hy White enrollment decline will be greater from
districts with high minority enrollments than from 
districts with lower minority enrollments.
Desegregation Process Variables. The third group of variables 
included as potential determinants of white student outmigration include 
superintendent and school board support, elite support, citizen partici­
pation, desegregation resistance, hiring a new school superintendent, 
school board insulation, and desegregation change. According to 
Hawley, et al. (1981: 61-65) school district and other local leaders 
must deal with the anxieties and fears associated with the school 
desegregation process. Thus, if school and community leaders support 
desegregation white student withdrawal should be lessened. In contrast.
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Rossell (1981: 41) suggests that negative reaction and activities 
(desegregation resistance) can precipitate white flight. Similarly, 
the employment of a new school superintendent is hypothesized to be 
positively associated with enrollment loss. Hiring of an outsider may 
be seen by some as an indication that significant change is in the 
offing, which may frighten those committed to the status quo. Indeed, 
the actions of such officials may run counter to the dominant views 
held by community residents and elites, creating a controversial and 
politicized desegregation milieu (see Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a). In 
addition, the degree to which school board members are insulated is 
hypothesized to be positively related to white student losses. As 
Rodgers and Bullock (1976a) note, insulated board members are more 
likely to respond to extralocal pressures. Finally, a measure of the 
absolute change in the level of segregation pre- and post-implementation 
is included as a predictor of enrollment loss. The expectation is that 
desegregation change is positively related to white student losses 
during the year of desegregation implementation (Rossell, 1981; Armor, 
1980). Thus, the hypotheses to be tested are:
H g T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  s c h o o l  d e s e g ­
r e g a t i o n  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  a n d  s c h o o l  
b o a r d  m e m b e r s  t h e  l e s s  t h e  w h i t e  e n r o l l m e n t  l o s s .
Hg The greater the citizen involvement in the deseg­
regation process the less the white enrollment loss. 
H^g White enrollment decline will be less from districts 
where community elites support the desegregation 
effort.
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The greater the desegregation resistance the 
greater the white enrollment decline.
Districts who hired a new school superintendent will 
suffer more white student losses than those who did 
not.
The greater the degree to which school board members 
are insulated, the greater the white enrollment 
decline.
Desegregation change should be positively related to 
white student loss during desegregation implementation. 
Before closing this discussion of the expected relationships 
of the variables shown in Figure 4 with desegregation change and white 
enrollment decline, it might be noted that Chapter 4 contains a lengthy 
discussion of desegregation strategies and desegregation success.
Chapter 5 elaborates upon the relationships of the variables with 
desegregation change, and Chapter 6 provides a background introduction 
to the white enrollment decline literature. The discussion now turns to 
the methodology used to gather data needed to operationalize many of 
the predictors— the case survey method.
The Case Survey Method
While Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Sabatier and Mazmanian
(1981) suggest that such variables as implementor policy support, and 
community and elite attitudes may affect implementation success, the 
remaining problem is how to collect data needed to operationalize these 
influences. As noted above, data such as these are not to be found in
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traditional reference sources. But as Fitzgerald's (1975) review of 
the case study literature found, desegregation case studies themselves 
often provide such information. What is needed is a data collection 
technique which will allow the systematic extraction of relevant 
information from case studies. The case survey method is one such 
technique.
The case survey method permits the extraction of relevant 
material from a group of cases in a reliable and replicable manner.
Based upon predetermined parameters, the approach requires a researcher/ 
analyst to assemble the available material on school desegregation for 
as many large districts as possible. The procedure then requires the 
analyst to answer the same set of questions using a structured instrument 
for each case study. The questions are closed-ended so that the 
answers can be quantified and systematically analysed. While no check 
can be made on the accuracy of the original case study, the reliability 
of the analyst-reader's responses can be determined by using another 
analyst and calculating measures of intercoder reliability. The 
following chapter discusses the advantages, limitations, and use of the 
case survey method. In addition, the source of each variable and its 
operationalization are also presented.
Summary
The primary purpose of this study is to assess the independent 
effect of variables representing three types of influences— external, 
school district, and desegregation process— on two school desegregation 
outcomes, desegregation success and white student enrollment decline.
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The variables included in the analysis are among those that the imple­
mentation literature, in general, and desegregation case studies and 
aggregate analyses, specifically, suggest affect desegregation success. 
The impact of some variables that previous research has found to be 
related to desegregation success and white enrollment loss, however, are 
not tested. For example, research by Rossell (1981: 31) finds that the 
number of whites versus blacks reassigned as part of a desegregation 
plan may impede desegregation success and increase white flight. Efforts 
to collect reassignment data for inclusion in the present study were 
unsuccessful. In order to collect data needed to operationalize many 
of the variables included in the study, the case survey method is 
employed. The discussion now turns to the characteristics of this 
data collection and aggregation technique.
NOTES
1. Broh and Trent (1981: 1) refer to this literature more generally 
as "qualitative literature and expert opinion." They state, '
"The term 'qualitative literature' refers to books, articles, 
reviews, and commentaries that embody judgments, interpretations, 
perceptions or opinions that are not directly linked to statistical 
data. Where empirical findings are included, they are used 
descriptively rather than analytically."
2. The nine variables are: school board support, community climate, 
black population, community socioeconomic characteristics, residence 
patterns, political process, black action, local leadership, and 
extra local pressure.
3. The 27 case studies reviewed were: Tipton (1953); Allen Report 
(1964); Hauser (1965); Lang and Lang (1965); Luchterwand and 
Weller (1965); Pettigrew (1965); Dentier (1966); Swanson (1966); 
Beker (1967); La Frankie (1967); Bouma and Hoffman (1968); Heifetz 
(1968); Hendrick (1968); Rogers and Swanson (1968); Stout and 
Stroufe (1968); Warshaver (1968); Dammerell (1968); Sullivan (1969); 
Inger (1969); Noland (1969); Wogaman (1969); Rogers (1970); Bagwell 






The analytic goal of this research project is to examine 
systematically the impact of three types of independent variables—  
external influences, school district characteristics, and desegregation 
process influences (including desegregation techniques)— on two 
school desegregation outcomes: the success of school districts in 
ending racial isolation (desegregation success) and white enrollment 
decline (generally referred to as "white flight"). This chapter out­
lines the research design developed to pursue this goal. The chapter 
is divided into three parts. Part one describes the procedures by 
which the data were gathered. Part two presents the independent and 
dependent variables used in the analysis. Finally, part three discusses 
the statistical methods employed to analyze the data.
Case Survey Method (GSM)
At least three approaches are available for aggregating 
previous research— prepositional, cluster, and case survey. Of the 
three approaches the prepositional method is the most commonly employed; 
it is based on collecting statements of relationships from a set of
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studies. The analyst assembles a group of well-known studies, 
"summarizes the findings, and weaves an argument about what statements 
of relationship are supported by the evidence" (Lucus, 1974a: 3). One 
of the basic goals of the approach is to resolve anomalous findings 
among studies through theory refinement and/or by pointing out method­
ological inconsistencies across studies. The propositional method is 
widely used in psychological research.
In contrast, the cluster and case survey methods are rarely 
used. Both of these approaches treat previous research as a source of 
data rather than as a source of conclusions or propositions. The 
cluster approach is based on the premise that "little headway can be 
made by pooling the words in the conclusions of a set of studies.
Rather, progress will only come when we are able to pool the original 
data from the studies in a systematic manner" (Light and Smith, 1971: 
443). The approach necessitates that data from several studies be 
pooled; the combined data are viewed as a sample of the larger popula­
tion. Findings emerging from the analysis of the combined data should 
reflect those found in individual studies (see McClintock, et al. , 1979) 
The principal impediment to the use of the cluster method is that 
the original studies must have been quantitative in nature and that the 
same or highly comparable variables must have been used across studies 
(Lucus, 1974a: 7).
The final approach is known as the case survey method. This 
method enables disjointed case studies to be analyzed in common con­
ceptual terms. According to Lucus (1974a: 8):
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To distill the lessons from these case experiences, the 
analyst prepares a set of questions to determine the 
presence and intensity of common characteristics, events, 
and outcomes contained in each of the case studies. The 
possible answers to the questions are carefully structured
and defined so that the analyst, after reading the case
materials, can readily determine the most appropriate 
response. The answers to these questions are determined 
in the same manner for each of the cases that have been 
selected for study. The results can then be put in a 
machine-readable form and analyzed.
One of the earliest applications of the case survey method 
occurred in 1972. In that year, Rand was requested by HEW to draw
together existing knowledge about the value of alternative citizen
participation organizational forms from the literature (see Yin, Lucus, 
Szanton, and Spindler, 1973). After reviewing 51 case studies, the 
research team found that "organizations where the citizens had 
'substantial influence' in the investigation of complaints were much 
more likely to be successful in having their views about services 
implemented into policy" (Lucus, 1974b: 5). The 51 case studies 
individually had, for the most part, not suggested a significant 
relationship between the complaint process and implementation process. 
Reflecting on the study Lucus (1974b: 5) states, "the case study survey 
can uncover factors that a simple reading of the cases could have 
altogether missed."
The case survey method has also been used in two recent 
studies sponsored by the National Science Foundation. Yin and Yates
(1975) employed the method to analyze the urban service decentralization 
process across 254 case studies. And based on 140 case studies, Yin, 
Heald, and Vogel (1977) utilized the approach to study the propensity 
of state and local governments to adopt technological innovations.
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A discussion of the salient features (i.e., advantages, limitations, 
and decision rules) of the case survey approach follows.
Advantages
The principal advantage to be gained through the use of the 
CSM is that the richness of detail found in most studies can be 
captured and systematically converted into quantitative data. Other 
advantages of the method include:
o the CSM forces the research analyst to establish
clear decision rules concerning the quality, inclusion, 
and exclusion of cases to be analyzed (Yin, Bingham, 
and Heald, 1976);
o the CSM provides a framework by which a conceptually 
related but methodologically disparate set of cases 
can be systematically analyzed (McClintock, et al.,
1979);
o the CSM is a relatively inexpensive way to aggregate 
existing research (Lucus, 1974b).
Limitations
While the case survey approach offers considerable promise as 
a method for systematically examining a case study literature, the use 
of case studies as a source of information poses several problems.
Three such problems merit special attention.
First, the accuracy and validity of findings reported in case 
studies cannot be verified and can be only partially checked. Second, 
those studies that define a case study literature may represent "a 
nonrandom sample of observations of the phenomena under study" (Lucus, 
1974b: v). Finally, analyst-readers' responses to items on the case 
survey instrument may be inadvertently biased owing to misunderstanding 
of the concepts being operationalized.
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To address these potential problems and as a prerequisite to 
using the CSM, a set of decision rules ;aust be developed to insure a 
rigorous case survey.
Decision Buies
Decision rules are of two general types: (1) rules to aid in 
the selection of and search for case studies; and (2) rules detailing 
concept specification and checklist reliability (Lucus, 1974b: 6).
In the present study, a four-point set of decision rules was 
established for case study selection:
(1) A district's desegregation effort had to be documented 
in a published or unpublished report (e.g., book, 
journal article. Civil Rights Commission report, 
court case). Expert testimonials or interviews with 
local officials could not serve as the primary data 
source.
(2) The major desegregation effort of a district must 
have occurred between 1968 and 1976. (Data for the 
desegregation index and white school enrollment 
employed as dependent variables in the study are 
limited to this period.)
(3) The total school enrollment of the district had to 
exceed 20,000 students. The intent of the project 
was to include only "large" districts on the basis 
that more published information would be available 
than for small districts. In addition, research has
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shown that size of district may affect the desegrega­
tion process. Imposing a size limit then precludes 
a perhaps incongruous comparison between a group of 
very large and very small districts.
(4) The minority percentage in the school system had to 
equal or be greater than 10 percent for at least one 
of the years between 1968-1976. Essentially, the 10 
percent minimum was established on the assumption 
that districts with a very small proportion minority 
are not likely to face the same issues and problems 
in desegregating that confront other districts.
Based on these case inclusion criteria, an exhaustive search 
for written material on large district desegregation, both published and 
unpublished, was undertaken. In addition to writing the 261 school 
districts with 1976 school enrollments exceeding 20,000, the following 
sources and agencies were consulted or solicited for research material:




4. National Institute of Education (NIE) library
5. regional offices of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights (USCCR)
6. state departments of education
7. state offices of human rights
8. various unpublished reports of the USCCR
9. all university-based Desegregation Assistance Centers
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Written contacts with school districts, in particular, resulted in 
identifying various individuals within or without the school system who 
might have useful information. A number of telephone calls were placed 
to various people such as directors of transportation for school dis­
tricts, district lawyers, and other academic-based researchers and 
research organizations.^ Such contacts did produce some written material 
(e.g., unpublished reports) that otherwise would not have been available.
In total, the search effort resulted in identifying 52 usable 
2case studies. These 52 cases represent the overwhelming majority of 
documented desegregation efforts conforming to the four-point criteria 
outlined above. However, since it is possible that a few cases might 
have been inadvertently overlooked, the 52 cases are viewed as a sample 
rather than a population. The references used to collect data for each 
of the 52 districts can be found in Appendix C.
The second general type of decision rule delineates concept
specification and checklist reliability. With respect to concept
specification, it is important to remember that the case survey approach,
like any other research methodology, is merely a tool designed to aid
in the collection of data. The method itself is not a substitute for
theory. Or, as Lucus (1974b: 19) states:
The greatest strengths and the fundamental weaknesses 
of the case survey method are the same: the almost 
infinite flexibility of the theories and concepts that 
can be studied. . . .  In practice, one cannot ask 
thousands upon thousands of questions of each case his­
tory, hoping to stumble across those mysterious factors 
that have a decisive influence. Some sense of theory is 
essential to bringing the inquiry into focus.
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A survey of previous school desegregation research findings 
suggests that three classes of variables may influence school desegrega­
tion success: (1) school district characteristics such as percent 
minority in the district and school district size; (2) external 
pressure in the form of court or HEW coercion; (3) desegregation process 
variables such as citizen participation, elite support, superintendent 
and school board support, specific desegregation techniques.
Unlike the first class of variables, school district character­
istics, concepts such as external pressure, citizen participation, elite 
support, and desegregation strategies are much more elusive and, 
therefore, more difficult to operationalize. Moreover, the effects of 
many of these variables on school desegregation, with the exception of 
external pressure and district characteristics are for the most part 
not tested in previous aggregate studies. Thus, the collection of 
desegregation process indicators became the central focus of the case 
survey instrument.
In preparing the school desegregation case survey instrument, 
technically called a "checklist," considerable time and thought was 
given to the questions to be included. Finally, after the original 
draft instrument was reviewed by a desegregation assistance center 
director and an outside consultant as well as tested by an analyst- 
reader, the case survey questionnaire was finalized.
The instrument was divided into four sections, with each 
section seeking a specific type of information. The four sections 
include :
89
(1) desegregation plan background questions (see Appendix 
A, questions 10-15b);
(2) questions concerning court involvement in the deseg­
regation process (see Appendix A, questions 16-17);
(3) questions seeking information about the desegregation 
plan techniques employed by districts (see Appendix 
A, questions 18-47);
(4) desegregation plan implementation questions (see 
Appendix A, questions 48-77)•
To insure that analyst-readers understood the concepts 
tapped by the various questions, a roundtable discussion was held in 
which each question was reviewed, discussed, and agreement on the 
meaning was reached. In addition, the two analyst-readers in charge 
of completing the checklists were instructed to complete the same 
three case surveys, discuss answers, and resolve differences in the
3meaning of questions.
Despite these preliminary procedures, as the project 
progressed additional clarification was required. As these occasions 
arose, written memos were prepared and distributed to the analyst- 
readers (see Exhibits A, B, and C), and a glossary of desegregation 
terms was prepared (see Appendix B). In short, every effort was made 
to familiarize the analyst-readers with the purpose and use of the 
CSM. The checklists as completed by the coders, however, were not 
accepted at face value. The CIM requires checklist reliability.
Reliability can be defined as "the degree to which separate, 
independent measurements or judgments of the same phenomena agree with
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EXHIBIT A
CASE SURVEY INSTRUMENT: 
DEFINITIONS OF SELECTED CONCEPTS/TERMS
Magnet-only plan. An essentially voluntary program under which parents 
may choose to send their children to a citywide or areawide school 
offering a special curriculum or educational program. Such magnet 
schools appear to be closely related to an open enrollment approach, 
since no mandatory reassignment is involved. Magnet-only plans thus 
depend on making such schools sufficiently attractive to induce 
parents to voluntarily leave their segregated neighborhood schools.
Magnet-mandatory plan. This form of magnet school is not optional.
The choice is not between a segregated neighborhood school and a 
desegregated magnet school. Parental choices are: (1) leave the 
school system, (2) accept the forced reassignment to a desegregated 




GUIDANCE FOR Q. 25-27 ON BUSING
25 through 27. To estimate amount of busing before and after plan
implementation, divide the number being bused by race by the total 
school enrollment for that race. For example, if the white 
student population is 10,000 and 3,000 were bused before the plan, 
mark a "3" for white on question 25. If 4,000 whites were bused 
following desegregation, a "4" would be marked for question 26.
To estimate the increase in busing for question 27, a percentage 
increase would be calculated. In this example, the increase in 
whites being bused of 1,000 would be divided by the initial number 
being bused, 3,000, to yield a figure of 33.3 percent. Thus a 
"3" would be marked for question 27.
If the before and after busing figures are expressed only as 
percentages, the increase in busing would be calculated as follows: 
subtract the initial year's figure from the more recent figure, 
then divide the difference by the initial year percentage. For 
example, if 40 percent of the students were bused before the plan 




15 T 40 = .375 or 37.5 percent increase 
Question 27 would then be marked as a "4"
EXHIBIT C




























low— vandalism, rock throwing, fighting
medium— above plus some arson and inter­


















high— above plus moderate to extensive 
arson, sniping, killing
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each other" (Yin and Yates, 1975). The validity of the data as well 
as the ability to generalize the results of the study are directly
related to the level of reliability (North, et al., 1963).
For purposes here the measure of reliability is the degree 
of interanalyst agreement. The following steps were followed in 
measuring interanalyst agreement.
Step 1. In completing the checklists the coders were
required to rank the "level-of-confidence" of their 
response to each questionnaire item as "sure,"
"not sure," or "impossible to answer."
Step 2. A random sample of 10 case surveys^ was drawn from
the pool of 52 cases. The sample was stratified
in two ways— by analyst-reader and by the time 
period when the checklist was completed (early, 
middle, or late stage of coding process).
Step 3. A tally sheet was created to facilitate the cal­
culation of percentage agreement scores by question 
and across all items.
Table 1 summarizes the results of this exercise and compares 
the percentage agreement scores with interanalyst agreement scores 
reported in two recent studies employing the case survey method. As 
Table 1 reveals, of the total number of questions possible to answer, 
coders marked a "sure" level-of-confidence for 83 percent of the 
answers and "not sure" for 17 percent of the responses. Interanalyst 
agreement on "sure" questions was 85 percent and 75 percent for "not 
sure" questions. These figures compare quite favorably to interanalyst
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF INTERANALYST AGREEMENT AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
WITH TWO MAJOR STUDIES USING CASE SURVEY APPROACH



















Sure 83.1 74.4 NR 85.2 77.1 82.4
Not Sure 16.9 25.6 NR 75.0 59.8 60.2
"Sure" includes those responses for which both coders were sure; "not sure" 
includes those responses for which one or both coders were not sure; does 
not include responses for which either coder considered the question 
"impossible to answer."
^Yin, Heald, and Vogel (1977: 26).
^Yin and Heald (1975: 38).
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reliability figures reported by Yin, Heald, and Vogel (1977) in their 
study of state and local technological innovation (77.1% and 59.8%) 
and by Yin and Yates (1975) in their study of urban service decentrali­
zation (82.4% and 60.2%).
The level of interanalyst agreement across the 10 cases by 
question as well as additional information concerning intercoder 
reliability is found in Appendix D.
Independent and Dependent Variables
Previous studies utilizing the case survey approach have 
used the method as a means of collecting both outcome (dependent) and 
explanatory (independent) variables. For example, in their study of 
state and local technological innovation, Yin, et al. (1977) used the 
case survey instrument to collect data on the propensity of state and 
local governments to adopt technological innovations as well as to 
collect various "device, background, and implementation" variables that 
were found to be significant correlates of successful innovative efforts.
In the present study, the case survey instrument was used 
primarily to collect desegregation background information (e.g., date 
of major desegregation effort, court involvement, etc.) and desegrega­
tion process variables (e.g., citizen participation, school board 
support, etc.). The two dependent variables analyzed in the study, 
desegregation success and white enrollment changes, as well as other 
school district characteristics (e.g., percent minority, school enroll­
ment) were derived from the Office of Civil Rights school file and were 
supplied in machine-readable form by Professor Franklin Wilson of the 
University of Wisconsin (Madison).
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Table 2 presents the principal variables employed in sub­
sequent analyses.^ The table also provides the source from which each 
variable was taken. Before proceeding to a discussion of the statisti­
cal methods that were employed to assess the relationships among the 
variables presented in Table 2, a few comments about the two dependent 
variables used in the study are in order.
To measure desegregation success, a widely used segregation 
index, generally referred to as the "index of dissimilarity" (DI), is 
employed (see Farley and Taeuber, 1974; Giles, 1974, 1975b; Farley, 
1975a, 1976a, 1976b; Giles and Walker, 1975; Rodgers and Bullock, 1976a, 
1976b; Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980). This index was created originally 
by Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) to measure residential segregation in 
American cities. The index represents the amount by which each school 
in a district departs from the precise racial composition of the entire 
district. In other words, the index value indicates the percentage of 
the total minority or white students that would have to change schools 
in order to achieve racial balance.^
While at least 13 indices of segregation are in general use 
(see Taeuber and Wilson, 1979b) and controversy surrounds which index 
most accurately measures (de)segregation (see Cortese, et al., 1976; 
Fitzgerald and Lyons, 1978), the index of dissimilarity, according to 
Taeuber and Wilson (1979a: 6), "provides the most useful operationali­
zation of relevant features of the concept 'segregation' for the pur­
poses of policy analysis." The index has important policy implications 
in three respects. First, the index is easily interpreted. The index
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scores range from 0 (indicating complete desegregation) to 100 
(indicating complete segregation). Any value between these two end­
points of the scale represents the percentage of minority or white 
students who would have to change schools in order for every school 
to reflect district racial composition. For example, if district A 
has a dissimilarity index score of 50.0, then either 50 percent of the 
minority students or 50 percent of the white students, of some combina­
tion of both (e.g., 30% minority and 20% white) would be required to 
change schools in order to obtain total desegregation (DI score of zero).
Second, the index facilitates the analysis of temporal changes 
in the status of local desegregation efforts. For instance, if in 1969 
district B had an index score of 80.0 and after an extensive desegrega­
tion effort in 1970 the score remained 80.0, then one could safely 
assume that the district's efforts were not successful.
Finally, and closely related, the index can be employed by 
the courts or HEW officials to measure the extent to which local dis­
tricts are in compliance with mandates to end dual school systems.
With respect to changes in white school enrollment, while a 
modest amount of controversy surrounds how to explain it (see Chapter 6), 
little disagreement exists about how to measure it. In general, changes 
in white school enrollment are operationalized by a percentage change 
from time X to time Y divided by the value for the antecedent year 
(time X).
In sum, the two dependent variables are change measures. 
Desegregation success is operationalized as the absolute change in the 
index of dissimilarity from the year prior to desegregation implementation
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TABLE 2











Avg. pre-implementation white 
enrollment declines^
OCR school district file (from 
Franklin Wilson)
OCR school district file (from 
Franklin Wilson)
County-City Databook, 1977
Case survey— questions 10, 16, 17, 62
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 
(Table 19)
OCR school district file (from 
Franklin Wilson)
School District Characteristics
Type of school district (0/1)^
Minority students (%)
Size of district (total student 
enrollment)^
Desegregation Process Variables
Superintendent and school board 
support (0-4)2
Citizen participation (factor 
score)"
Elite support (factor score)
Desegregation resistance 
factor score)b
Hiring of new school superin­
tendent (0/l)i
School board insulation (0-3)^
Case survey— question 50
OCR school district file (from 
Franklin Wilson)
OCR school district file (from 
Franklin Wilson)
Case survey— questions 56, 65
Case survey— questions 57, 59, 60
Case survey— questions 51, 66 
Case survey— questions 68, 70, 71
Patterson's American Education, 
Vols. 54-72




Open enrollment Case survey— questions 18, 38
Construction of new schools Case survey— questions 19, 39
Pairing/clustering Case survey— questions 20, 40
Magnet schools Case survey— questions 21, 41
Rezoning Case s urvey— ques tions 23, 43
G = Nonsouth; 1 = South. South includes the District of Columbia, the 11 
states of the Confederacy, and six border states (Delaware, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia that had laws requiring 
separate school systems at the time of the 1954 Brown decision.
seven-point index that sums: (1) source of desegregation impetus, 0 = 
local, 1 = HEW, 2 = court order; (2) court order plan parameters, 0 = none, 
1 = recommendations, 2 = specified plan; (3) court specify racial balance,
0 = none, 1 = recommended minimum and maximum racial balance, 2 = ordered 
minimum and maximum racial balance; (4) court mandated special master,
0 = no, 1 = yes.
^Indicator of availability of alternative schools in the metropolitan area. 
Operationalized by dividing total school enrollment in the suburban ring 
of the SMSA by total district enrollment for the central city. The higher 
the ratio the greater the availability of other schools in the area.
^Used in the white flight analysis as a control measure to represent trends 
in pre-implementation white enrollment change. Calculated by summing pre­
implementation percentage white enrollment changes and dividing by appro­
priate number of time points.
^0 = noncountywide, 1 = countywide.
^Year before major desegregation effort.
^School board support, 0 = opposed, 1 = neutral, 2 = favor ; superintendent 
support, 0 = opposed, 1 = neutral, 2 = favor.
^These three variables represent dimensions of community and local elite 
involvement in and support of local desegregation efforts. The original 
eight variables from the case survey instrument were factor analyzed using 
the common factor model. Based on Kaiser's criterion (eigenvalue ^1.0), 
three factors emerged: Factor 1 was labeled citizen participation;
Factor 2, elite support; and Factor 3, desegregation resistance. In total, 
73.5 percent of the common variance was captured by the three dimensions.
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED
district received a score of 1 if a new superintendent was hired the 
year before or year of the district's major desegregation effort.
^A three-point index measuring the degree to which local school boards 
are more insulated from outside influences: size of school board > 7 = 0; 
£ 7 = 1; term of office <2, 3 = 0; ^ 4  = 1; number of meetings per 
month > 2 = 0, 1 = 1. Thus, the smaller the size of the school board, 
the longer the term of office, and the fewer the number of meetings per 
month, the more insulated the school board (see Morgan and Fitzgerald,
1980).
^The case survey instrument also allowed the analyst-reader to record 
educational parks as a desegregation strategy. However, this method 
was not used as a primary technique by any of the 52 districts.
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(T-1) to implementation year (T). White enrollment change is calculated 
as white school enrollment implementation year (T) minus white school 
enrollment the year prior to implementation (T-1) divided by the white 
school enrollment the year prior to desegregation (T-1).^ The year 
prior to and year of major desegregation effort by grade level as well 
as dissimilarity index scores over time for each of the 52 districts 
can be found in Appendix E.
Certain characteristics of the 52 districts should be pro­
vided here. The majority of the districts are southern (31), although 
a sizable number are located outside the South (21). South is defined 
here as those 11 states of the Confederacy and six border states (see 
Table 2, note a). Partly because the bulk of the cases are from 
southern states quite a few districts are countywide (20). The 
majority of the districts (32), of course, do not encompass the entire 
county. As mentioned above the minimum enrollment for the entire 
school system was set at 20,000 students. At the year of desegregation 
the average (mean) size of the 52 districts was 72,510 (median = 54,974). 
The range was from 12,494 to 244,016 (the actual size variable for four 
districts fell below 20,000 because enrollment data for one level only 
were used) . The minimum proportion minority was set at 10 percent for 
at least one year of the study. The average (mean) figure was 33.4 
percent (median = 27.9%). The actual range was from 5.5 to 77.4 per­
cent, with minority data for a few districts falling below the minimum 
for part of the period under study.
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Methods
To assess the effects of the three types of independent 
variables— external influences, school district characteristics, deseg­
regation process influences and strategies— on the two desegregation 
outcome variables— desegregation success and changes in white school 
enrollment— a series of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses 
are performed. Chapters four through six summarize the results of 
these analyses.
Chapter 4 presents a preliminary analysis of the relationship 
between desegregation strategies employed across the 52 school districts 
and desegregation success. Since local school officials may opt to use 
one type of desegregation strategy to desegregate elementary schools 
and another type to end racial isolation in secondary schools, the 
analysis of desegregation strategies and desegregation success is per­
formed by school level. Mean analysis serves as the primary statistical 
procedure for estimating effects. In Chapter 5 an attempt is made to 
place school desegregation in a multivariate context. Using multiple 
regression, the independent effects of the three classes of predictor 
variables on desegregation success are determined. Finally, employing 
primarily the same statistical methods and explanatory variables.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the analysis of white enrollment 
change.
NOTES
1. Many of these contacts yielded information that was used to check 
the accuracy of information presented in certain case studies, or 
to answer specific questions where case studies did not report 
information (e.g., busing information).
2. Thirty-six other documented desegregation efforts were found in the 
literature search. Unfortunately, however, for 25 of the 36 cases 
the district's desegregation efforts occurred either before 1968 or 
after 1976. In four cases the school district's percent minority 
did not reach the 10 percent criterion. Finally, the desegregation 
efforts as reported in seven cases were deemed insufficient in 
depth as well as breadth for inclusion in the study.
3. Two of the practice cases were among those that were unusable
because they did not meet either the size or date criterion
(Wilmington, Delaware and Stamford, Connecticut). The third trial 
case was Tulsa, Oklahoma, for which the mutually agreed upon final 
instrument was used as one of the 52 total cases.
4. The ten cases were: Newport News, VA; Clark County, NV; Boston, MA;
Colorado Springs, CO; Wichita, KS; Dade County, FL; Richmond, CA; 
Houston, TX; Mobile, AL; Minneapolis, MN.
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5. The effects of several other variables (e.g., residential segrega­
tion, busing increases) on the dependent variables are also 
assessed. Where appropriate, the relationship of these variables 
with desegregation outcomes are reported.
6. The formula for calculating the index of desegregation is:
D .  2
i=l 2TP(1-P)
where: P^ = proportion of students in a school who are minority
group members;
P = proportion of the minority population of the total 
school district population;
K = total number of schools in district;
T^ = total population of the ith school; and
T = total population of the school district.
A value of 100 (complete segregation) is observed when the 
differences between (P\) and (P) are at their maximum. Conversely, 
a value of 0 (complete desegregation) is obtained when (P̂ ) equals 
(P) for all i's (see Taeuber and Wilson, 1979a: 6).
As a note of caution, the DI values are not statistically 
meaningful if: (1) a school district contains only one school; 
and/or (2) a district contains very few members of a given ethnic 
category. In order to guard against statistical artifacts Taeuber
and Wilson suggest that when working with districts with populations
of 5,000 or greater, a record should be deleted if the minority 
population is less than 3 percent or greater than 97 percent 
(Taeuber and Wilson, notes section of codebook for School District 
Universe Data File).
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7. A number of researchers suggest that while the use of gain scores 
is an intuitively appealing approach to measuring change, the 
approach should be used with caution (see Lord, 1963; Bohrnstedt, 
1969; Van Meter, 1974). The primary problem of measuring change 
in absolute terms is that the measure of change (A) resulting from 
the subtraction of t^-t^ is, in part, a function of the value at 
t^ (Van Meter, 1974: 128). That is, initial standing has an effect 
on subsequent change. Thus, statistical control is not achieved 
since the effect of t^ has not been totally removed from (the
correlation between change (A) and t^ does not equal zero), and 
the relationship between change and initial standing is often 
negative (Borhnstedt, 1969: 115-116).
A negative relationship between initial standing and a change 
measure introduces regression effects into the analysis. For 
as Bohrnstedt (1969: 116) notes: "Anytime a variable is imperfectly 
correlated with itself across time, regression toward the mean can 
be expected to occur." The lack of perfect correlation between 
the same variable over time can be due to three factors: (1) the 
effect of a second variable (or variables) causing change,
(2) measurement error, or (3) a combination of both of these 
influences (Bohrnstedt, 1969: 116). And Bohrnstedt notes that 
since initial measurement and change are correlated, the use of 
gain scores to measure change accentuates measurement error thus 
creating difficulties in discerning whether change is due to other 
variables or is attributable to initial values.
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In order to create a change measure that is independent of 
values at t^, Lord (1963), Bohrnstedt (1969), and Van Meter (1974) 
suggest that the regression of tg on t^ values is preferable. 
Resultant residuals from the ordinary least squares equation become 
the measure of change; positive residualized scores indicate that 
the amount of change from t^ to t^ are greater than that which 
would have been predicted using least squares procedures. Negative 
residualized scores indicate an amount of change less than would 
be predicted.
Despite these potential problems, in the present study gain 
scores are used to measure desegregated change, and white enroll­
ment change is expressed in terms of percentage points. The under­
lying rationale for choosing to measure change in these ways is for 
comparability with other research. Most studies measure desegrega­
tion change in absolute terms. In fact, Rodgers and Bullock (1976a: 
175-176), after evaluating several alternative ways of measuring 
desegregation change, suggest that absolute change is the most 
appropriate method of measuring desegregation success. With respect 
to white enrollment change, percentage change is the most 
frequently employed measure.
CHAPTER IV
DESEGREGATION TECHNIQUES : A PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS
Introduction
In developing a desegregation strategy, school district 
officials, desegregation planners, and the courts must attempt to strike 
a delicate balance between local values, mores, and environmental 
conditions, on the one hand, and the national policy mandate to end 
dual school systems, on the other. No foolproof blueprint exists. As 
Crain and Hawley (1981: 10) put it, "once armed with criteria for 
reassignment and with a knowledge of the alternative strategies that 
can be employed, the desegregation planner is an artist, not a 
technician or scientist." He or she must pick and choose among a 
plethora of available desegregation strategies and attempt to find one 
or a combination of techniques that will work under local conditions.
This chapter offers a summary of current knowledge about the 
effectiveness of various desegregation strategies in reducing racial 
isolation and white student outmigration. The summary is organized 
into four sections. The first section discusses the purpose (goals) 
of desegregation plans and the standards the courts may use in judging
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their adequacy. Types of desegregation strategies (voluntary and 
mandatory) are identified in section two. The effectiveness of deseg­
regation techniques based on 52 case experiences is assessed in section 
three. Finally, the findings and implications of the findings are 
discussed in section four.
Desegregation Goals and Court Standards
Desegregation Goals
While school desegregation has many goals, its primary one 
is to redefine the racial mixture of students. In fact, Hughes, et al. 
(1980: 7) view desegregation plans as "body mixers pure and simple."
The successful plan ends racial isolation both among and within schools. 
Desegregation among schools primarily concerns how closely the racial 
mix of students in individual schools conforms to districtwide norms. 
Desegregation within a school concerns those actions which impede inter­
racial contact, such as tracking and exclusion from extracurricular 
activities, or as Hawley and associates (1981: 3) state, "a range of 
practices that result in racially identifiable classes or groupings 
with no demonstrable educational necessity." Even if a district is 
successful at achieving racial balance among its schools, the positive 
value of that achievement is negated if within school desegregation is 
lacking.
A desegregation plan ought also be designed in such a way as 
to preclude resegregation. Thus, the aim is not only to end racial 
isolation but also prevent it from recurring in the future.
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Resegregation may be due to one or a combination of factors including
(1) "flight" from the district (moving or enrolling in private schools),
(2) changed residential patterns within the district, or (3) a shift 
in births within the district.
Further, if desegregation is to be effective and equitable, 
it should result in improved race relations (ideally, "color blindness"), 
among students, improvements in educational quality for all races, and 
community commitment to the local school system (which might be shown, 
for example, by reduced opposition to desegregation and better fiscal 
support for the schools).
What are the basic components of a school desegregation plan 
that can accomplish these goals? Willie (1978: 58-59) suggests the 
following :
. . . (a) there is a systemwide approach; (b) the schools 
and not the student is the basic educational unit; (c) 
such units or schools that complement each other may be 
grouped into common attendance zones, districts, or regions 
for more effective and efficient operation and administra­
tion; (d) a uniform grade structure facilitates inter­
change between and easy access to all units or schools 
within the system; (e) opportunities are provided to pur­
sue specialized interests as well as common concerns ;
(f) the existence of a monitoring structure insures good- 
faith implementation of the systemwide plan; (g) faculty 
is diversified.
Desegregation Techniques : A View From the Courts
While local school officials are primarily responsible for 
the formulation and implementation of desegregation plans, they must 
make decisions within the context of federal court rulings. Vergon 
(1981: 5-6) suggests that the courts may invoke five general standards 
in assessing the adequacy of local plans :
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. . . the obligations of school officials is to bring 
about 'the maximum amount of actual desegregation in 
light of the practicalities of the local situation' . , . 
(Green v .  Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 1968; Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 1971)
. . . the primary criterion for assessing the legal 
adequacy of a plan . . .  is its effectiveness in elimina­
ting one-race or racially identifiable schools (Green).
. . . while prohibited from requiring school districts to 
achieve a precise racial mix or balance . . . courts are 
authorized to use racial ratios as a starting point in 
formulating or evaluating the effectiveness and legal 
adequacy of proposed plans (Swann; Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 1979).
. . . where racially identifiable buildings persist, 
school districts are generally required to utilize, and 
courts to order the utilization of, the most effective 
desegregation technique reasonably available (Green;
Davis V. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, 402 U.S. 
33, 1971).
Vergon is quick to note, however, that a host of other district-specific 
influences help guide federal court decisions, such as practical consid­
erations (e.g., logistics of desegregation), education factors (e.g., 
curriculum capacity), and equitable principles (e.g., disproportionate 
racial burden).
Thus, while school policymakers must follow the law, they are 
not required to operate within a strategic straightjacket. In fact, 
the range of strategies that may be employed to reduce racial isolation 
is surprisingly large and includes everything from open enrollment and 
redrawing attendance zones to magnet schools.
Desegregation Strategies and Effectiveness 
Close examination suggests that many desegregation techniques 
are variations of a few basic strategies. In considering desegregation
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in northern communities, Kirby, et al. (1973: 39) isolate 27 different 
desegregation actions, which they then divide into three groups:
(1) symbolic-procedural (e.g., appointing a committee to study a 
specific problem), (2) voluntary participation (e.g., initiating compen­
satory education, hiring more black teachers), and (3) forced partici­
pation (e.g., instituting open enrollment, redrawing boundaries, 
closing schools, busing).
Most of the literature further divides those techniques falling 
under the above heading of "forced participation" into a number of 
other categories. For example, Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman (1980: 54) 
enumerate six popular techniques for pupil assignment: rezoning, 
contiguous pairing, noncontiguous pairing, clustering, single-grade 
centers, and islands, listed in order of "ease and economy of implemen­
tation." Desegregation specialist Gordon Foster (1973: 17-22) discusses 
five basic means: redrawing zone lines, pairing and grouping, modified 
feeder patterns, skip zoning, and site selection and construction 
policies, along with several so-called "optional methods" (including 
open enrollment and magnet schools). In their research on California 
school desegregation, Wegner and Mercer (1975: 128-129) construct a 
"desegregation action index" from six techniques: relocation, new 
construction, boundary changes, open enrollment, mandatory busing, and 
pairing. Table 3 summarizes the various techniques identified by these 
as well as other authorities.
Vergon (1981: 7) suggests that while the names assigned to 
techniques vary from study to study, desegregation strategies are of 
two generic types: voluntary desegregation strategies (e.g., open
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TABLE 3
A SUMMARY OF DESEGREGATION TECHNIQUES 
IDENTIFIED IN SELECTED STUDIES
Desegregation Techniques
g g
B 0CU CD P -








O’ o  ___ H
g go m p. p rt









Rezoning X X X X X X
Pairing X X X X X
Clustering X





closing X X X X
Open enrollment (voluntary) X X X X
Mandatory busing X X X
Magnet X X X
Areawide/metropolitan
(multidistrict) X X
Educational parks X X
Reorg. of grade structures X
This listing of four desegregation techniques 
study includes only those that could actually 
the school system.
from the Kirby, et al. 
be used to desegregate
113
enrollment, magnet-only, majority to minority transfers), and mandatory 
desegregation strategies (e.g., rezoning, pairing, clustering).^ Based 
on these two generic types of strategies, the effectiveness of different 
desegregation strategies in reducing racial isolation is now addressed.
Voluntary Techniques
Voluntary desegregation strategies such as open enrollment and 
free transfers represent the customary initial approach to a school 
desegregation order. Since voluntary desegregation plans allow students 
or their parents to select the school in the district they will attend, 
this type of desegregation plan is often the least objectionable and 
arouses the least controversy.
One means of voluntary assignment is majority to minority 
transfers. Called M and M transfers, these permit students to attend 
schools in which their race is a minority. Thus a white student may 
elect to leave his or her all-white or predominantly white school to 
attend a predominantly black or desegregated school. Minority children 
have the same option.
In general, voluntary assignments have not proven effective in 
reducing racial isolation. In 1968, the Supreme Court held that "If 
there are reasonably available other ways . . . promising speedier and 
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system,
'freedom of choice' must be held unacceptable" (Green v. County School 
Board of Kent County, 1968: 441). In response to this, many communities 
tried a novel voluntary desegregation strategy— magnet schools. Magnet 
schools are highly specialized schools that draw students from all over
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the district. Frequently, these schools offer courses in the sciences, 
humanities, or performing arts. Students must apply to attend and are 
usually required to meet strict entrance standards. Magnet school plans 
may be of two types: magnet-only plans, which rely on voluntary partici­
pation, and magnet-mandatory plans, which require student assignment to 
either a desegregated magnet school or to another desegregated school 
within the district. Figure 5 provides an illustrative example of the 
magnet school approach.
Levine and Campbell (1977: 248) suggest various reasons for 
the appeal of magnet schools: They offer a variety of options as to 
curriculum, put great emphasis on quality instruction, and are funded 
from state, local, and federal sources. All of these are, of course, 
definite advantages, providing that magnet schools are effective at 
reducing racial isolation. The question is, are they effective?
A recent comparative study by Christine Rossell (1979: 304) of 
18 school districts' experiences with magnet schools suggests that 
the effectiveness of magnets may depend on whether they are part of a 
mandatory citywide plan or are the sole means of school desegregation. 
Rossell advances two models of decision making. The first, labeled 
"conflict control," is associated with a magnet-mandatory plan. The 
conflict control model "assumes that coercion is necessary to induce 
whites to leave their segregated schools, but that some element of 
choice . . .  is necessary to reduce hostility and white flight to 
manageable levels" (Rossell, 1979: 308). The second model is based 
on "public choice" theory. This model assumes that parents will choose 
the school their child will attend "on the basis of curricular









SOURCE: Leronia Josey (ed.), Desegregation Resource Handbook.
Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia School District, Office of 
Community Affairs, 1974.
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incentives" (Rossell, 1979: 305). In other words, a district may opt to
use a (voluntary) magnet-only plan on the assumption that parents choose
only the best schools for their children. Rossell (1979: 310) suggests
that this assumption may be false: " . . .  the only reason why some
parents might choose a magnet school is that their neighborhood school
2is becoming predominantly minority."
Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman (1980: 19) are even more critical
in their appraisal of magnet schools:
Though this voluntary mechanism appeals to many educators 
and school boards, it has not proved effective in school 
desegregation. School systems in Dallas, Houston, 
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia point to their 
magnet programs as important parts of their school deseg­
regation plan; in fact, these programs have had minimal 
impact on the overall racial balances of these systems.
The authors conclude that magnet schools "simply have not worked as a 
tool of desegregation" (Hughes, et al., 1980: 19).
Two unanticipated problems are associated with magnet schools. 
First, they are expensive to establish and maintain, especially in light 
of their documented ineffectiveness in reducing racial isolation— their 
intended purpose. In these times of fiscal stress and nationwide 
decline in school enrollments, magnets may simply prove not to be cost 
effective. Second, it is believed that the use of magnet schools some­
times results in inequities among schools in a district, and are a form 
of "institutional racism" in that they may receive a disproportionate 
share of a district's per pupil educational expenditures. Rossell's 
analysis of "quality education indicators" in magnet and non-magnet 




BOSTON: CHARACTERISTICS OF MAGNET AND NON-MAGNET 
SCHOOLS, 1975-1976
Quality Education Indicators Magnet Non-Magnet
Average per-pupil expenditure on 
regular teachers in dollars 843.9 714.6
Average per-pupil expenditure on 
special instruction in dollars 221.1 184.4
Average per-pupil expenditure on 
instructional supplies in dollars 64.6 49.5
Average facility age in years 41.8 49.1
Average pupil-teacher ratio 15:1 20:1
SOURCE: Reported in Rossell (1979: 311).
As Table 4 reveals, per-pupil expenditure on regular teachers, special 
instructions, and instructional supplies are higher in magnet than in 
non-magnet schools. Also, the average age of the educational facilities 
is less and the pupil/teacher ratio is smaller.
Consistent with this charge of "institutional racism" is the 
fact that to make a magnet school work, a district will on occasion take 
the best teachers and the best students in the district, further 
"ghettoizing" black students. For example, in Detroit, Foster (1973: 24) 
notes :
. . . the magnet middle schools had not aided desegrega­
tion but had served as an escape route for whites assigned 
to predominantly black schools; and the magnet concept 
itself set up a new type of dual structure with unequal 
educational opportunities. If one-fourth or one-half of
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the schools in a system are developed as magnet schools 
with above-average expenditures and superior programs, 
then a dual structure has been established.
Rossell (1979: 30) concludes: "If a dual system based on race is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, it is
not at all clear that a dual system based on educational quality is
not also such a violation."
Considerable attention has been devoted here to weighing both
the advantages and limitations of magnet schools. The bulk of the
evidence collected thus far would seem to support a federal court ruling
concerning the use of magnets in Boston: reliance on a magnet school
approach "would be to place the realization of the rights of Boston's
black students in a vessel that would begin rudderless against the
world" (401 F. Supp. 228). This is not to suggest that magnet schools
should be abandoned as a desegregation strategy. As Hawley, et al.
(1981: 22) remind us, "when magnets are part of a mandatory plan they
can effectively attract students to desegregated settings. However,
magnet plans should continue to be closely scrutinized by desegregation
planners, academics, and the courts.
Mandatory Reassignment Techniques
Under mandatory desegregation strategies, school officials, 
and not students or parents, decide which schools a student will attend. 
In contrast to voluntary desegregation techniques, Vergon (1980: 15) 
contends "the effectiveness of mandatory plans utilizing geographic 
reassignment techniques is suggested by the number and proportion of 
approved plans which incorporate this approach to a significant extent."
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According to Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman (1980: 54) the "most 
desirable assignment patterns are ones that keep distances that must 
be traveled to and from school to a minimum . . . In addition, the 
authors (p. 54) note three other assignment considerations: "(1) the 
burden of the desegregation must not fall disproportionately on one race 
or economic level; (2) once desegregated, each school must have a racial 
ratio that reflects the overall racial ratio of the school district; and
(3) the number of students assigned to any building must not exceed 
the established building capacity."
Four of the most commonly employed reassignment techniques 
(see Table 3) are: construction of new schools, pairing and/or cluster­
ing, rezoning, and magnet-mandatory schools. New schools are usually 
built in minority or mixed neighborhoods. The rationale for building 
new schools is relatively straightforward: If the educational facilities 
are new or modern, white parents may be more easily persuaded to send 
their children to integrated facilities; also, by building new schools 
in neutral neighborhoods, commuting time may be reduced; and finally, 
some older schools are simply not large enough to accommodate the 
increased number of students resulting from integration.
Pairing and/or clustering is a technique whereby two or more 
schools are grouped together to form a single school. Children attend 
one school for a few years, then attend the other. If, for example, a 
black school containing grades 1 through 6 was paired with a white 
school nearby containing the same grades, all students in grades 1 
through 3 might attend one of the schools while those in grades 4 
through 6 attend the other school. For an illustration of how pairing 




Mostly Black Mostly White
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SOURCE: Leronia Josey (ed.), Desegregation Resource Handbook.
Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia School District, Office 
of Community Affairs, 1974.
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Rezoning of school boundaries is also a widely used desegrega­
tion technique. According to Foster (1973: 17) rezoning is the "least 
disruptive and easiest way to achieve edesegregation," especially at 
the secondary school level. Hughes, et al. (1980: 54) comment:
Redrawing attendance boundaries causes minimal disruption 
within the school community and achieves the desired goal 
of racial balance. This technique is easier to use with 
high schools because high school attendance zones draw 
from a larger geographic area. This is the first technique 
that should be considered when preparing a desegregation 
plan.
Figure 7 provides an example of how rezoning might be accomplished.
Finally, magnet-mandatory schools may be used as a component
part of a large school desegregation plan. Under these arrangements, 
students have several school options: They can "(1) leave the school 
system, (2) accept the forced reassignment to a desegregated school, 
or (3) choose a desegregated magnet school" (Rossell, 1979: 308).
To date, few studies have attempted to assess the impact of
desegregation techniques on desegregation success using a systematic, 
comparative research design. Most analyses of effects rely on case
studies. Wegner and Mercer's (1975) study of 49 California unified
ise
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3school districts is a notable exception. As mentioned above, the
authors combine six techniques into a "desegregation action index.' 
To assess the impact of the desegregation techniques on their 
dependent variable (change in racial balance from 1966 to 1971), 
three analyses were performed. First, using a dichotomous variable 
(0/1), the researchers compared average (mean) changes in racial 
balance for those districts that used one of these techniques with 
those that did not. Second, a multiple correlation coefficient was
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*Dotted line depicts outline of original school zone.
SOURCE: Adapted from Larry Hughes, William Gordon, and Larry Hillman,
Desegregating America's Schools. New York: Longman, 1980, p. 55.
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calculated between desegregation actions and change. Finally, the 
desegregation action index was correlated with the dependent variable.
In each analysis, the results were not statistically significant. Wegner 
and Mercer (1975: 134) conclude: "the number and kind of Desegregation 
Actions taken by a district does not significantly influence the extent 
to which that district will experience a change in the percent of 
minority children attending racially balanced schools." In other words, 
desegregation success may not be facilitated regardless of the strategy 
used.
For the desegregation planner responsible for formulating and 
implementing a desegregation plan, these findings are not very promising. 
The Wegner and Mercer (1975) study is, however, limited to California 
districts, and the only other comparative analysis of the effects of 
techniques on desegregation success (Kirby, et al., 1973) is based on 
data from the 1960s for northern districts only.
What about white flight? Do any desegregation techniques or 
features of the plan seem to affect white enrollment? Most of the 
systematic research on white flight does not take account of any 
features of the desegregation plan itself. Any effect of desegregation 
is determined altogether by using some measure of the change in racial 
balance occurring as a result of plan implementation. Yet Rossell 
(1981: 46-48) points out that certain characteristics of the desegrega­
tion effort may affect white enrollment. They include the following: 
o White reassignments to formerly black schools result 
in considerably more white enrollment loss than black 
reassignments to white schools.
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o The greater the busing distance, the greater the 
white flight, but only in the implementation years, 
o White flight is greater from elementary school
desegregation than from secondary school desegregation, 
o Phased-in plans may result in greater white flight 
than plans implemented in one year because of the 
advance notice parents receive.
The data gathered for this project do not permit a test of all 
of these propositions. For example, efforts to gather reassignment data 
were unsuccessful. But, at least in a bivariate relationship, the 
effects of certain desegregation strategies on white enrollment can be 
ascertained.
It should be mentioned again that desegregation success is 
operationalized as the absolute change in the index of dissimilarity 
from the year prior to desegregation implementation (T-1) to implementa­
tion year (T). White enrollment change is a percentage figure based on 
the amount of change from the year desegregation was begun (T-1) to the 
year of implementation (T). In the analyses to follow, a difference in 
means test is used as the primary statistical technique to estimate the 
effects of each technique.
Strategies, Desegregation Success, and 
White Flight : Bivariate Analyses
For purposes of this research only five basic desegregation 
strategies were coded— voluntary student assignment (including voluntary 
open enrollment and majority to minority transfer), construction of new 
schools, pairing and clustering, magnet schools,^ and rezoning. This
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decision was based on two considerations. First, previous research 
suggests that only a limited number of prinicpal techniques are actually 
used. Second, the use of a larger number increases the likelihood that 
only a few districts will have used certain techniques. It would then 
be more difficult to separate out the effects of techniques from other 
characteristics of the district or the desegregation process. In other 
words, a proliferation of techniques makes it more difficult to generalize 
regarding the possible effectiveness of each one.
As mentioned previously different desegregation actions are 
often pursued at different grade levels. What is appropriate or 
potentially effective at the secondary level may not be so at the elem­
entary level, and vice versa. So the bivariate analysis of techniques 
will divide the 52 districts into elementary and secondary schools.^ As 
discussed above, in a few instances desegregation was undertaken at only 
one level. For example, in this sample elementary school desegregation 
actions numbered 46, while 47 occurred at the secondary level. (Those 
districts implementing plans at only one level are shown as part of 
Appendix E.) An analysis of desegregation strategies should provide 
information by level as well as for the entire school system.
Initially, Table 5 offers a comparison that includes desegrega­
tion and white enrollment change by number of strategies used— two or 
fewer or three or more. As the data reveal, quite a few districts relied 
on only a small number of techniques, and perhaps surprisingly, such 
efforts produced better results than those instances where three or 
more were used. For the entire system, those using two or fewer had a 
mean change in desegregation level between T and T-1 of -34.0 (larger
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TABLE 5
DESEGREGATION AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE 
ACCORDING TO TOTAL STRATEGIES USED 


























1  2 23 -34.0 -7.9 29 -36.4 -11.8 32 -27.3 -2.6
1  3 27 -23.5* -11.5 18 -18.0** -12.6 14 -17.5* -9.3*
TOTAL 50 -28.3 -9.8 47 -29.4 -12.1 46 -24.3 -4.7
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
^Measured as the absolute change obtained by subtracting the desegregation 
score at T from T-1.
^Percentage change from T-1 to T.
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scores equal more change). This compares with a figure of -23.5 for 
districts using a greater number of techniques. The same thing holds 
for each separate level, but especially for elementary schools. The 
analysis suggests that the use of a number of specific approaches does 
not help, that in fact concentration on a few more potentially effective 
techniques is the better course of action.
Table 5 also shows that the fewer strategies employed, the 
lower the rate of white student loss (percentage change between T-1 to 
T), although the relationship is not statistically significant. By 
school level, however, important differences appear for secondary grades, 
where the difference in loss between fewer and greater number of 
techniques is 6.7 percent (-9.3% compared to -2.6%). No such 
differences appear for elementary schools.
Before assessing the effectiveness of various strategies it 
might be instructive to examine just which ones were most widely used, 
again by school level.^ Table 6 provides this comparison. Although 
a variety of combinations appear, only a limited number are extensively 
employed. At the elementary level, three techniques separately or in 
combination clearly predominate— rezoning (with 27% using that 
technique alone), pairing and clustering (25%), and pairing and cluster­
ing in combination with rezoning (20%). For secondary schools, only 
one strategy was heavily used— rezoning (61%). Further discussion will 
be confined to these more widely used strategies.
When desegregation success at the elementary level is 
examined in Table 6, pairing and clustering with rezoning produces the 
most change— a 40.5 absolute drop in the level of segregation. This
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TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES ON DESEGREGATION SUCCESS 
AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE BY 52 SCHOOL 



















Vol. assign. 1 2 - - 1 2 -31.1 -9.6
Const, new school - - - - 1 2 -24.3 -8.9
Pair./Clust. (P/C) 12 25 -35.9 -13.0 1 2 -18.5 -11.0
Magnet 2 4 -9.3 -23.6 1 2 -4.0 -0.7
Rezoning 14 27 -31.6 -15.4 29 61 -27.8 -2.2
P/C-Rez. 10 20 -40.5 -5.8 2 4 -44.2 . 0.0
Vol.-P/C-Rez. 2 4 -3.8 -7.6 1 2 -0.1 -4.5
Vol.-P/C-Mag.-Rez. - 4 - - 1 2 -22.8 -6.9
Vol.-Rez. 2 4 -33.4 -5.4 1 2 -22.1 0.0
Vol.-Const.-P/C-Rez. 1 2 -2.8 -37.5 1 2 —6.6 -10.8
Const.-Rez. 2 4 -11.7 4.6 2 4 -9.4 6.7
Mag.-Rez. 1 2 -1.6 -15.5 4 9 -13.9 -19.4
Vol.-Mag.-Rez. - - - - 1 2 -12.9 -13.3
Const.-P/C-Rez. 1 2 -2.2 -11.7 - 1 - -
Vol.-Mag. 1 2 -22.4 -21.1 2 4 -18.1 -13.4
TOTAL 50 100 - 2 9 . 4 -12.1 48 100 -24.3 -4.7
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TABLE 6 CONTINUED
^Two districts' desegregation efforts (Stockton and Colorado Springs) 
did not include elementary schools.
^(N=47). Five cases were not included in the analysis: Stockton and 
Colorado Springs (see note a); Peoria and Tacoma (no T-1 desegregation 
time point); Corpus Christi (missing data).
^Desegregation in four districts (San Francisco, Lansing, Pontiac, Clark 
County) did not include elementary schools.
^(N=46). Six cases were not included in the analysis: San Francisco, 
Lansing, Pontiac, Clark County (see note c); Peoria and Tacoma (no T-1 
desegregation time point).
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is closely followed by the 35.9 point change reflected for pairing and 
clustering alone. Rezoning as a primary technique also does well, with 
an absolute decline in racial isolation of 31.6 points. Tentatively then 
these three strategies alone or in combination seem to work well. The 
most improvement in racial balance for elementary schools, of course, 
is associated with pairing and clustering with rezoning.
Table 6 also shows white enrollment change by strategy for 
the two levels. First, for elementary schools the average decline in 
white enrollment during the desegregation year was 12.1 percent. This 
compares with the average loss for the year preceding desegregation of
4.9 percent (now shown in the table; N=43). Also, for the year follow­
ing plan implementation the average decline among elementary grades is
5.1 percent (also not shown; N=39). The range of white enrollment 
change among the districts at implementation year is considerable— from 
one school system with no decline to one with a 37.5 percent drop.
The range is much narrower, however, for the three most frequently used 
techniques. Pairing and clustering with rezoning, the most effective 
desegregation strategy, also reflects the lowest level of white flight 
of the three, 5.8 percent. Pairing and clustering is associated with 
a decline of 13.0 percent, while rezoning shows a 15.4 percent drop.
This relatively low degree of white loss found with pairing and cluster­
ing with rezoning would certainly seem to enhance its position as the 
most desirable strategy for elementary schools.
Turning to desegregation success at the secondary level (in 
Table 6), as noted above, rezoning is the overwhelming choice (61%), 
and this technique brings an absolute reduction in segregation of 27.8
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points. This is not the largest reduction for all techniques, which 
is 44.2 points for pairing and clustering with rezoning, but only two 
secondary schools use this combination approach. This small number, 
as mentioned above, makes it more difficult to generalize about the 
effectiveness of this particular combination.
What relationship exists between strategies and white enroll­
ment change at the secondary level? As Table 6 shows, the overall white 
loss at this level, 4.7 percent, is considerably less than exists for 
elementary schools. One year pre-desegregation loss is .3 percent, 
while one year after implementation the loss continues at 2.1 percent 
(not shown in Table 6). The technique employed by most of the districts 
(rezoning) is associated with an even lower level of white decline, 2.2 
percent. Certainly nothing here suggests that rezoning should be 
avoided because of any potential negative effect on white enrollment.
One further comparison of strategies might be useful. Table 
7 contrasts the effects of each of the most frequently used techniques 
(under base group) with all others that are used (comparison group), by 
school level. Consider desegregation change at the elementary level, 
for example. The 12 districts using pairing and clustering reflect a
35.9 point decline in level of segregation. This contrasts with the
27.1 drop for the remaining 35 schools employing all other techniques. 
Actually, the information on the left-hand side of the table (for the 
base group) also appears in Table 6. But Table 6 offers no direct way 
of showing how each technique fares against all others combined.
Table 7 offers this comparison. In brief. Table 7 confirms again for 
the elementary level that pairing and clustering combined with rezoning
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TABLE 7
EFFECTS OF PRIMARY DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES COMPARED TO 
ALL OTHERS BY SCHOOL LEVEL
Elementary Level



























47 -29.4 -12.1 P/C 12 -35.9 -13.0 All
Others
35 -27.1 -12.0
47 -29.4 -12.1 Rezon. 13 -31.6 -15.4 All
Others
34 -28.5 -10.8
47 -29.4 -12.1 P/C
Rezon.




46 -24.3 -4.7 Rezon. 29 -27.8 -2.2 All
Others
17 -18.5* —8. 8*
< .05.
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produces the most effective desegregation results. For secondary 
schools Table 7 also shows that the 29 districts using rezoning achieve 
more desegregation change (-27.8) than those using all other techniques 
(-18.5). These results also confirm the earlier findings regarding 
white flight. The most effective technique for elementary schools 
(pairing/clustering with rezoning) shows much less white enrollment 
loss (5.8%) than do all other techniques (13.8%). This particular 
comparison highlights even more how little white flight (2.2%) is 
associated with rezoning compared to all other techniques (8.8%).
Busing might be considered as a separate desegregation tool 
(see Wegner and Mercer, 1975). No doubt some efforts to achieve a 
unitary school system result in sizable increases in student transporta­
tion. Yet seldom do courts order busing per se; ordinarily more trans­
portation must be provided by the district to implement the requirements 
of a specific plan. Nonetheless, one might assume that an increase in 
busing would be associated with greater desegregation success. In 
fact, Orfield (1978: 137) cites evidence to show that in many places 
with very little additional busing the amount of school desegregation 
could be greatly increased.
Information on busing was collected for the 52 districts in 
this study. In particular, an attempt was made to gauge the increase 
in student transportation resulting from desegregation. This turned 
out to be one of the most difficult data gathering tasks of the project. 
Many written reports do not provide before and after data on busing, 
and busing information by school level is virtually nonexistent. This 
void in the published literature required that a number of telephone
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calls be made to various districts. In some instances, school officials 
were asked to provide busing information from ten years ago. Fortunately 
some officials had such data and provided it. Others either did not have 
it or for whatever reason would not give it. The result is that when 
the busing increase variable is included in the analysis, the N is 
reduced to 44. One further comment should be made regarding the busing 
measure. This was scored on a basis of 0 to 20, generally corresponding 
to a percentage increase. That is, a score of 10 would indicate a 100 
percent jump in busing. The upper limit of 20 was established to 
handle one or two very large increases that otherwise might have to be 
treated as outliers and removed from the analysis.
Table 8 provides one way of assessing the effects of busing.
The districts are divided at the median increase (4 or about 40%), and 
comparisons are made between one group above and one group below the 
median. The table shows the pre-desegregation DI score, the implemen­
tation year score, and two change measures. Those districts with more 
busing experience slightly greater reduction in racial isolation (an 
absolute change of -31.7 compared to -26.7), but it is not statistically 
significant. Since the busing increase score ranges from 0 to 20, a 
correlation coefficient has also been calculated— r = .14 (not signifi­
cant). Thus, somewhat surprisingly, increases in busing are only 
modestly associated with desegregation success.
White enrollment is also somewhat related to busing as shown 
in Table 8. Those districts with an above average increase in student 
transportation show no loss of white students prior to desegregation.
At implementation those districts lose an average of 10.8 percent of
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TABLE 8





All Below Median^ Above Median^
Deseg. score year prior to 
implem. (T-1)
65.1(N=44) 66.5(n=25) 63.3(n=19)
Deseg. score implementation 
year (T)
36.8(N=46) 40.5(n=27) 31.6(n=19)
Deseg. score absolute change -28.9(N=44) -26.7(n=25) -31.7(n=19)
Percent white enrollment 
change (T-2 to T-1)
-1.7(N=37) -3.1(n=19) 0.0(n=18)
Percent white enrollment 
change (T-1 to T)
-9.7(N=44) -8.8(n=25) -10.8(n=19)
Percent white enrollment 
change (T to T+1)
-2.9(N=37) -2.2(n=22) -3.8(n=15)
^Busing change was recorded on a scale of 1 to 20, with numerical values 
generally corresponding to percentage differences.
b.Median=4.0.
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white enrollment. This compares with an implementation year loss of the 
below average group of 8.8 percent. But this second group reflects 
a 3.3 percent loss for the preceding year. So the net loss is only 
5.5 percent, considerably smaller than the loss figure for those with 
more busing. Also somewhat unexpectedly, the below median group has a 
post-implementation year loss of only 2.2 percent, actually lower than 
the figure of 3.1 percent for the year prior to desegregation. The 
above average group shows a 3.8 percent loss for the year after which, 
of course, compares with the 0 figure for the before desegregation year.
This preliminary analysis in which only two groups are com­
pared should be considered as suggestive. With that caveat, the findings 
imply that increases in busing may not produce much desegregation 
change. Also, the results suggest that more busing might tend to 
accelerate white student outmigration.
Summary
This bivariate analysis of desegregation strategies is 
limited, since it does not take account of a variety of other influences 
that can affect desegregation success. The multivariate analysis of 
desegregation change will incorporate a number of other explanatory 
measures as a way of putting strategies into the proper context. Yet 
this preliminary analysis does provide certain information that might 
be useful to both the desegregation planner as well as those who wish 
to understand the process better. For example, previous research 
suggests that such factors as the size of district, percentage 
minority, and especially the degree of external pressure primarily
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determine the degree of desegregation success. But unlike others, this 
analysis suggests that specific techniques may also make at least a 
modest difference.
Those elementary schools using rezoning in combination with 
pairing and clustering not only achieved a greater reduction in racial 
isolation than those districts using other techniques, such schools also 
had less white enrollment loss. A comparable development appeared for 
secondary schools. Rezoning was the overwhelming choice of secondary 
schools, and compared to those using other strategies, districts using 
this approach reflected a greater degree of desegregation success. 
Additionally, white flight was lower with this technique than with the 
others.
Busing was also considered as part of this bivariate analysis. 
When districts were divided at the median of a measure of busing 
increase, those above the average had somewhat greater desegregation 
success. Increases in busing also showed some modest relationship with 
white enrollment change: the more busing, the more white loss. As 
discussed above, the available data for busing and the bivariate method 
of analysis necessitates that considerable caution be exercised in 
interpreting these findings.
A school district or an educational consultant for the 
district or the court cannot arbitrarily impose a preconceived plan on 
a group of elementary schools. The particular needs and requirements 
of the district must be taken into account. Yet, this research 
suggests that where possible responsible officials might consider 
first the combination of rezoning with clustering and pairing of
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various elementary grades. At the secondary level, rezoning might be 
considered as the strategy of first resort.
For scholars of desegregation, the study emphasizes that 
different desegregation techniques are used across school levels with 
varying degrees of success. Thus, future assessments of the effective­
ness of desegregation strategies in reducing racial isolation should 
incorporate appropriate designs to capture this variation.
NOTES
1. Vergon also lists interdistrict or metropolitan plans as a third 
general type of desegregation strategy.
2. Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman (1980: 19) advance a similar argument.
3. For two other studies that attempt to systematically assess the
effect of desegregation strategies see Kirby, et al., 1973 and 
Rossell, 1979.
4. The desegregation action index did not take into account the degree 
to which each of the six techniques were used, only if they were 
used or not used.
5. The case survey instrument allowed the separate coding of magnet-
only and magnet-mandatory plans. A preliminary analysis revealed, 
however, that (contrary to Rossell, 1979) there was almost no 
difference in the relationship of the two with desegregation success. 
Thus the two were combined into a single measure.
6. The OCR data being used in this analysis contain separate desegrega­
tion measures for two levels only. By interpretation it was also 
possible to determine the category to which junior or middle 
schools has been assigned. For our 52 districts the junior or
middle schools were assigned to the secondary level.
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7. For both levels these techniques represent the primary but not
exclusive ones used by particular districts. This was determined 
by the extensiveness of use as measured by the analyst-reader's 





Success in achieving a racially balanced school system depends 
on considerably more than the desegregation technique used. As the 
review of the implementation literature and previous research showed, 
a host of local and extralocal influences may also affect school deseg­
regation efforts (see Chapter 2). This chapter attempts to assess the 
independent effect of the influences shown in Figure 4 (see p. 70) on 
desegregation success. The chapter is comprised of three sections. In 
section one the relationship of each element found in the three blocks 
of predictor forces (shown in Figure 4)— extralocal influences, school 
district characteristics, and desegregation process variables— with 
school desegregation is discussed. The determinants of desegregation 
success systemwide as well as by school level (elementary and secondary) 
are identified in section two. Finally, in the third section, the 
chapter is summarized and implications are discussed.
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School Desegregation Determinants 
As Figure 4 showed, three types of influences may affect 
school desegregation success— external, school district, and desegrega­
tion process. The discussion to follow will be oriented around this 
set of influences.
External Influences
Because of historic and legal reasons, region has been a 
major factor in school segregation from the beginning. Before the 
concerted action of the federal courts at the end of the 1960s, 
southern schools had made little headway with desegregation. Since 
that time, the South has born the brunt of federal pressure, through 
both the actions of HEW and the Department of Justice operating 
through the courts. So these two major external conditions— region 
and federal pressure— have been prominently associated in the course 
of so much desegregation action over the past decade or so. While 
which of the two sources of federal impetus is the most efficacious 
has been debated (see Bullock and Rodgers, 1976; Rossell, 1978b: 156), 
there is little disagreement that federal pressure brings more deseg­
regation (Farley, 1975a; Giles, 1975a; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b).
Whether or not southern schools achieve greater racial 
balance upon desegregation than northern schools is not certain, how­
ever. Fitzgerald and Morgan's (1977b: 448) comparison of the deseg­
regation levels for 1968 and 1972 among a large group of northern 
and southern cities shows that districts in the South made much greater 
changes over the four-year period. But that comparison can be
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misleading. The 1968 and 1972 segregation scores for their 114 
northern cities changed hardly at all, indicating that few had actually 
desegregated. The South reflects large segregation score differences 
for 1968 and 1972 because so many southern districts had been forced 
to act during that period. Nevertheless, southern region is expected 
to be positively related to desegregation success.
School District Characteristics
School district characteristics represent a second basic set 
of environmental forces affecting the effort to achieve racially 
balanced schools. Several district features would seem important, in 
particular the type of district (countywide or noncountywide), district 
size, and percentage minority. Each of these will be considered briefly.
Many observers think an areawide approach to desegregation may 
be the only effective remedy for large urban areas (U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, 1977b:11-12). Without access to predominantly white 
suburbs, it may be virtually impossible to achieve desegregation where 
central city minority enrollment is high. Nonetheless, since the 
Milliken v. Bradley decision in 1974, the courts have been reluctant 
to compel metropolitanwide desegregation. Regardless of the court's 
position, something approximating areawide desegregation exists in some 
communities. In a number of southern states especially, school dis­
tricts are organized on a countywide basis. In effect, the absence of 
white suburban districts means that those who want to avoid desegrega­
tion must either choose a private school or perhaps leave the state. 
Countywide districts are thought to be a useful deterrent to white
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student outmigration. Thus, countywide districts may desegregate more 
successfully than noncountywide districts because they tend to have a 
higher proportion of whites initially and experience less white flight 
(Hawley, et al., 1981: 40). The expectation here is that countywide 
districts will reflect more improvement in desegregation levels than 
noncountywide districts following the implementation of a desegregation 
effort.
Two other features of the school system may contribute 
significantly to desegregation success— the size of the district and 
the proportion minority. Almost every study agrees that the proportion 
minority substantially affects white public school enrollment. Evidence 
is strong that, at least prior to desegregation, the larger the propor­
tion black the higher the level of school segregation (Dye, 1968;
Farley, 1975a). It should be noted, however, that as federal inter­
vention occurs, percentage minority pupils in a district becomes a 
considerably less important influence at least in southern school 
desegregation (Giles, 1975a; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b). Since 
districts with high minority enrollment should evince more segregation 
initially, they may show more change in levels of segregation after a 
plan has been implemented.
Size of district may affect the desegregation process 
primarily for physical and logistical reasons. Districts with large 
enrollments may find it more troublesome to work out the complicated 
arrangements for transporting students. In fact, several studies 
(Giles, 1975a; Farley, 1975a; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977b) find the 
larger the district, the higher the initial level of segregation.
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Again, however, this relationship may be attenuated where desegregation 
occurs under federal coercion (see Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980). Still, 
for purposes of this analysis, the expectation is that more desegregation 
success will be shown among smaller rather than larger districts.
Desegregation Process Variables
Figure 4 depicts an additional set of forces that should 
directly affect desegregation success. In fact, these influences might 
be divided into two groups— desegregation process variables and deseg­
regation strategies. Since the preceding chapter dealt at some length 
with strategies, the discussion here will focus on just those variables 
associated with the desegregation process itself. In particular, 
attention will be devoted to the attitudes toward desegregation on the 
part of the school board and superintendent, citizen involvement in the 
process, and the views of other local elites (including the press).
Two other measures associated with the board and superintendent will 
also be examined— whether or not a new superintendent was hired during 
the desegregation effort and the degree of political insulation of 
the local school board. Each of these will be discussed briefly in 
turn.
First, the school administration may play a key role in the 
desegregation process (see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976: 73-74). 
Even though most of the cases studied here involve mandatory efforts, 
the degree of cooperation, if not support, of the local school officials 
may considerably facilitate or impede the creation and implementation 
of an effective plan. In fact, among the 52 districts, the desegregation
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effort was initiated voluntarily by the school board 15 percent of the 
time. Even where plan implementation is the only part played by the 
school administration, foot dragging and other recalcitrant actions by 
local officials are possible, all of which may adversely affect the 
ultimate outcome. In short, supportive school officials should be 
associated with higher levels of desegregation success.
What about the larger public, does it haVe much effect on 
school desegregation? This potential relationship will be tested in 
two ways. First, if the general white citizenry becomes interested in 
the process, it seems likely that this concern will be manifested by 
opposition and protest. Whether this resistance has any real effect 
is questionable. Intuitively one might assume that an aroused and 
irate citizenry might be able to at least slow down desegregation if 
not get certain objectionable features of the plan changed. Yet Rodgers 
and Bullock (1976a; 43) report that organized white opposition had a 
negligible impact on desegregation. In effect, it came too late. As 
the authors put it, "The tardiness of organized opposition rendered it 
futile." They do acknowledge, however, that unorganized opposition 
may well have taken its toll at an earlier time by creating delays and 
perhaps contributing to the official reluctance to act until federal 
pressure became compelling. Kirby, et al. (1973: 125) observe that, 
among their group of 91 northern communities, white opposition was 
actually associated with greater desegregation success. Again, they 
agree that white resistance is ineffective since it comes after the 
fact. "By the time citizens have rallied to protest a decision, the 
die is cast." Still it would seem this relationship is worth testing
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for the 52 districts included in this study. An index of white 
resistance was created through factor analyzing eight survey items 
pertaining to citizen and elite involvement (see Table 2, Chapter 3). 
Resistance is expected to have a minimal effect on desegregation success.
Citizens may be involved in desegregation in another way— by 
serving in some official or semi-official advisory capacity to the local 
board or the court (a committee of 100, for example). Several questions 
were included in the survey instrument asking about the degree of 
officially sanctioned citizen participation in either plan formulation 
or plan implementation. Factor analysis was used to create an index of 
citizen participation. The expectation is that this form of citizen 
involvement should be positively related to desegregation progress among 
the various districts.
Several studies suggest that community elite support may 
facilitate the desegregation process (see Kirby, et al., 1973: Chap. 8; 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976: 75; Hawley, et al., 1981: 66-67). 
The argument is as follows. Elite endorsement may minimize negative 
citizen reaction. Kirby, et al. (1973: 132) find that where elites favor 
desegregation, the masses follow. Undoubtedly, such commitment may also 
provide valuable help to local officials who might be less inclined to 
move boldly if they feared they might be isolated or even ostracized 
from important community leaders. The local media might also be 
considered as part of a community elite. In many ways it serves a 
similar purpose with regard to a local issue such as school desegregation 
by helping to shape public opinion and generate support or opposition 
to the plans of school officials. Again, an index of elite support was
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generated through factor analysis. To the extent elites favored the 
desegregation effort, greater success should have been achieved.
Two other process measures are used. The first is the hiring 
of a new superintendent. Rodgers arid Bullock (1976a: 44) observe that 
changing a superintendent may expedite the demise of dual school systems 
in the South. Apparently bringing in new leadership can hasten the 
process of desegregation. The second variable is one labeled school 
board insulation. Certain governmental characteristics of the local 
school system make school board members less immediately accessible and 
less potentially responsive to citizen influence. For example, the 
fewer the meetings, presumably the less opportunity the public has to 
confront board members over unpopular issues. The assumption is that 
school boards somewhat insulated from popular access are in a better 
position to act contrary to mass opinion. Several studies (Crain, et 
al., 1968; Kirby, et al., 1973) suggest that where sensitive or contro­
versial issues are under consideration, action by local governments is 
easier where public participation is minimized. Thus, it is expected 




The multivariate analysis of desegregation success will include 
the effects of various influences systemwide as well as by school level. 
Table 9 shows the systemwide analysis to include the simple correlation 
(r), the beta weight (standardized regression coefficient), the t scores
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TABLE 9
EFFECTS OF VARIOUS INFLUENCES ON DESEGREGATION CHANGE 
AT SYSTEMWIDE LEVEL (N=50)
Blocks of Variables r Beta t-score
External Influences
Region^ (0/1) ^ .23 .27 (9.38)® 1.64
Federal coercion .37 .44 (3.73) 3.19**
School District Characteristics
Type of district^ (0/1) .40 .27 (9.18) 1.46
Percent minority^ -.26 -.01 (-.008) .04
Size of district -.12 -.40 (-.0001) 2.64**
Desegregation Process Variables^
Supt. and school board support .26 .29 (5.66) 2.18*
Citizen participation -.03 .02 (.335) .14
Elite support .02 .04 (.762) .28
Hiring new superintendent .04 .21 (7.83) 1.63
School board insulation .26 -.04 (-1.15) .32
* p < .05
** p < .03
R^ = .46; R^ = .32; F = 3.28** with 10 and 39 degrees of freedom.
N o n - S o u t h / S o u t h .
^For operationalization see Table 2, pp. 98-100. 
'Noncountywide/countywide.
Total school enrollment.
' U n s t a n d a r d i z e d  r e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s .
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2(to determine the level of statistical significance), and the R 
(total explained variance). After a brief consideration of the zero- 
order associations, the primary concentration will be on the beta.
This statistic indicates how much change in level of segregation can be 
attributed to a one standardized unit of change in an independent 
variable, when all other variables are statistically held constant. In 
short, the beta indicates the relative importance of each variable within 
the equation.
First, the simple correlations at the systemwide level are 
examined^ (see Table 9). Several variables show fairly strong relation­
ships with desegregation success. Type of district (r=.40) and federal 
coercion (r=.37) are the two strongest. Countywide districts reflect 
considerable achievement. Likewise, the more involved the federal 
government, the more desegregation change occurs. Several other 
correlations might be mentioned. Southern districts manifest more 
progress in creating unitary schools than did those in the non-South 
(r=.23). As expected, the greater the minority percentage, the less 
change took place (r=-.26). Only three desegregation process variables 
show enough simple association with desegregation success to warrant 
mention. Superintendent and board support is of some consequences; 
the more support, the more racially balanced the schools (r=.26). 
Likewise, the more the board was shielded from direct citizen pressure 
(board insulation), the higher the level of desegregation success 
(r=.26). Finally, one other correlation should be noted that is not 
shown in Table 9. Desegregation resistance covaries positively with 
desegregation change (r =.27). This suggests that, not only is
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opposition not effective, it probably arises in reaction to the deseg­
regation effort. The more racial isolation is reduced, the greater the 
tendency of whites to protest. This particular relationship is not 
included in the table for reasons discussed below. None of the other 
simple relationships are especially noteworthy, except in some instances 
where they did not prove to be as closely associated with desegregation 
success as expected. In that regard, size of district did not prove to 
be as conspicuous as had been expected (r=-.12). Previous research has 
found that elimination of dual school systems is especially difficult 
for those districts with large total enrollments. As will be shown 
below, however, district size does become quite potent in the multi­
variate analysis.
The results of the initial multiple regression analysis are 
also shown in Table 9. The equation for desegregation success at the
systemwide level shows three statistically significant explanatory
2 —2 2 variables with a total explained variance (R ) of 46 percent (R =.32).
Both measures in the external influence block are important. In fact,
federal coercion (beta = .44) is the most powerful single effect in
the equation. Region is also of some consequence with a standardized
regression coefficient of .27 (not significant). Both are in the same
direction as for the bivariate case indicating that, when other
variables are taken into account, federal involvement produces more
change and greater success occurs among southern than northern districts.
Two of the three school district characteristics are 
influential as well. In fact, size of district (beta = -.40) is the 
second most powerful effect of all under controlled conditions. The
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direction is as hypothesized: large districts have more trouble 
desegregating. While not significant statistically, type of district 
with its standardized slope (beta) of .27 is of some consequence. 
Countywide districts produce better results all other things considered. 
Percent minority should be noted. With other measures held constant, 
the effect of this variable virtually disappears (beta = -.01). This 
confirms previous research indicating that when other forces enter in, 
the potential barrier of a large minority enrollment largely evaporates.
One of the five desegregation process measures reflects 
statistical significance. If desegregation resistance had been kept, it 
too would have been significant. Since the ordinary least squares 
regression techniques used here do not allow reciprocal causation, the 
resistance variable should not be used to predict desegregation success.
As suggested above, this development comes after the fact. If this
2 ' measure had been included, however, the R for the equation would rise
to .54 (R^=.41). Superintendent and board support is of considerable 
import, and in the expected direction (beta = .29; statistically signifi­
cant). Also, as others have shown, the hiring of a new school super­
intendent may also contribute to desegregation success (beta = .21). 
Citizen participation, elite support, and school board insulation do 
not seem to make much difference when all factors are taken into account. 
Since the specific techniques are applied at each school level separately, 
they are not included as part of the systemwide analysis.
The desegregation literature also suggests that three other 
variables may influence local desegregation efforts. First, the 
degree to which a community (school district) is residential!/ segregated
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may affect efforts to end racial isolation (see Farley, 1975b; Fitzgerald 
and Morgan, 1977b). Second, if busing is employed as part of the over­
all local effort to end racial isolation, desegregation success should 
be enhanced, so the argument goes. As Orfield (1978: 118) puts it:
"Often the only choice is the one people most wish to avoid— busing or 
segregation." Finally, previous literature suggests (see Kirby, et al., 
1973; Wegner and Mercer, 1975) that the total desegregation activity 
(i.e., number of strategies employed) in a district is not, or is only 
moderately, related to desegregation success. Data are available in 
this study to offer a limited test of these arguments. When these three 
variables— residential segregation,^ busing increase,^ and the total 
number of techniques used— were added to the systemwide equation in 
Table 9, the following results emerged:
o An increase in busing as a part of a local desegrega­
tion effort is positively but not significantly 
(.05 level) associated with desegregation success 
(r=.14; t-score = .14). 
o The greater the number of desegregation strategies 
employed by a district the less desegregation success 
(beta = -.24; not significant at .05 level), 
o Residential segregation is positively and significantly 
(.05 level) related to desegregation success (beta =
.37; t-score = 1.99). 
o The N size is reduced from 50 to 38 in this supplemen­
tary analysis (data are missing on two of the three 
variables— busing and residential segregation).
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2o The predictive power (S. ) of the equation is increased 
from .46 to .59 (R^=.32 to .38).
In sum, increases in busing and the number of desegregation 
strategies employed by districts are only weakly to moderately related 
to desegregation success. In fact, the more strategies used, the less 
progress made. In contrast, high levels of residential segregation are 
positively related to desegregation success, a finding that may be 
explained best by the substantial gains made in southern communities in 
reducing separation in the schools.
These three variables were not retained in the regression 
equation reported above for several reasons. First, preserving as many 
of the cases as possible was considered vital. Second, finding resid­
ential segregation positively related to desegregation success raises 
questions regarding what the residential segregation variable represents. 
A priori, one might expect reducing racial isolation in the schools to 
be more difficult in heavily segregated communities. Farley (1975b: 192) 
states that residential segregation makes school desegregation harder 
because it increases the necessity for busing, which the white community 
vigorously resists. But here more success is found among districts 
that are segregated, contrary to expectations. This suggests that 
residential segregation is serving as a proxy for some other situation 
or influence, southerness probably,^ and should not be used to "predict" 
desegregation success. Finally, once it has been established that the 
desegregation activity score index is negatively related to desegrega­
tion success, it is more productive to search for those specific 




Table 10 provides the analysis for elementary schools only. It 
should be mentioned again that only a few of the 52 districts desegregated 
at just one level. This means that, with the exception of the desegrega­
tion technique variable, the values of the other predictor variables in 
this equation are virtually the same as for the systemwide analysis.
The dependent variable, however, represents a separate calculation of 
the dissimilarity index for each level. For example, the year prior to 
desegregation, elementaty schools had a desegregation score of 69.6 
compared to a figure of 59.5 for secondary schools. Following the 
effort to achieve a unitary system, elementary schools dropped to a 
segregation level of 40.8, a difference of 29.4. At the secondary level, 
for the year of desegregation the score was 35.3, which indicates an 
absolute change of 24.3 points. In brief, among the group of 52 schools 
the initial level of segregation was higher at the elementary level, but 
somewhat more change was achieved there than for the secondary level.
Now back to the findings in Table 10. The major differences 
between the elementary and systemwide level will be highlighted. First,
less variance can be accounted for at the elementary level = .36;
—2 2 —2 R = .16) compared to the systemwide analysis (R = .46; R = .32). And
none of the predictor variables reach statistical significance. As far
as individual predictor variables are concerned, somewhat surprisingly,
the most important at the elementary is not federal pressure but type
of district (with a beta of .30). For the primary grades, countywide
districts do especially well. Federal coercion is the next most prominent
effect (beta = .23), followed by size of district, superintendent and
board support, and the hiring of a new superintendent.
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TABLE 10
EFFECTS OF VARIOUS INFLUENCES ON DESEGREGATION CHANGE 
AT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LEVEL (N=47)
Blocks of Variables r Beta t-score
External Influences
Region^ .15 .13 (5.01)^ .62
Federal coercion .29 .28 (2.71) 1.58
School District Characteristics
Type of district^ .31 .30 (11.62) 1.41
Percent minority^ -.24 .02 (.024) .10
Size of district -.17 -.25 (-.0001) 1.30
Desegregation Process Variables
Supt. and school board support .19 .23 (4.88) 1.47
Citizen participation -.11 -.03 (-.59) .20
Elite support .10 .16 (3.78) 1.07
Hiring new superintendent .07 .20 (8.26) 1.30
School board insulation .23 -.01 (-.38) .10
Desegregation Technique
Pairing/clustering and
rezoning (0/1)® .20 .19 (8.91) 1.10
* p < .05
** p < .01
R^ = .36; R^ = .16; F = 1.76 with 11 and 35 degrees of freedom.
^Non-South/South.






In general, the basic influences are quite similar when the 
elementary-level findings are compared to those for both levels combined, 
except for two things. Less variance can be explained, and federal 
coercion is not quite as powerful, relatively speaking. Neither of 
these two developments are easily explained. Since almost no one else 
has done a separate analysis by school level, these findings cannot 
readily be compared to those of other studies. One possibility does 
come to mind, nonetheless. Apparently parents become more concerned, 
if not threatened, when desegregation comes to the early grades (see 
Hawley, et al., 1981: 17). This is manifested in part by the greater 
degree of white withdrawal from elementary as opposed to secondary 
schools (see the previous chapter. Table 6). This outmigration may also 
be complicated by the "nonentrance" of white families who have young 
children and wish to avoid desegregated schools. Rossell (1981: 20) 
reports that at least in one city, evidence shows that some white 
families moving into a desegregated system tended to place their children 
in private schools. This may be especially likely where young children 
are involved. No doubt the variables used here are not very effective 
in capturing these more subtle behavioral processes that affect the 
ultimate desegregation outcome.
The other notable difference at the elementary level concerns 
the relatively less critical role of federal coercion. Again perhaps 
even the federal courts are not as eager to push for extensive change 
in the lower grades for fear of further antagonizing white parents. The 
relatively greater import of countywide districts may have more to do 
with the differences in choices afforded parents of young children than
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anything else. The absence of segregated suburban districts may offer 
parents few alternatives unless they can afford private schools. Thus, 
avoidance becomes more difficult, contributing to the overall success 
of the desegregation effort.
The analyses by level also contain one additional feature—  
the effects of the most promising desegregation strategy (see Table 7).
In this case, the variable indicates whether or not the district used 
pairing/clustering and rezoning as the principal technique. Initially, 
it might be mentioned that the simple correlation between desegregation 
change and this technique (r=.30) is among the strongest for any 
predictor variable. Yet when this measure is included with all the 
others, it does not reach statistical significance. It does add 2 
percent to explained variance, however. And its beta weight of .19 is 
the sixth largest, suggesting that the use of this particular technique 
does contribute to greater success. In fact, the unstandardized regres­
sion coefficient of 8.91 means that if a district uses this strategy 
at the elementary level it would expect to lower the level of segrega­
tion by about nine points,^ even with all the other influences in the 
equation taken into account. This is not an inconsequential amount, 
suggesting again that at least for elementary schools, the specific 
technique does matter.
Secondary Level
The analysis of desegregation change at the secondary level 
is found in Table 11. Again, the differences between these results and 
those at the systemwide level will be emphasized. In fact, only one
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TABLE 11
EFFECTS OF VARIOUS INFLUENCES ON DESEGREGATION CHANGE 
AT SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL (N=46)
Blocks of Variables r Beta t-score
External Influences
Region^ ^ .35 .35 (11.77)^ 2.07*
Federal coercion .40 .50 (3.85) 3.72**
School District Characteristics
Type of district^ .46 .20 (6.43) 1.10
Percent minority^ -.26 .00 (-.002) .00
Size of district -.13 -.41 (-.0001) 2.89**
Desegregation Process Variables^
Supt. and school board support .27 .34 (6.01) 2.61**
Citizen participation -.04 .03 (.490) .24
Elite support -.04 -.05 (-1.05) .44
Hiring new superintendent -.12 .04 (1.47) .33
School board insulation .22 -.13 (-3.37) 1.00
Desegregation Technique
Rezoning^ .29 .09 (3.01) .72
* p < .05
** p < .01
R^ = .55; R^ = .41; F = 3.85** with 11 and 34 degrees of freedom.
^Non-South/South.






main dissimilarity appears. Among the group of secondary schools, 
hiring of a new superintendent helps very little (beta = .05). Other­
wise, at the secondary level the basic forces shaping desegregation 
success parallel those for the system as a whole: federal coercion has 
clearly the most powerful effect followed by size of district.
The technique of rezoning (used or not used) has also been 
added to the equation to account for variation in desegregation success 
among secondary schools. In this case rezoning makes little difference. 
Even though the simple correlation is .29, the beta is only .09 (not 
statistically significant), and this variable adds nothing to explained 
variance. If the unstandardized regression coefficient is examined, it 
shows that the use of rezoning, as opposed to other techniques, should 
produce an average decline in segregation levels of about three points.^ 
Even though including the desegregation tool in the analysis does not 
help much, the overall equation predicts desegregation success better at 
the secondary than the elementary level, = .55 (R̂  = .41). This lack 
of additional explanatory power for rezoning tends to confirm the 
earlier bivariate analysis of strategies when elementary and secondary 
schools are compared. When the most effective strategy at the elementary 
level (pairing/clustering with rezoning) is employed, somewhat greater 
desegregation success seems to occur than when rezoning is used at the 
secondary level. Apparently the application of particular techniques 
as opposed to others is somewhat more compelling when lower grades are 
being desegregated as opposed to upper grades.
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Summary
This chapter has offered a multivariate analysis of deseg­
regation change among 52 large school districts based on a school 
desegregation implementation model. The model postulates that external 
forces (federal coercion and region), school district characteristics 
(size of district, percent minority, type of district), and desegrega­
tion process variables (e.g., strategies, citizen participation, school 
board support) affect the degree to which a district may improve its 
racial balance. The major feature of this analysis distinguishing it 
from previous efforts lies with the inclusion of the process and 
strategy measures. Most past attempts to account for desegregation 
change have not been able to capture these possibly significant forces.
The use of the case survey method has enabled this analysis to incor­
porate these otherwise difficult to obtain data.
The analysis was performed at the systemwide level as well as 
separately for elementary and secondary schools. The analysis by level 
was essential to permit the inclusion of the various desegregation 
techniques, which vary in their use by school level.
At the systemwide level the following influences were especially 
salient in helping to account for desegregation success (when all other 
factors were taken into account):
o Federal coercion was the single most powerful force 
in producing racially balanced schools, 
o Greater change in segregation levels occurred in 
southern rather than northern districts.
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o Larger districts (based on enrollment) has less deseg­
regation success than smaller districts (the second 
most potent influence). 
o Countywide districts moved further toward unitary 
school systems than noncountywide districts, 
o Support by school officials tended to improve the 
prospects for desegregation success, 
o Hiring a new school superintendent helped achieve 
desegregation progress.
Certain differences appeared when the analysis was performed 
by school level. For elementary schools the most important predictor 
of desegregation success was type of district (countywide) closely 
followed by federal coercion. Although the relationship was not 
statistically significant the inclusion in the analysis of the most 
efficacious desegregation technique (pairing/clustering with rezoning) 
did make a difference. Based on the regression coefficient, the equation 
predicts that the use of pairing and clustering with rezoning should 
reduce the level of segregation about nine points, when all other 
variables are taken into account.
The multivariate analysis for secondary schools closely 
paralleled that for the systemwide level. The main difference appeared 
with the lack of importance of hiring a new superintendent at the 
secondary level. Federal coercion was the most powerful influence for 
this analysis followed by size of district. When the technique of 
rezoning (the most widely used and tentatively most effective) was 
included, it did not contribute much to explaining desegregation success
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at the secondary level. The equation indicated that rezoning (as 
opposed to other techniques) should produce an average decline in 
segregation of about three points.
In short, certain desegregation process and strategy variables 
did prove to be useful predictors of desegregation success. Although 
variations appeared by school level, school board and superintendent 
support and to a lesser extent hiring of a new school superintendent 
helped further desegregation progress. Especially for elementary schools, 
the use of pairing and clustering with rezoning as the principal technique 
also contributed to reducing racial imbalance among the 52 districts.
NOTES
In completing the case survey instruments, the analyst-readers 
were unable to respond to some questions. When the instruments 
were coded and transformed into machine-readable form, nonresponses 
were given missing data codes. Missing data, of course, may be 
a problem in any data analysis.
In choosing the variables from the case survey instrument that 
would be used to create the desegregation process variables (see 
Table 2), considerable attention was given to the issue of missing 
data. Following the lead of Yin, Heald, and Vogel (1977), missing 
data, in those cases where it was theoretically possible to do so, 
were assigned to a "neutral" category or position. The alternative 
would be to listwise delete cases that had missing values for one or 
more of the variables. This proved to be an unacceptable alterna­
tive since it would have automatically reduced the number of cases 
for analysis from 52 to 19.
For the desegregation process variables employed in the present 
study. Table 12 shows:
(1) those variables that contained missing data codes;
(2) the number of cases for which data were missing;
(3) the category assigned to those cases with missing data;
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TABLE 12















Court order parameters of plan 
(Q. 16) 2 NO .26 .21
Court specify racial balance 
(Q. 17) 2 NO .17 .12
Court require outside profes­
sional (Q. 62) 2 NO .30 .35
Citizen participation required 
(Q. 57) 3 NO -.14 -.16
Power of citizen group in plan 
formulation (Q. 59) 4 NONE -.09 -.10
Power of citizen group in plan 
implementation (Q. 60) 3 NONE .01 -.07
School board support (Q. 56) 12 NEUTRAL .38 .35
Effectiveness of antidesegrega­
tion groups (Q. 68) 11
NOT
EFFECTIVE .15 .11









(4) the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) 
of the variable with systemwide desegregation success 
when missing data were assigned to a "neutral" category 
and when cases containing missing data were excluded.
As Table 12 shows, in every case but one (Q. 60) the difference 
between the two correlation coefficients is not greater than ,05. 
Moreover, these differences do not display a consistent pattern or 
direction. Based on these differences, a systematic bias does not
seem to appear when missing data are assigned to neutral categories.
2 —2 22. The adjusted R statistic (R ) adjusts R for the number of
independent variables in the equation and the number of cases.
According to Nie, et al. (1975: 358) the statistic is "a more con­
servative estimate of the percent of variance explained, especially 
when the sample size is small."
3. Residential segregation scores are the dissimilarity indices for 
the principal city (or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
where more appropriate) in the district. The source is Van Valley, 
Roof, and Wilcox (1977).
4. Busing increase is on a scale of 0 to 20, corresponding generally
to percentage increases. The median value for the variable is 4.4.
5. The simple correlation (r) between region and residential segrega­
tion is .21, indicating that southern communities indeed tend to be 
more segregated than those in the North.
6. The other two strategies previously shown to be potentially effective 
were also included separately in the analysis in lieu of pairing/ 
clustering with rezoning. They both add an additional 2 percent to
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explained variance, but neither shows an unstandardized coefficient 
(b) of the magnitude of pairing/clustering with rezoning (8.91). The 
b for pairing and clustering (versus all others) is 7.11; for 
rezoning (against all others) the b is 5.60. This offers additional 
confirmation that the use of certain techniques rather than others 
may help achieve desegregation success. It should be remembered, 
however, that the effects of the three desegregation techniques bn 
desegregation change, when simultaneously assessed with the other 
predictor variables, are not statistically significant.
Since rezoning was the overwhelming choice of secondary schools and 
seemed to generally work better than other strategies, no additional 
techniques were tried in the multivariate analysis.
CHAPTER VI
EXPLAINING WHITE ENROLLMENT DECLINE:
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Introduction
"The ineffectiveness of protest demonstrations and protest 
voting in preventing desegregation, once the decision has been made, 
will compel some individuals to attempt to avoid school desegregation 
even though the community is still forced to undergo it" (Rossell, 1981: 
15). One way in which school desegregation can be avoided is through 
"white flight"— the withdrawal of white students from the local school 
system (see Cataldo, Giles, and Gatlin, 1978).
The research by James S. Coleman and associates made big news 
in 1975 when they announced that white loss in large city school systems 
was accelerated by school desegregation. The immediate response by some 
was to question these results, partly because of the method of analysis 
and the cities used. For example, Rossell (1978b: 153) contends that if 
the Coleman study had not divided the group of schools into large and 
small, they would have discovered that school desegregation had no 
statistically significant effect on white flight. In fact, Rossell's 
(1975-76) early research found that desegregation did not contribute
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to white enrollment loss. Other early studies also took issue with the 
degree of white flight identified in Coleman's work (see Farley, 1975a; 
Pettigrew and Green, 1976; Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977a, 1977c).
More recently, however, a reassessment of the relationship 
between school desegregation and white flight has begun to appear. For 
example. Armor (1978) and Rossell (1981) suggest that while the degree 
of white loss may be dependent upon other influences (e.g., community 
attitudes, school level, duration of desegregation efforts), one fact 
seems certain— school desegregation does accelerate white enrollment 
loss during implementation year. The primary purpose of this chapter is 
to identify those influences that may affect the school desegregation 
implementation process and to test the implementation year-white enroll­
ment decline relationship. The chapter is organized into three sections. 
Section one serves as an introduction to the white flight literature.
In section two white enrollment decline is explained based on the 52 
school districts included in the present study. The third section pro­
vides a summary of findings.
Research Issues Affecting the 
Analysis of White Flight
Why the difference? Why, even now, do some studies identify 
a greater degree of white loss resulting from desegregation than do 
others? As with most complex social research, this question cannot be 
answered definitively. Yet, some clues do exist. As Armor (1978: 1) 
points out, the early studies used substantially the same data base—  
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) annual ethnic enrollment data. Most 
of the initial efforts thus were based on enrollment data through 1972
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or 1973, prior to court-ordered desegregation in the North. Even so, 
Coleman's (1975) findings are at odds with several other early studies, 
especially Farley (1975a) and Rossell (1975-76). A brief examination of 
the major studies, the approaches taken, and the variables used might 
help determine why certain discrepant findings exist.
The research of Coleman, et al. (1975) might be considered 
first since it caused such a reaction. Focusing on year-by-year changes 
in white enrollment and using multiple regression techniques, they 
estimate the increase in loss of whites as a function of desegregation, 
proportion black in the school system, number of students in the 
system, and the degree of metropolitan desegregation (as a proxy for 
white suburbs). Separate analyses are performed for northern and 
southern cities and for large and small districts. Their essential 
conclusion is that white loss is greatest in large southern central 
city districts with a sizable percentage black enrollment. This loss 
is magnified where white suburbs exist around the district. As noted 
above, Rossell (1978b) believes that the Coleman study would have found 
very little white flight had it not divided the cities into groups by 
size. Coleman's work has also been criticized for the choice of cities 
(Pettigrew and Green, 1976) and because no effort was made to separate 
the effects of government-imposed desegregation from other types 
(Rossell, 1975-76).
Rossell's (1975-76) initial work on white flight should be 
elaborated briefly as well, since it represents a significant variation 
upon the methods Coleman used. Employing a quasi-experimental design, 
Rossell divided 86 medium and large-sized northern school districts into
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those legally required to desegregate and a "control" group under no 
such orders. She then compares pre-desegregation white loss with post­
desegregation losses for both groups of districts. In effect, she finds 
that all the districts experienced white loss but that court-ordered 
districts had less white flight than the other group (pp. 688-689).
Armor (1978: 6-7) faults this particular study on several grounds. He 
objects to the use of percentage white enrollment as the dependent 
variable instead of change in white enrollment. He thinks omission of 
other factors identified by Coleman as affecting white loss (e.g., 
proportion black) may have influenced the findings as well. Finally, 
he notes that Rossell did not take account of other events that might 
influence white enrollment decline prior to the year of desegregation 
(e.g., changing demographic characteristics).
A second analysis of white flight has been done by Rossell 
(1978a). Again she uses a quasi-experimental, interrupted time series 
design for a time period from 1964 to 1975 with 113 school districts. 
This time Rossell finds that school districts undergoing extensive 
desegregation are likely to have sustained a statistically significant 
white enrollment loss. Only three control districts suffered a signifi­
cant loss (p. 14). Nonetheless, she observes that proportion black in 
the district and not desegregation is by far the most important pre­
dictor of white loss. Also Rossell confirms that the greatest white 
outmigration occurs in the year of implementation and that post­
implementation losses tend to decline. This second Rossell study is one 
of the best done, although Armor (1978: 7-8) still complains that the 
absence of demographic trends makes it difficult to determine just how
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much white loss results from anticipatory effects. In addition, Rossell 
includes only one desegregation plan effect (percentage white and black 
reassigned), although an interaction term with white reassignment and 
proportion black ^ 35 percent is the second best predictor of white 
enrollment decline.
Another study taking a somewhat different approach was done in 
1978 by David Armor. He includes only a group of large city districts 
undergoing court-ordered mandatory desegregation. Armor is especially 
concerned with anticipatory white loss, which he controls for by applying 
demographic projections to 23 northern and southern districts with over 
20 percent minority enrollment and available suburbs (those most prone 
to white flight). The method essentially involves a comparison of 
actual white loss rates with rates projected on the basis of demographic 
trends. Armor (1978: iii) concludes that court-ordered desegregation 
produces "both large and long-term" increases in white loss, resulting 
in growing "ethnic and racial isolation in many larger school districts." 
Although the idea of taking account of demographic changes sounds appeal­
ing, Rossell (1981: 26-27) considers Armor's efforts flawed. In parti­
cular, she objects to the way in which he derives his demographic pro­
jections.
At least two recent studies might be considered for the light 
they shed on the controversies surrounding the proper approach to 
studying white enrollment loss. Giles (1978) works with a group of 
southern districts located in metropolitan areas that underwent govern­
ment (court or HEW) enforced school desegregation (also see Giles, Cataldo, 
and Gatlin, 1975). Using only percentage black to predict enrollment
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change, Giles examines white loss at both the district and the school 
level. His principal concern is with the nature of this relationship, 
e.g., whether or not it is linear. His major finding is that with 
districts above 30 percent black enrollment, increases in percent black 
produce an exponential increase in white withdrawal. Yet, districts 
with less than 30 percent black experiences only moderate white loss, 
which was unrelated to the level of black concentration. Giles 
acknowledges that this relationship does not take into account other 
reasons for white outmigration (e.g., general trends toward suburbaniza­
tion) and is limited to southern districts.
Finally, a recent study by Farley, Richards, and Wurdock (1980) 
contends that many of the discrepant findings in this area are the result 
of the use of different explanatory models. They identify three types—  
pooled models, means models, and deviations models. In a careful compari­
son of the three, they conclude that the most appropriate way of assess­
ing the effect of school desegregation on white flight is by using the 
deviations model. This approach permits a comparison of within-district 
changes in white enrollment to within-district changes in school deseg­
regation rather than a comparison of such changes across districts.
Based on this model, Farley, et al. find that an unusually large drop in 
segregation is associated with a similarly large decline in white enroll­
ment, at least in the short run. Over a longer period, however, deseg­
regation could account for only a small part of the total white enroll­
ment change. Although this approach appears especially effective as 
a way of concentrating on variations within districts, the deviation 
model tested by the authors does not possess good predictive power. For
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example, using three predictor variables— percent black, change in level 
of school desegregation, and metropolitan residential segregation— the 
deviations from school district means model can only explain 14 percent 
of the percentage change in white school enrollment (p. 131).
Farley, et al. (1980) are correct that at least some of the 
controversy over desegregation's impact on white enrollment stems from 
the use of different statistical models. Yet, as Armor (1978) suggests, 
regardless of the method, agreement has been reached on several issues. 
Rossell (1978b: 134-135; also see 1981: 46-48) provides the best summairy, 
based on both aggregate research and case studies, of what is now known 
regarding this relationship. The following points seem to have consid­
erable support :
o School desegregation does indeed accelerate white
enrollment decline, primarily because of losses during 
the implementation year, 
o White reassignments to black schools considerably 
increase white flight.
0 White losses are greater from elementary as opposed to 
secondary schools, 
o Phased-in desegregation plans may result in greater 
white flight than single year implementation plans 
since the more advance notice white parents receive, 
the greater the white losses, 
o Adverse media publicity may induce greater white losses, 
o Above a certain level proportion black (30-35%) in
the school system, white flight substantially increases.
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o The greater the extent of desegregation resistance
(e.g., protests, violence) the greater the white flight, 
o White enrollment losses are smaller under metropolitan 
plans as well as countywide school districts than city 
only plans.
o The long-term effects of school desegregation vary by 
size and type of district and proportion minority. In 
large central city districts with above 35 percent 
minority, white enrollment continues to decline as a 
result of school desegregation.
Some of these propositions appear better established than 
others. Armor (1978) insists that court-ordered desegregation leads to 
greater white withdrawal than board-initiated plans. Rossell (1981: 36) 
disagrees. In addition, Farley, et al. (1980: 137) also suggest that 
if national trends in white enrollment change are considered, the 
effects of proportion minority within a district become less clear. 
Overall, the relationship is as expected— higher percentage black induces 
greater white loss (but is not statistically significant). In addition, 
the Farley study finds that in countywide and smaller districts, the 
relationship reverses— the effect of the district's racial composition 
is not in the expected direction. Thus, despite the growing number of 
studies and the increased analytic sophistication, further research may 
yield useful results. This would seem especially true where, as is the 
case here, certain variables concerning the desegregation process it­
self are available.
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The case survey approach used in this research permits the 
accumulation of considerably more information than is customarily 
available regarding the various features of the desegregation process 
itself. Consequently, in the analysis that follows primary emphasis 
will be placed on explaining white enrollment losses resulting from the 
three types of influences— external, school district, desegregation 
process— displayed in Figure 4. Similar to most of the comparative 
studies focusing on white enrollment declines, the dependent variable is 
a standardized white enrollment measure (proportional white enrollment 
change) and the between-district model is employed.
Explaining White Enrollment Decline 
Before examining the combined effects of a group of variables 
on white enrollment change, three preliminary analyses might be offered. 
First, previous research suggests that elementary schools suffer more 
white losses as a result of school desegregation than do secondary 
schools (Rossell, 1981: 37). The first table in this analysis will 
present changes in white enrollment over time by school level. A second 
question that will be addressed using a bivariate analysis concerns the 
effects of phased-in plans. As suggested above, where implementation 
occurs over several years, the white outmigration may accelerate 
because of the longer notice parents receive. As a test of this propos­
ition, the 52 districts are divided into two groups— those that phased- 
in versus those that desegregated in one year. Finally, previous litera­
ture suggests that large central city districts with high minority 
enrollments may suffer unusually heavy white flight (see Rossell, 1981: 35)
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And, moreover, such districts may not recover their pre-desegregation 
white enrollment levels over the succeeding years. In addition, Rossell 
(1981: 35) notes that white enrollment losses should be less in metro­
politan districts than among city-only areas. These previous findings, 
applied to the 52 districts analyzed here, are tested below.
White Enrollment Change by School Level
Table 13 presents the mean white enrollment changes by school 
level over time. At the systemwide level, prior to desegregation implem­
entation (T-2 and T-1) the school districts lost an average of, respec­
tively, 2.2 and 2.0 percent of their white students. During implementa­
tion year the mean white student loss jumped to 9.8 percent, and then 
returned to approximately pre-implementation levels (2.7%). Clearly, 
with no other influences considered, desegregation is associated with 
about a 7 to 8 percent one-time decline in white enrollment.
When districts are divided by school level, some variations 
appear. As Table 13 reveals, during implementation year elementary 
schools lost, on the average, 12.1 percent of their white students. In 
contrast, secondary schools experienced only a 4.7 percent white student 
enrollment decline. Moreover, pre-implementation losses as well as post­
implementation losses are greater at the elementary than the secondary 
level. In fact, the data lend some support to the notion that when 
desegregation efforts are aimed at the elementary school level, greater 
white flight may occur due to anticipatory effects and the "nonentrance" 
of young children into the school system (see McConahay and Hawley, 1978; 
Pride, 1980). For example, two years prior to desegregation implementation.
TABLE 13
MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY SCHOOL LEVEL
School Level
Time Point^
(T-2) (T-1) (T) (T+1) (T+2) (T+3)
Systemwide -2.2(N=32) -2.0(N=43) -9.8(N=50) -2.7(N=37) -2.7(N=39) -2.7(N=34)
Elementary -3.1(N=34) -4.9(N=43) -12.1(N=47) -5.1(N=39) -3.5(N=39) -4.0(N=33)
Secondary -1.1(N=28) -0.3(N=39) =4.7(N=46) -2.1(N=39) -1.8(N=36) -1.8(N=33)
T equals desegregation implementation year. White enrollment changes are calculated as percentages. 
For example (T-2) = (T-2)-(T-3)
(T-3) oo
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elementary schools lost approximately 3 percent of their white students. 
The year prior to implementation this percentage increased by almost 
2 percent to 4.9. In comparison, both at the systemwide and secondary 
levels T-1 white student declines are less than T-2 losses.
Finally, Table 13 supports the hypothesis that the effect of 
school desegregation on white student losses is not long-term (Rossell, 
1978a; Farley, et al., 1979; McConahay and Hawley, 1978). Regardless of 
school level, post-implementation white enrollment changes, while 
slightly larger, are similar in magnitude to pre-implementation declines.
Phased-In Plans
Does it make a difference if a desegregation plan is "phased- 
in" (spread out over several years)? Rossell (1981: 35) argues that 
"phasing-in plans . . . may cause greater white flight than simply 
implementing a plan in its entirety in one year." The argument is that 
when desegregation plans are phased-in by school level or over several 
years, parents are given more time to flee. Thus, this advance notice 
creates greater white flight.
In order to test the generalizability of this finding, the 
school districts comprising this study were divided into two groups—  
districts who spread their desegregation efforts over two or more years 
(phased-in their plans) and those who completed major desegregation 
efforts within a single year. Table 14 presents the white school enroll­
ment changes for these two groups.
As Table 14 reveals, the 18 districts employing phased-in 
plans, on the average, lost 2.5 percent more white students in the 
implementation year than the 32 districts implementing desegregation
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TABLE 14
MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY 
WHETHER DESEGREGATION PLAN WAS PHASED-IN
Variable Category
White Enroll. Chg. 
Year Prior to 
Implementation 
(T-l)b








Phased-In Plan^ -3.3(N=15) -11.4(N=18) -1.6(N=8)
Nonphased-in Plan -1.3(N=28) -8.9(N=32) -2.9(N=28)
Grand Mean -2.0(N=43) -9.8(N=50) -2.7(N=37)
^Primary desegregation effort occurred over two or more years.
^Percentage change (T-1)-(T-2)/(T-2). 
"^Percentage change (T)-(T-1)/(T-1) • 
"^Percentage change (T+1)-(T) / (T) .
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within a single year (-11.4% and -8.9%, respectively). But white enroll­
ment losses were also higher the year prior to implementation in 
districts using phased-in plans (-3.3 compared to -1.3). This means 
the net loss difference between the two plans is not great— 8.1 percent 
for phased-in plans (11.4 minus 3.3) and 7.6 percent for one-year plans 
(8.9 minus 1.3). Taking account of pre-implementation loss yields a 
difference, then, of only .5 between the two types of plans. Moreover, 
one-year efforts show greater enrollment declines the year following 
desegregation than phased-in plans (-2.9% compared to -1.6%). So, if 
losses before and after the period of implementation are considered, 
phased-in plans appear in a more favorable light.
White Enrollment Change by Type of School District
Table 15 summarizes the results of the analysis of white 
enrollment change by type of school district— countywide, large city 
school district with high minority school enrollment, and all other 
districts. As Table 15 reveals, for the 20 countywide districts very 
little white student loss occurred during the year of implementation 
(-2.9%). In the few years following desegregation a very slight downward 
white enrollment trend continues. This seems to confirm Rossell's 
(1981) position regarding metropolitan desegregation. A much different 
picture appears for big city districts with large minority enrollments. 
Such districts are defined here as located in a city of 250,000 or 
greater with a minority enrollment of 30 percent or above. For these 
13 school systems, the drop among white students is drastic— 21.3 per­
cent. The pre-implementation losses were somewhat greater than average
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TABLE 15
MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
BY TYPE OF SCHOOL DISTRICT
Time Point^















Large city school districts 



























^T equals desegregation implementation year. White enrollment changes are 
calculated as percentages. For example: (T-2) = (T-2)-(T-3).
(T-3)
Since the districts desegregated at different times between 1968-76, in 
some cases a time point was not available to calculate a white school 
enrollment change measure. Thus, the N varies across time.
^Large equals over 250,000 population; high minority school enrollment
equals ^  30 percent.
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as well; even so, the average net loss at the year of desegregation 
approximates 16 percent. And, of perhaps greater significance, the 
post-desegregation decline continues at a fairly high rate— the average 
for the three years is about 10.5 percent. This compares to an average 
of about 5 percent loss prior to desegregation.
Finally, Table 15 depicts the white enrollment changes for 
districts that are neither countywide nor large city with high proportion 
minority. The white loss for these districts (N=17) parallels the figure 
for the entire group of 52— 9.2 percent. The average loss following 
desegregation is slightly more than occurred for the two years before 
implementation.
Since all these figures can be a bit confusing even presented 
in tabular form. Figure 8 provides a graph of these trends. It shows 
the average white enrollment declines over a six-year period for the 
entire group of 52 districts plus the two subcategories discussed above—  
countywide districts (N=20), large city with high proportion minority 
(N=13). Perhaps two important facts stand out from this entire analysis—  
countywide districts have less white loss and large city high minority 
districts have considerably greater losses compared to all others.
At this point the data analyzed here offer additional support 
for previous research findings. Desegregation does seem to accelerate 
white student enrollment losses during implementation year, and elementary 
schools do seem to suffer greater white student losses than secondary 
schools. The effects of phased-in plans on white enrollment declines 
are less certain. White enrollment decline is less than average for 
countywide districts and by implication for metropolitanwide desegregation
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T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2T T+3
TIME POINT (T = Year of Desegregation)
countywide (N=20)
'large city districts with high minority enrollment (N=13) 
'all districts (N=17)
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plans. White flight is likely not only to be much greater than 
average at the desegregation year for large city districts with high 
minority enrollments, but also such loss continues at a level somewhat 
beyond that for the year prior to desegregation. But prior research 
also suggests that a host of other external, school district, and 
desegregation process influences may affect the degree to which school 
districts may suffer a loss of white students. Utilizing Figure 4 as 
a conceptual framework, white enrollment changes are now investigated 
in a multivariate context. That is, employing three types of explanatory 
variables— external influences, district characteristics, and desegrega­
tion process variables— losses in white school enrollment at the system- 
wide level from the year prior to desegregation (T-1) to implementation 
year (T)^ are examined using multiple regression.
The Multivariate Analysis
The multiple regression equation, which is only for the 
systemwide level, contains three measures not previously included in 
the analysis of desegregation success— "suburban escape," average pre­
desegregation white enrollment loss, and the absolute change in deseg­
regation level (T-1 to T). Each of these requires some comment and 
justification. The suburban escape variable is the least obvious on 
its face. This measure is operationalized as a ratio, with the total 
school enrollment in the surrounding area (ordinarily the balance of 
the SMSA enrollment) divided by total enrollment for the district. Thus, 
if the outlying area school district enrollment exceeds that of the 
district in question (usually a central city), the ratio would exceed
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1.0. If the surrounding area has a lower total enrollment, the figure
used for the district in the study would be less than 1.0. Most
countywide districts are assigned a score of 0 on the assumption that
little or no escape is possible from such districts without perhaps
2moving a long distance. The expectation is that where this ratio is 
high, indicating escape potential, white enrollment loss will also be 
high.
The second "new" variable is the average pre-desegregation 
3white enrollment change. This is incorporated in the equation as a way 
of controlling for the general tendency of most of these districts to 
have lost whites prior to plan implementation. In a way, this takes 
account of the host of additional social and economic influences contri­
buting to white loss. Such factors as central city crime rate, unemploy­
ment rate, or even suburban attraction variables (such as housing 
availability) have not been directly included in this analysis, for 
several reasons. First, as just suggested, the use of a pre-desegregation 
white loss variable represents a reasonable proxy for these influences. 
Second, the addition of several more explanatory measures causes an 
undesired loss of degrees of freedom in the equation.^ Third, these 
measures are not necessarily good predictors of white flight.^ Finally, 
to the extent white loss at time T is merely a continuation of pre­
desegregation trends, the measure used here should help capture that 
development. This variable should be positively related to white 
enrollment loss at the year of desegregation.
The third additional variable to the white flight equation is 
a measure of absolute change in desegregation. Without such a variable.
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of course, no test of desegregation's potential effect on white flight 
would be possible. The most recent research, reviewed above, suggests 
that desegregation will indeed contribute independently to white enroll­
ment loss.
Before assessing the simultaneous effects of the three types of 
influences on white enrollment declines, the simple correlations (r) 
might be examined (see Table 16). With respect to the four external 
influence variables, suburban escape and average pre-desegregation white 
enrollment losses display the highest Pearson product-moment correlations 
(r) with white enrollment losses, .32 and .52, respectively and both 
are in the expected direction. That is, the greater the availability 
of alternative schools in the metropolitan area, and the greater the 
pre-implementation white student losses, the greater the loss of white 
students during desegregation implementation. As expected, southern 
region is negatively associated with enrollment declines (r = -.09), 
and federal coercion is positively associated with losses (.04). But 
both correlations are rather weak.
Of the three school district characteristics, in the bivariate 
case, percentage minority is quite prominently related to white enroll­
ment declines (r=.64). Countywide school districts are negatively 
associated with losses (r = -.41), and as prior research suggests, 
larger school districts suffer more white student losses (r = .25).
An examination of the simple relationships between the six 
desegregation process variables and white flight shows that citizen 
participation (r = .12), desegregation resistance (r = .37), and hiring 
a new school superintendent (r = .15) are positively associated with
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TABLE 16
FACTORS INFLUENCING WHITE ENROLLMENT LOSSES DURING 
DESEGREGATION IMPLEMENTATION YEAR (N=43)^
Blocks of Variables r Beta t-score
External Influences
Region^ (0/1) -.09 -.29 (-.068)h 1.91*
Federal coercion .04 -. 06 (-.004) .46
Suburban escape .32 .12 (.009) .83
Avg. pre-deseg. white enroll, loss .52 .13 (.003) 1.03
District Characteristics
Type of district^ (0/1) -.41 —. 18 (-.045) 1.22
Percent minority .64 .57 (.004) 3.94**
Size of district^ .25 .37 (.000001) 2.46**
Desegregation Process Variables'^
Citizen participation .12 -.07 (-.009) .74
Desegregation resistance .37 .23 (.028) 1.87*
Elite support -.02 .05 (.006) .43
Supt. and school board support -.22 -.03 (-.005) .30
School board insulation -.22 -.07 (-.012) . 66
Hiring new superintendent .15 -.01 (-.003) .10
Desegregation Activity
Absolute change in deseg. (T-1 to T) -.04 .40 (b=.002) 2.58**
* p < .05
** p < .01
R^ = .75; R^ = .62; F = 5.97** with 14 and 28 degrees of freedom
^ine districts were not included for analysis since ;1 T-2 time point was
not available for the calculation of a pre-desegregation white enrollment 
loss control measure (see note e). Richmond, CA; Escambia County, FL; 
Orange County, FL; Polk County, FL; Volusia County, FL; DeKalb County, GA; 
Peoria, IL; Wichita, KS; Tacoma, WA.
^Non-South/South.
''For operationalization see Table 2, pp. 98-100.
^Ratio between suburban ring total school enrollment and district school 
enrollment. The larger the ratio the more availability of suburban 
schools in the area.
^Percentage white student enrollment change between T-3 and T-1 summed and 
divided by the appropriate number of time points.
^Noncountywide/countywide.
^Total school enrollment.
^rn^rnndnrdized nartial regression coefficient.
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enrollment declines. While not intuitively appealing, citizen partici­
pation in the desegregation process may contribute to the exodus of 
white students. That desegregation resistance may prompt white exodus, 
however, is not unexpected. The positive correlation between the hiring 
of a new superintendent and white student losses also is not surprising. 
In some districts, school officials bring in a new superintendent to 
expedite local desegregation efforts, and Rodgers and Bullock (1976a) 
suggest such a move may result in significant school desegregation. In 
short, public debates (citizen participation), violent or non-violent 
protests and demonstrations (desegregation resistance), and strong 
leadership in the form of a new school superintendent may arouse public 
awareness of impending desegregation efforts and contribute to white 
withdrawal from local schools. ,
In contrast, the relationship of the other three desegregation 
process variables— elite support (r = -.02), superintendent and school 
board support (r = -.22), and school board insulation (r = -.22) are 
negatively related to the loss of white students. These relationships 
are also in the expected direction. Media, white community leaders, 
and school elite support of local desegregation efforts should help 
minimize suspicions and fears about the desegregation process and thereby 
reduce white flight.
Finally, in the simple case, desegregation change is found to 
be unrelated to white student losses. In fact, as Table 16 shows the 
simple correlation between the absolute change in the level of segrega­
tion during implementation year and white enrollment loss during 
implementation year is negative (r = -.04), indicating that the greater
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the change in desegregation, the less the loss of white students. As 
will be shown below, however, desegregation activity behaves quite 
differently in the multivariate analysis.
Although simple relationships may provide some useful initial 
insights, the simultaneous effects of the variables on white enrollment 
change are of primary concern here. The beta weights shown in Table 16 
indicate the relative importance of each variable while controlling 
(statistically) for all other variables in the regression equation.^
As Table 16 reveals, in the multivariate case, five variables 
have a statistically significant impact on white enrollment loss. In 
order of their importance the five variables are: (1) percent minority 
(b = .57)— the larger the percent minority in the school district the 
greater the white enrollment decline; (2) desegregation change (b = .40)- 
the larger the absolute change in the level of segregation during 
implementation year the greater the white enrollment loss; (3) size of 
school district (b = .37)— the larger the total school enrollment the 
greater the white enrollment decline; (4) region (b = .29)— enrollment 
losses are smaller in southern than in nonsouthern districts; and (5) 
desegregation resistance (b = .23)— the greater the desegregation resis­
tance the larger the loss of white students.
In addition, while not statistically significant, three other 
effects are noteworthy. The suburban escape indicator (availability 
of other schools in the metropolitan area) and average pre-desegregation 
white enrollment losses (control measure for pre-implementation white 
student loss trend) are positively related to white enrollment decline, 
b = .12 and .13, respectively. And countywide districts are negatively
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associated with losses (b = -.18). In total, the 14 variables can
— 2explain 75 percent of the variation (R = .62) in white enrollment
decline at the systemwide level.^
Although the findings from the multivariate analysis are not
particularly surprising and are generally supported by previous research
efforts, one question remains. Why is desegregation success unrelated
to white enrollment losses in the bivariate case, but significantly
related to white enrollment declines when other effects are held constant?
Rossell (1981: 32) suggests a possible explanation:
Virtually all . . . aggregate studies have detected a 
significant interaction effect between percentage black 
and the extent of desegregation in terms of their effect 
on white flight. That is, a school district or school
with a large proportion of students who are black will
have more white flight with a given desegregation plan 
than will a school district with a small proportion of 
students who are black.
A statistically significant interaction effect between percent
g
minority and desegregation change in the present study was not found. 
Nevertheless, the findings here suggest that when desegregation occurs 
in certain types of districts, white loss during the implementation year 
may be substantial. In particular, among large, nonsouthern districts 
with high proportion minority, which have experienced considerable 
community resistance, desegregation is especially likely to contribute 
to white withdrawal.
But what about post-implementation losses; Does implementation 
year desegregation efforts produce long-term white student losses?
The earlier preliminary analysis of mean white enrollment declines over 
time suggested not. In fact the analysis showed that after desegregation.
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post-implementation white student losses are only slightly larger than 
pre-implementation losses (see Table 13). To assess the post­
implementation impact of desegregation actions on white withdrawal, post­
implementation white student losses were averaged and regressed on the 
eight best predictors of implementation year losses— region, type of 
district, percent minority, size of district, desegregation resistance, 
suburban escape, average pre-implementation losses, and implementation 
year desegregation change. Table 17 summarizes the results of this 
exercise.
As Table 17 shows, the best predictor of post-implementation 
white enrollment losses is the percentage of minority pupils in the school 
system (b = .29). In addition, the availability of suburban schools 
as well as pre-implementation white student losses are also good 
predictors (b = .25 for both variables). Countywide districts continue 
to lose fewer white students than do countywide districts (b = -.27).
And surprisingly, desegregation resistance becomes negatively related 
(b = -.19) to post-implementation enrollment declines. None of the 
relationships, however, are statistically significant, although explained 
variance (R̂ ) is .55 (R̂  = .37).
Finally, Table 17 reveals implementation year desegregation 
efforts are totally unrelated to post-implementation white enrollment 
losses (b = .00). Thus, one might argue that while desegregation efforts 
may accelerate white student withdrawal during implementation year, 
post-implementation losses are a function of other forces, especially 
the percentage minority in the school, the availability of alternative 
schools in the metropolitan area, pre-desegregation enrollment losses, 
and whether the district is countywide in area.
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TABLE 17
FACTORS INFLUENCING POST-DESEGREGATION WHITE ENROLLMENT LOSSES (N=30)‘
Variables r Beta t-score
Region (0/1) -.08 .01 (.154)8 .10
Suburban escape^ .45 .25 (.755) 1.20
Avg. pre-implementation white 
enrollment loss‘s .49 .25 (.196) 1.41
Type of district (0/1)^ -.52 -.27 (-2.65) 1.26
Percent minority .52 .29 (.088) 1.56
Size of district^ .01 .07 (.00001) .33
Desegregation resistance^ -.09 -.19 (-1.06) 1.20
Absolute change in deseg. (T-1 to T) -.34 -.01 (-.002) .05
*p < .05
R^ = .55; R^ = .37; F = 3.15* with 8 and 21 degrees of freedom.
^The N size was reduced to 30 since percent white school enrollment change 
could not be calculated because T-2 or T+1 was missing for certain 
districts.
bNon-South/S outh.
"See Table 16, notes d and e. 
^Noncountywide/countywide.
"Total school enrollment.




The primary purpose of this chapter was to assess the 
independent effects of three types of influences— external, school 
district, desegregation process— on white enrollment losses during the 
year of school desegregation. Before examining these multivariate 
relationships, white enrollment losses over time, the impact of phasing- 
in desegregation efforts, and white losses by type of school district, 
were investigated. In brief, the results of these preliminary analyses 
confirmed previous research findings that: (1) desegregation efforts 
accelerate white enrollment declines during implementation year;
(2) elementary schools experience greater white student losses than 
secondary schools; (3) phasing-in a desegregation plan may result in 
greater white student withdrawal than implementing a plan in a single 
year; and (4) large school districts with high minority enrollment 
experience greater white loss both during and after implementation 
than do countywide or other types of school districts.
When implementation year white student enrollment declines 
at the systemwide level were explained in a multivariate context, the 
following findings emerged.
o Percent minority in the school system was the single 
most powerful predictor of white student losses, 
o Desegregation success (absolute change in level of 
segregation) resulted in greater white enrollment 
decline.
o Larger districts (based on enrollment) experienced
greater white student withdrawal than smaller districts.
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0 Enrollment declines were smaller in southern, county- 
wide districts than in nonsouthern, noncountywide 
districts.
o Districts that experienced greater desegregation 
resistance lost more white students, 
o The availability of other schools in the metropolitan 
area as well as pre-implementation white enrollment 
losses were positively related to implementation year 
enrollment declines.
When the eight best predictors of implementation year white 
enrollment declines were included in a multiple regression equation to 
explain post-implementation white student losses, once again percent 
minority in the school system was the most powerful predictor. In 
addition, the availability of alternative schools in the metropolitan 
area and a pre-implementation loss trend were also good predictors of 
post-implementation white withdrawal. But, unlike during implementation 
year, desegregation activity was found to be unrelated to post­
implementation white losses.
In conclusion, the results of the analyses reported here are 
not particularly novel or surprising and tend to confirm findings 
reported in other research. It should be noted, however, that many of 
the proposed relationships reported in previous research are based on 
case studies. In contrast, in the present study various aspects of the 
desegregation efforts of 52 school districts were systematically assessed 
using the case survey method. Thus, this study not only supports pre­
vious findings but also enhances the generalizability of these findings.
NOTES
1. Some districts gained white students during desegregation implementa­
tion (primarily countywide southern districts). Since we wished to 
explain white enrollment decline, the variable scores were 
reversed (multiplied by minus 1).
2. Enrollment for most countywide districts was identical or virtually 
so with the SMSA enrollment. In a few instances estimates were made. 
For example, it did not seem appropriate to use the total non-central 
city SMSA school enrollment for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area to create the measure for Prince George's County. Instead, the 
enrollment figure for an adjacent district (Montgomery County) was 
used. Likewise, the total figure for the metropolitan area outside 
of Los Angeles did not seem valid for use in creating the suburban 
escape variable for rather small Pasadena. Instead the enrollment 
figure for a nearby similar district (Glendale) was used to represent 
the possible escape area. Data are for 1971 and come from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1972: Table 19).
3. Percentage change in white school enrollment between T-3 and T-2 
and T-2 and T-1 were summed and divided by two if both percentages 
could be calculated; otherwise, T-2 to T-1 change was used. The 
variable was reversed to reflect enrollment declines.
196
197
4. The equation in Table 16 contains 14 predictor variables, which 
seems to be the upper limit for an N of 52 without seriously 
exhausting the essential degrees of freedom for least squares 
regression. Any increases in explained variance would likely be the 
result of the mere addition of new independent variables and would 
not be substantively meaningful.
5. This is especially true of various efforts to measure the negative 
features of central city life. Rossell (1978a: 17) finds that 
neither crime rate nor employment rate are statistically significant 
predictors of white enrollment change. On the other hand, researchers 
using certain proxies for "suburban appeal" such as total new 
suburban dwellings have found such measures importantly related to 
white movement to the suburbs (see Marshall, 1979).
6. Similar regression analyses were also performed across school levels.
In general, the impact of the variables on white enrollment losses 
are the same at both the elementary and secondary school level. A 
few minor differences did emerge, however. At the secondary level 
the suburban escape indicator was not important (b = -.03). In 
contrast, at the elementary level it was the fourth best predictor
(b = .21), following percent minority (b = .44), district size (b = .34),
and desegregation change (b = .50). At the secondary level the vari-
—2ables were able to account for 76 percent of the variation (R = .62)
2in white enrollment decline. At the elementary level, the R was 
.50 (R^ = .24).
7. While there are conflicting findings, some studies have found that 
greater busing distances produce greater white flight (see Rossell,
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1980; for opposite findings see Giles, Gatlin, and Cataldo, 1974). 
Unfortunately, we were not able to collect such data in the present 
study. However, when we added an indicator of increases in busing 
due to local desegregation efforts to the regression equation, the 
explained variance increased by 1 percent (to 76%). The beta for 
the variable was a -.18, indicating that increases in busing are 
negatively associated with enrollment declines. Since the inclusion 
of the variable would have further reduced the N size to 37 and 
since the effect of the variable was not statistically significant, 
it was not used in the final equation.
8. In order to test for an interaction effect between percentage
minority and desegregation change, hierarchical regression was
employed (see Cohen and Cohen, 1975: Chap. 8). First, desegregation
change and percent minority were used to predict implementation year
white enrollment losses. Then a multiplicative desegregation change
and percent minority interaction term was added to the equation.
The results of the analysis showed that while the interaction term
could explain 2 percent more of the variance in white enrollment
declines than the two variables singularly, the F-value of the 
2addition to R was not statistically significant (F = 1.44, require 
an F-value of 4.09 to be significant at .05 level).
In addition to a potential interaction effect between desegrega­
tion change and percent black, previous literature also suggests 
that the relationship between percent black and white student with­
drawal may be nonlinear (see Giles, 1978). The argument is that 
after a district's percent minority enrollment reaches a certain
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threshold or "tipping point" (around 30%), white enrollment losses 
increase exponentially. To check for such a nonlinear relationship 
here, three tests were employed. First, a scatterplot between per­
cent minority and white enrollment decline was visually examined. 
This examination clearly reveals a linear relationship (r = .65). 
Second, employing the same multiple regression procedure used by 
Giles (1978) to test for nonlinearity, white enrollment decline was 
regressed on two variables— percentage minority and percentage 
minority squared. Percentage minority squared is a quadratic term 
representing the possible exponential effect of percentage minority 
on enrollment loss. The quadratic term in this equation was not 
statistically significant, indicating that the relationship between 
proportion minority and white flight is linear.
Finally, as a third test hierarchical regression was employed. 
First, white loss was regressed on percentage minority and then 
the quadratic term (percentage minority squared) was added to the
equation. The additional quadratic term added virtually nothing
2to explained variance (R increased from .417 to .418), again 
revealing that the relationship is linear. In short, no support 
for a threshold effect was found.
CHAPTER VII
THE STUDY IN RETROSPECT
Purpose
Previous studies focusing on school desegregation have been of 
two general types— case studies describing the process and influences 
that affect location-specific desegregation efforts and comparative, 
aggregate studies that seek to isolate the determinants of desegregation 
success and/or white enrollment decline. According to Crain and 
Hawley (1981: 5), however, the current desegregation research agenda 
requires that research should attempt to capture the complexity of the 
desegregation process as well as the factors (determinants) that affect 
different types of desegregation outcomes. In short, an effort should 
be made to bridge the gap between two separate approaches to studying 
school desegregation, case studies and comparative studies.
To date, Rodgers and Bullock's (1976a) analysis of desegrega­
tion efforts in 31 Georgia school districts is perhaps the best example 
of an attempt to bridge this gap. Employing a comparative research 
design, these authors systematically examined the effects of process 
variables (white organized resistance and black activism) on desegrega­
tion success. Previously, these effects had only been speculatively 
defined in case studies.
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Based on the work initiated by Rodgers and Bullock (1976a), 
the purpose of this study was to investigate three sets of school 
desegregation related questions:
o Which desegregation strategies are most commonly
employed across school districts? What is the relation­
ship between the type of desegregation strategy 
employed by a district and the district's success in 
reducing racial isolation? 
o What are the "determinants" of school desegregation 
success? Do certain external influences, school 
district characteristics, desegregation process variables, 
and desegregation strategies facilitate or impede the 
school desegregation process? 
o What factors explain white enrollment declines ? Is 
desegregation success a good predictor of the white 
exodus of students from the school system?
To facilitate this investigation, school desegregation was 
conceptualized as a process and an implementation model comprised of 
three blocks of potential influences— external forces, school district 
characteristics, and desegregation process variables— was advanced. Much 
of the data used in the study were gathered using a relatively new 
approach, the case survey method, that involves the use of an instrument 
to record various features of the desegregation process that appear in 
the case literature so they can be quantified, aggregated, and systemati­
cally investigated. Employing the data gleaned from the case survey 
method and data derived primarily from the Office of Civil Rights
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school district file, three analyses were undertaken. First, a prelim­
inary effort to gauge the efficacy of certain strategies or techniques 
in reducing racial isolation and in minimizing white enrollment loss was 
presented (Chapter 4). Second, school desegregation success systemwide 
as well as by school level (elementary and secondary) was analyzed in a 
multivariate context (Chapter 5). Finally, an attempt to explain 
implementation year and post-implementation year white enrollment losses 
was undertaken (Chapter 6). Before discussing the implications associa­
ted with the results of these analyses, a brief summary of the purpose 
and findings emerging from each chapter is presented.
Findings
In the first chapter the historical and legal lineage of public 
school desegregation efforts in the United States was traced. The 
primary purpose of this chapter was to document the important role that 
the federal judiciary has played in either impeding or facilitating the 
school desegregation process. Prior to 1954, the official posture of the 
courts was reflected in the Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896: 551-552): "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the 
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane." 
The Court surmised that "separate-but-equal" public facilities was an 
adequate response to the Constitution's demand for equal protection of 
the laws. The individual states and not the federal government would 
determine local school policy.
In 1954, the Supreme Court officially abdicated the separate 
but equal doctrine. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)
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the Court ruled that segregation of children in public schools solely 
on the basis of race, even though physical facilities may be equal, 
deprived children of minority groups of equal educational opportunities. 
This ruling established school desegregation as a national public policy. 
One year later in Brown II (1955) the Court provided broad guidelines 
for desegregating public schools and ordered that desegregation should 
proceed with "all deliberate speed."
One key component was needed to fulfill the Brown mandate—  
compliance. A review of efforts to implement school desegregation 
policy highlighted the overt resistance of southern communities to 
school desegregation, the search for desegregation standards, the 
massive desegregation of southern schools, and efforts to move desegrega­
tion from the South to the northern and western regions of the nation.
The chapter concluded with a discussion of four desegregation 
related issues that continue to arouse considerable controversy and 
that require further court consideration and clarification— metropolitan 
(interdistrict) desegregation plans, busing, white flight, and resegrega­
tion.
The second chapter was devoted to the development of a con­
ceptual framework for understanding the process of desegregating local 
schools. A brief overview of the implementation literature suggested 
that a number of general (multiplicity of participants, multiplicity of 
perspectives, and multiplicity of decision points) as well as specific 
desegregation-related problems (problems of mission, power, structure, 
and resources) may affect desegregation implementation. Moreover, 
an examination of four approaches to implement school desegregation
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policy (organizational development, systems management, bureaucratic 
processes, and conflict and bargaining) as well as the general implem­
entation literature resulted in the identification of three general 
types of influences that impinge on the desegregation process— external 
pressure, local environmental conditions, and community actors and 
attitudes.
A number of previous studies have attempted to describe or 
explain school desegregation and/or white enrollment decline based on 
these three types of forces. A critical appraisal of these efforts, 
however, suggested that while case studies provide rich detail about the 
process of desegregation, they are limited because observed relation­
ships are not generalizable. On the other hand, comparative studies 
are limited since, for the most part, they do not test the effects of 
variables that the case study literature suggests bear directly upon 
desegregation success— variables referred to here as desegregation 
process variables (e.g., school board support, elite attitudes, etc.).
In response to these shortcomings, a research design similar 
to the one employed by Rodgers and Bullock (1976a) was advanced. The 
proposed implementation model allowed for the systematic analysis of 
three types of influences— extralocal, school district, and desegrega­
tion process— on desegregation success and white enrollment decline.
In order to gather and operationalize indicators needed to tap deseg­
regation process variables, the case survey method was introduced as 
an appropriate methodology. The case survey method permits the 
extraction of relevant information from a number of cases in a 
replicable and reliable fashion.
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Chapter 3 introduced the research design employed in the study. 
The primary purpose of the chapter was to familiarize the reader with 
the case survey method and to present the variables and methods used in 
subsequent analyses.
An exhaustive search of the case literature, both published 
and unpublished, yielded 52 usable cases that met three selection 
criteria:
(1) the major desegregation action had to occur between 
1968 and 1976 (the dependent' variables were limited 
to that time period);
(2) total school enrollment had to exceed 20,000 students 
(to qualify as a "large" district);
(3) the percentage minority in the school system had to 
equal or exceed 10 percent.
In addition, the results of an exercise to determine the reliability of 
analyst-readers' responses to various items asked on the case survey 
instrument were reported. The exercise produced interanalyst agreement 
scores quite similar in magnitude to those reported in two recent uses 
of the technique (see Table 1). Finally, the variables, their source, 
and operationalization were summarized in Table 2.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 summarized the results of three data 
analyses. In the fourth chapter the relationship between commonly 
employed desegregation strategies and desegregation success and white 
student outmigration were investigated.
Although this analysis consisted primarily of a set of 
bivariate tables, several noteworthy results emerged. First, unlike
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previous research testing the effects of desegregation strategies in an 
aggregate context, this analysis did find that certain specific 
techniques might make a modest contribution to improving racial balance. 
Those elementary schools using rezoning in combination with pairing and 
clustering as their principal technique not only achieved more reduction 
in levels of segregation (based on the index of dissimilarity) than 
those using other techniques, such schools also had less white enrollment 
loss. A similar finding appeared for secondary schools. Here the 
technique that contributed most to desegregation success was rezoning. 
White flight was lower for this technique in comparison with others as 
well.
Busing was also included in the bivariate analysis. When 
districts were divided at the median on a measure of busing increase, 
those above the average attained somewhat greater racial balance than 
the other group. But those with more busing also experienced somewhat 
greater white enrollment losses. Since the busing data were not as 
reliable as most of the other information and the analysis was only 
bivariate, these findings should be considered as tentative and 
inconclusive.
Based on an implementation model in which explanatory influences 
were grouped into three categories— external forces, school district 
characteristics, desegregation process variables— a multivariate analysis 
of desegregation success was offered in Chapter 5. External forces 
were represented by region (North/South) and a measure of federal 
coercion. School district characteristics included type of district 
(countywide/noncountywide), percentage minority, and size (total
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enrollment). Five desegregation process variables were incorporated 
in the multiple regression equation— superintendent and board support, 
citizen participation, elite support, hiring of a new superintendent, 
and school board insulation. Finally, the most effective desegregation 
technique was included as a dummy variable (used/not used). The analysis 
was performed for the entire school system as well as by school level 
(elementary or secondary). The desegregation technique measure was 
used only in the equation for each level, since the most successful 
strategy varied by level. This analysis differed from previous efforts 
to assess desegregation change at the aggregate level in one primary 
respect. It incorporated desegregation process measures and the deseg­
regation technique variable. The use of the case survey method allowed 
the inclusion of these potentially important effects, which otherwise 
would be difficult to obtain.
At the systemwide level the following variables had the 
greatest effect on desegregation success (when all other factors were 
statistically controlled):
o Federal coercion was the single most powerful force 
in reducing racial isolation, 
o Larger districts achieved less racial balance than 
smaller districts, 
o Southern districts had greater desegregation success 
than those outside the South, 
o Countywide districts improved racial balance more 
than did noncountywide districts.
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o Support by school officials helped achieve desegrega­
tion progress.
o Hiring a new school superintendent tended to improve 
the prospects for desegregation success.
Certain differences were apparent when separate multivariate 
analyses were conducted by school level. For elementary schools county- 
wide district was the best variable predicting desegregation success, 
closely followed by federal pressure. Although not statistically signi­
ficant the inclusion of the most effective desegregation technique 
(pairing/clustering with rezoning) did make some difference in the 
expected direction. Elementary schools using this technique could 
expect somewhat greater success than those choosing another course of 
action.
The multivariate analysis for secondary schools produced 
results similar to the systemwide analysis. The principal discrepancy 
was the failure of the variable "hiring a new superintendent" to 
contribute much to reducing racial isolation. Federal coercion was the 
best predictor at this level followed by size of district. The use of 
rezoning as the principal technique did not add significantly to 
explaining desegregation success.
In Chapter 6 a multivariate analysis of white enrollment 
change was performed. The same basic research model was employed with 
the addition of three new variables. Two more measures of external 
conditions were added— a proxy for the potential for families to flee 
the district (called "suburban escape") and the rate of pre-implementation 
white enrollment loss. This second measure was included to represent
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two trends : (1) the extent to which other social and economic conditions 
might contribute to white outmigration, and (2) the degree to which 
white loss at the year of desegregation might be a mere extension or 
continuation of previously occurring white student declines. The white 
flight equation contained one more new variable— desegregation success, 
measured as the absolute change in level of segregation for the year 
prior to implementation to the year of implementation.
A preliminary examination of changes in white enrollment over 
several years indicated that desegregation is associated with a one­
time abnormal white student loss. Elementary schools suffered more 
white outmigration than did secondary schools. Although the evidence 
was not overwhelming, there was some indication that phased-in plans 
contributed to slightly more white loss than those plans implemented 
in only one year. Finally, large central city school districts with 
high minority enrollments tended to lose more white students than did 
countywide or other types of school districts.
When white student enrollment declines at implementation 
year were subjected to multivariate analysis, the following statistically 
significant results were reported (when controlling for all other 
effects):
o Percentage minority in the school system was the 
single strongest effect contributing to white with­
drawal.
o Desegregation success resulted in greater white 
enrollment decline.
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o Larger districts experienced greater white loss than 
smaller districts, 
o Those districts with greater desegregation resistance 
had larger white losses than those with less opposition, 
o Nonsouthern systems suffered more white student out­
migration than did southern districts.
Two other findings seem worth mentioning. In a multivariate 
analysis of post-implementation white student loss, no relationship was 
discerned between desegregation success and white flight. School 
desegregation is related to white withdrawal at only one time period—  
the year of implementation. And, no threshold effect for percentage 
minority enrollment was discovered. In other words, the relationship 
between percentage minority and white withdrawal was substantially linear.
Implications
The implications associated with this study have relevance 
for both policy makers and academics. First, and perhaps most obviously, 
federal coercion constitutes the single most powerful force in producing 
desegregation success. This research provides little support to those 
who might hope that local school districts will somehow achieve 
effective desegregation with voluntary efforts. Federal pressure 
remains essential. In all likelihood, the courts will continue to 
rely on what Yudof labels "systems management" to force some districts 
to achieve appropriate racial balance. For as Rodgers and Bullock 
(1976a) remind us, school desegregation can be characterized as a 
process of coercion to compliance.
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Second, what about desegregation strategies? In brief, the 
particular desegregation technique(s) does make some difference, 
especially at the elementary level. For elementary schools the evidence 
suggests the following:
o Pairing and clustering in combination with rezoning 
seems likely to yield the greatest success not only in 
achieving racial balance but in minimizing white flight, 
o The use of a number of techniques does not assure 
greater desegregation success, 
o Active, overt support of the desegregation effort by 
school officials should facilitate the reduction in 
racial isolation.
For the desegregation of secondary schools, the specific 
technique employed does not matter much. The most popular approach has 
been rezoning. The bivariate analysis indicates that, in fact, this 
strategy may prove somewhat more effective than others. But when other 
potential influences are considered simultaneously, the use of rezoning 
has little impact for overall desegregation success. Nonetheless, since 
rezoning is a relatively simple technique to apply and is widely used, 
these findings suggest that Foster (1973) and Hughes, Gordon, and Hill­
man (1980) are correct in their statements that rezoning should probably 
be considered the strategy of first resort for secondary schools.
Several other points might be made. First, school officials 
should not be discouraged at the appearance of public opposition to 
desegregation. As Kirby, et al. (1973) suggest, this likely signifies 
that the plan is indeed apt to achieve considerable success in reducing
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racial separatism, although such opposition may accelerate white with­
drawal .
Second, certain events and procedures associated with the 
desegregation process— citizen participation and community elite support- 
do not contribute much to the level of desegregation success. On the 
other hand, this research suggests that hiring a new superintendent and 
school board support are important determinants of desegregation success.
Third, this research lends support to those who are skpetical 
about magnet schools. For these 52 districts, communities relying 
primarily on magnets alone or in combination tended to have less deseg­
regation success than those systems employing the more efficacious 
techniques discussed above.
Fourth, what about busing? Most of these desegregating 
districts did indeed increase the degree of school-supported student 
transportation. Some limited evidence suggests, however, that the 
degree of busing is only tangentially related to the amount of success 
achieved. Reductions in racial isolation are only marginally related to 
increases in busing. This implies that considerable desegregation 
can be achieved without massive increases in busing.
With regard to white flight, this research does not offer 
much that is new. Yet this in itself may be quite important. This 
analysis tends to confirm the most recent findings that some degree of 
one-time white student loss is inevitable at the year of desegregation. 
Some of this withdrawal will likely occur regardless of what school 
officials do. Avoiding phased-in plans may help reduce the loss 
slightly. The more effective desegregation techniques were also shown
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to be somewhat less likely to be associated with large white withdrawal. 
Although desegregation opposition tends to induce more white out­
migration, this may be something over which local officials may have 
little control. Yet as Hawley, et al. (1981: 61-65) point out, it is
up to the school district and other local leaders to deal with the
anxieties and fears that parents have. These authors suggest that 
positive media coverage may allay some parental concerns and that every 
effort should be made to provide parents with clear and full information 
about the desegregation plan and its implementation. It does seem 
important, however, to remember that research presented here suggests 
white enrollment losses as a result of desegregation are not long term.
In retrospect, perhaps one of the most important policy
implications growing out of this study concerns findings regarding
countywide school districts. Not only were countywide districts found
to achieve greater desegregation success, but also they suffered less
white student outmigration, especially when compared to large central
city school districts with high minority enrollments (see Table 15).
It seems worth repeating that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977:
6, 11, 12) takes the position that:
To a very great extent the remaining problems of segrega­
tion by race and national origin in public schools are 
problems that exist in big cities . . . [w]e have come 
to a point where substantial integration of public schools 
can be accomplished only if the area covered is larger 
than the city itself . . . .  There is no other approach 
that will deal promptly and effectively with racially 
isolated schools in metropolitan areas.
To the extent the courts or state governments can facilitate the
creation of metropolitan districts, white flight should be lessened
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and more effective desegregation remedies should be possible. Although 
Milliken v. Bradley remains a formidable obstacle, this research 
supports the widely held view that "metropolitan plans are highly 
effective strategies for reducing racial and class isolation" (Hawley, 
et al., 1981: 39).
Two more academic-based implications are also associated with 
this study. First, this research suggests that efforts to explain 
school desegregation success should be investigated not only systemwide, 
but also by school level (elementary and secondary). Findings here 
indicate that, for example, desegregation strategies may make a 
greater difference at the elementary than at the secondary school level.
In addition, desegregation success is much harder to explain at the
2 — 2 2 elementary (R = .36; R = .16) than at the secondary level (R = .55;
R^ = .41). Second, the use of the case survey method itself holds
considerable potential as a means of aggregating a case study literature
and systematically investigating relationships that are only tentatively
defined.
Limitations
Before concluding, a brief discussion of three limitations of 
this research project is in order. The first limitation concerns the 
issue of generalizability. Which school districts can the findings 
summarized above be generalized to? Since all of the districts analyzed 
here initiated formal desegregation actions between the years 1968 and 
1976, the findings can only be generalized to those districts that 
attempt to reduce racial isolation by implementing a specific school 
desegregation plan.
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The rationale for including for analysis only districts that 
initiated formal desegregation actions was based on two points. First, 
Crain and Hawley (1981) insist that desegregation is a distinct process, 
a process where change is planned. And change that results from planned 
action (i.e., as a result of a desegregation plan) should not be 
confused with change that results from unplanned action (e.g., desegrega­
tion as a result of changing birth or residential patterns). Second, 
one of the primary purposes of this research was to assess the impact 
of such variables as superintendent and school board support, elite 
attitudes, and desegregation techniques on desegregation success. If 
a district is not in the process of implementing a desegregation plan, 
whether or not, for example, school officials favor desegregation efforts 
is not of immediate concern.
Despite these reasons for focusing only on districts that 
attempt to implement a specific desegregation proposal, one might 
speculate that such a focus has the effect of attenuating the effect 
of, for example, federal coercion on desegregation success. That is, 
if both districts that desegregated and did not desegregate had been 
included in the analysis, the impact of federal coercion would probably 
have been enhanced. This is because federal coercion is a strong 
predictor of success, and the introduction of districts that did not 
desegregate, and consequently experienced little change in levels of 
segregation, would tend to accentuate the strong relationship between 
coercion and success.
The second limitation concerns the use of public policy as a 
focus of analysis and the use of case studies to gather information.
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This study was predicated on the assumption that in order to better 
understand the implementation of desegregation policy, those factors 
which desegregation case studies and aggregate analysis suggest affect 
desegregation success should be included in a comparative research 
design and systematically assessed. But as Greenberg, et al. (1976:
1533) argue, problems arise when public policy becomes the focus of 
systematic comparative analysis.
The authors note:
. . . the policy process takes place over time. . . . This 
leads to difficulty in explaining ’the process’ as a 
simple unit. Even if one attempts to explain specific 
outcomes, the explanatory forces invoked almost invariably 
involve characteristics of this long and shifting process 
(Greenberg, et al., 1976: 1533).
With respect to the use of case material as a reference source the
researchers state:
When a characteristic of the participants becomes a 
variable of interest, as it often does, variation among 
participants with regard to that characteristic causes 
difficulty. . . . [p]erceptions vary considerably, of 
course, depending upon the participants consulted or 
described. . . . [t]hat is, by the researcher, interviewer, 
casewriter, or other outside observer. Ambiguity is 
introduced when the heterogeneous group of all partici­
pants, or heterogeneous subcollections of participants, 
must be assigned a single score on such a characteristic 
(Greenberg, et al., 1976: 1533).
These points are particularly relevant to research presented 
here. First, in attempting to explain two relatively specific deseg­
regation outcomes— desegregation success and white enrollment decline—  
only a "slice," with respect to time, of the desegregation process is 
captured. The focus was on investigating the effects of three types of 
influences, external, school district, and local attitudes and techniques,
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on desegregation success and white enrollment decline during the 
implementation year. And as Greenberg and associates suggest, events 
preceding and following implementation year efforts also can affect 
the overall policy implementation process. Second, much of the data 
used in the study came from desegregation case studies by virtue of the 
case survey method. In order to operationalize variables, "heterogeneous 
subcollections of participants" (e.g., school officials, community 
elites, citizen groups) had to be assigned a single score on a character­
istic (e.g., support, resistance, participation). The potential for 
measurement error is not only increased by the use of a summary measure 
to represent a number of individual's support for, attitudes about, or 
participation in desegregation efforts, but is also potentially 
increased since the data are twice removed from the actual desegregation 
experience; once as reported in the case study and once as interpreted 
by the case survey analyst-readers.
Finally, the study is limited because no effort was made to 
model the interrelationships among the variables employed in the study. 
Rather, the emphasis was on determining the independent impact of each 
variable on desegregation success and white enrollment decline. The 
examination of the linkages among the variables remains an area fertile 
for further desegregation research.
Despite these limitations, the research represents one of 
the few efforts to include process and technique variables in an 
aggregate analysis of school desegregation outcomes. The case survey 
approach permitted the accumulation and aggregation of diverse deseg­
regation experiences among 52 large U.S. districts. Most were compelled
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to desegregate under federal mandate.■ Yet the findings here confirm 
that federal coercion, while crucial, is only one among many forces 
shaping the final desegregation outcome. Indeed, a variety of actions 
can be taken by local and national policy makers to facilitate the 
creation of equitable and effective desegregation plans. No precise 
set of guidelines was provided here. But, it is hoped that some of 
these findings will be useful to those who must continue the search for 
workable and acceptable solutions to the enduring problem of racially 
segregated schools.
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University of Oklahoma 
Bureau of Government Research
DESEGREGATION CASE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
District and Community Characteristics
1. City name and school district;
2. County-wide district: _______
3. State: _____________________
4. Region:
5. Population (1970): __________
6. Percent black (city, 1970):__
7. Percent minority (city, 1970):
8. Income (1970): ______________
9. Ethnicity (1970): ___________
t Sure Desegregation Plan Background
(x)   10. Source of desegregation plan impetus :
 1. Local board
 2. HEW
3. Court order
11. Plan formulated by:
 1. Local school
 2. Consultants appointed by school board
 3. Consultants appointed by court _____4. HEW
12. Public hearings held during plan formulation:
 1. No
 2. Yes
13. School year plan first implemented: E ' ■ ; J/M ' ' ■ H ' ■ ■ ■
14. School year plan completed: E J/M H_____
15a. Was plan implemented within time schedule:
1. No 
 2. Yes
15b. Year of first major case or significant impetus for desegregation
or the reopening of an earlier case, which resulted in the extant
desegregation plan: ________________
Court Involvement in Plan
  16. To what degree did the court order specify the parameters of the plan
regarding the techniques to be implemented?
 1. None
 2. Suggestions/recommendations/guidelines
 3. Specific plan or technique ordered
  17. To what degree did the court specify the racial balance to be attained
by desegregation?
 1. None
 2. Recommended minimum and maximum racial balance
3. Ordered mimimum and maximum racial balance
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Desegregation Plan Techniques
The following questions pertain only to the Elementary School level (check the 
number that applies to this city):


















21. Magnet-only plan (schools with special programs open to any student 













23. Rezoning or school closing (the placement of school attendance 
boundaries to include both majority and minority race children







24. Education Parks (a centrally located single facility which replaces 







*25. Estimate the amount of busing before the plan was implemented 
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*26. Estimate the amount of busing taking place after plan implementation 
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*27. Estimate the approximate increase in busing as a result of the 






*Although originally intended for elementary schools only, busing data 
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The following questions pertain only to the junior high or middle school 
level (check the number that applies to this city):


















31. Magnet-only plan (schools with special programs open to any student 














33. Rezoning or school closing ( the placement of school attendance 
boundaries to include both majority and minority race children







34." Education Parks ( a centrally located single facility which 






Estimate the amount of busing before the plan was implemented 
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Estimate the amount of 
(zero being none; 10 i







stimate the approximate increase in busing as^result of the 
(zero being none; 10 indicates extremely^arge)
white o
exact no
0 1 2  
minorities only
exact no
The following questions pertain only to the high school level (check the 
number that applies to this city):



























41'. Magnet-only plan (schools with special programs open to any student 



















43. Rezoning or school closing (the placement of school attendance 
boundaries to include both majority and minority race children 







Education Parks (a centrally located single facility which replaces 












Estimate the amount of busing before the plan was implemented 










46. Estimate the amounn/bf busing taking^place after plan implementation 







47. Estimate the\approximate increase infusing as a result of the 
plan (zero beihg^ none ; 10 indicates extremely large)
white only
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Desegregation Plan Implementation
 48. Estimate the percentage of white students reassigned as a result of
the plan (either voluntary or "forced"), 
virtually 100%).
(Zero means none; 10 means
49.
8 10
Estimate the percentage of black students reassigned as a result of 
the plan (either voluntary or "forced"). (Zero means none; 10 means 
virtually 100%).
1 10
50. Is the plan district-wide?
 1. No
 2. Yes
51. Rate the degree to which leaders of the white community were favorable
to the plan (zero being strongly opposed; 10 being highly favorable):
10
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52. Rate the degree to which the general white population was 
favorable to the plan (zero being strongly opposed; 10 being 
highly favorable):
Ô Î 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ
53. Rate the degree of satisfaction with plan implementation by the 
white community (zero being not at all satisfied; 10 being totally 
satisfied):
0 Î 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ
54. Rate the degree to which the black community was favorable to the 
plan (zero being strongly opposed; 10 being highly favorable):
_ - 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ~
55. Rate the degree of satisfaction with plan implementation by the black 
community (zero being not at all satisfied; 10 being totally 
satisfied):
_  _  _  _  _  _  -  _  _  -  _
56. Estimate the extent to which the local school board was divided 
in its support of the plan:
_____1. Unanimously in favor
 2. Predominantly in favor
 3. Closely divided but in favor
 4. Closely divided but in opposition
_5. Predominantly opposed
6. Unanimously opposed
57. Was some form of officially sanctioned citizen participation




58. How did formal citizen participation take place, if any?
 1. Group appointed voluntarily by superintendent or board
 2. Group required by court but appointed by superintendent or board
 3. Group appointed by court
 4. Group part elected from district and part appointed by super-
indendent or board (all done voluntarily)
 5. Group part elected from district and part appointed by super­




6. Court mandated election from district
7. Other arrangement
_8. No such group existed
59. Indicate the power of the citizens group regarding plan formulation: 
 1. Advisory only
 2. Binding by court order
 3. No such groups existed
60. Indicate the extent of citizen group involvement in plan 
implementation:
 1. Advisory only
 2. Binding by court order
 3. Was not involved in implementation
 4. No such groups existed
61. If citizen group was involved in implementation, estimate for 
what period of time:
 1. First one or two years only
 2. Three or more years
 3. No such groups existed
62. Was an outside professional, expert advisor, or "special master" 




63. Indicate the scope of services of the outside professional:
 1. Only to develop plan
 2. Only to oversee plan implementation
 3. Both develop and oversee implementation
 4. No such person hired
64. Was a new superintendent hired primarily for purposes of either 
plan formulation or implementation?
1. No
_2. Yes, for plan formulation and implementation 
_3. Yes, for implementation of plan created by others
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65. Rate the degree to which the attitudes and actions of the school 
superintendent favored the plan (zero being strongly opposed;
10 highly favorable. If nothing reported, assign five.)
“Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ~
66. Rate the degree of support for the plan on the part of the
local media (zero being strongly opposed; 10 being highly favored- 
If nothing reported, assign five.)
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10“
67. Did organized anti-desegregation groups (usually with a name or 
initials) develop to oppose the desegregation effort?
1. No
2. Yes
68. Rate the effectiveness of organized anti-desegregation groups (zero 
being totally ineffective in impeding the desegregation effort;
10 being extremely effective in impeding, delaying, or otherwise 
preventing desegregation):
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ“
69. Rate the degree to which litigation has impeded desegregation 
since the original court decision (zero indicates no further 
litigation, or litigation has not impeded desegregation at all;
10 indicates litigation completely halted any move to desegregate):
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ“
70. Rate the degree to which violence accompanied plan implementation 
(violence is defined as the exertion of physical force with the 
intent to injure individuals, destroy property, or physically 
impede the desegregation process). Zero indicates no violence; 10 
indicates total or extreme violence :
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ“
71. Rate the degree of community resistance to the plan other than by 
physical violence, as manifested by such things as demonstrations, 
boycotts, protests, verbal harassment (zero means no resistance;
10 indicates total or extreme resistance):
Ô I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ
72. Rate the degree to which overall community resistance 
(organized, unorganized, violent, nonviolent) has impeded 
desegregation following the original court order or other 
major impetus to desegregate (zero being no impediment; 10 being 
completely halted any move to desegregate):
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÜ“
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73. Rate the approximate increase in private school enrollment 
accompanying the plan (zero being none; 10 being very extensive):
Ô Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÎÔ
74. Rate the degree to which the burden of compliance falls on black 
and/or white students (-10 indicates that the burden falls entirely 
on black students; +10 indicates that the burden falls completely 
on white students; 0 indicates that the burden falls equally on 
black and white students.)
^  ^5 Ô +5 +10“
75. Rate the degree to which overall racial balance has improved since 
the plan was put into effect (racial balance defined as the extent 
to which each school in a district equals or closely approximates 
the racial composition of the entire school system):
 1. tittle OT: Ï10 substantial change (30% or fewer of schools
have achieved racial balance)
 2. Moderate to fairly substantial change (30% to 60% have
achieved racial balance)
 3. Substantial change or virtually complete racial balance
(more than 60% of schools have achieved racial balance)
76. What is the stage or phase of the desegregation plan at the time 
of the major report?
 1. Initial stage (first two years)
2. Middle stage (third or fourth year)
3. Advanced stage (more than four years)
77. What is your opinion as to the total effectiveness of the
desegregation plan? In considering overall effectiveness, account 
for such factors as compliance, litigation, white flight, massive 
transfers to private schools, violence, racial balance achieved. 
Zero indicates that the plan was totally ineffective; 10 indicates 
a totally effective plan.
8 9 10
78. Your major report writer: ____
79. Date this instrument completed:
80. Coder/analyst: ______________
List of sources used in completing this survey (specific citations). Mark 
the major report used.
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81. The major study appears as:
 1. Civil Rights Commission report
 2. Book or part thereof
 3. Unpublished report from district
4. Court Case
_5. Journal article
6. Dissertation 7. Other (specify)








83. The primary author of the study is:
 1. CRC advisory committee
 2. Academic
 3. School official or staff
 4. School lay committee
5. Court
6. Outside research organization or consultant
7. Other (specify) ___________________________
84. Your overall evaluation of the quality of the study based on the 
adequacy of the evidence (completeness and comprehensiveness) 
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Philadelphia School District: Office of Community Affairs 
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Busing— refers to any means by which students are transported between
home and school when paid for by public funds. Most of the
transportation is indeed provided by district-owned or con­
tract buses. In some larger cities, however, students ride 
existing public transportation systems. "Increase in busing" 
is derived in such a way that the actual mode of transporta­
tion in each separate district does not affect the actual 
calculations.
Clustering— the method that combines three or more schools, any one or 
more of which may have been previously segregated, into 
desegregated facilities with different grade levels in each.
De facto segregation— a separation of students by race which the law
recognizes as having happened either by sheer accident or
because of housing patterns, with no local or state action 
responsible for the separation.
De jure segregation— although frequently equated with "southern" segrega­
tion in the 17 southern and border states, de jure segregation 
in fact refers to any separation of students by race which 
results from official school board, city, or state action.
Educational parks— large school sites with several buildings, central­
ized administration, consolidated media, and physical educa­
tion facilities. Frequently, as many as 10,000 students are 
served in a grade structure from pre-K to grade 12. Few if 
any such organizational facilities actually exist.
Magnet-mandatory plan— a form of magnet school that is not optional.
The choice is not between a segregated neighborhood school 
and a desegregated magnet school. Parental choices are:
(1) leave the school system, (2) accept the forced reassign­
ment to a desegregated school, or (3) choose a desegregated 
magnet school.
Magnet-only plan— an essentially voluntary program under which parents 
may choose to send their children to a citywide or areawide 
school offering a special curriculum or educational program. 
Magnet-only plans depend on making such schools sufficiently 
attractive to induce parents to voluntarily leave their 
segregated neighborhood schools.
Majority-to-minority transfer— a method of voluntary student assign­
ment by which students who are enrolled in schools in which 
their race is in the majority may transfer to any school 
(in the same district) where their race is in the minority. 
Usually, the school district is obliged to provide transpor­
tation. The hope is to produce a voluntary leveling of 
racial imbalances between schools.
255
Metropolitan plan— a desegregation plan that crosses established 
school district lines. In effect, metropolitan plans 
call for interdistrict remedies to segregation.
Open enrollment— a voluntary student assignment approach that permits 
parents to choose any school within a district for their 
children to attend. In the North, it is frequently the first 
hesitant step taken by a desegregating school district; in 
the South, it was the predominant form of desegregation 
under the appellation of "freedom of choice."
Pairing— a method of desegregating two schools, one predominantly white, 
the other minority, which serve the same grades. Instead of 
both schools containing K-6, after pairing one school might 
have grades K-3 and the other grades 4-6, with students drawn 
from the former attendance zones of both schools. Both 
schools would share the white and minority populations of 
the enlarged zone.
Racial balance— a requirement that the racial makeup of each school in 
a district equal or approximate the racial composition of 
the entire community.
Resegregation— the return of previously desegregated schools to
segregated conditions. Population mobility and the disposi­
tion of some parents to send their children to private 
schools are frequent causes of this.
Rezoning— the redrawing of attendance area boundaries so that the
newly constituted attendance areas more closely reflect the 
racial composition of the entire school community.
School closing— frequently a part of a larger desegregation plan, the 
closing of a school and the redistribution of its student 
body into other schools not of the same racial makeup is one 
way to change the racial identity of schools.
Special master— an expert appointed by the court to act as the repres­
entative of the court in the development of a desegregation 
plan.
Voluntary desegregation— a desegregation plan in which the school
district decides to desegregate its schools without direction 
from the courts.
White flight— a term often used instead of white enrollment decline.
Although it generally refers to the tendency for white middle- 
and upper-class families to relocate out of communities that 
implement desegregation plans, it may also include those 
students who have opted for private schools.
Zoning or rezoning— the placement of school attendance boundaries to 
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APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ABOUT INTERCODER RELIABILITY
Each case survey instrument included 87 possible questions to which 
the analyst-readers could respond. However, for some case studies many 
of the questions asked were not applicable to the district's desegrega­
tion effort. For example, in San Francisco only elementary schools 
were involved in the desegregation process. Thus, questions on the case 
survey seeking information about desegregation strategies employed at the 
junior high and high school levels were coded as non-applicable. In 
addition, as the project progressed it became apparent that certain types 
of data were simply not reported in most case studies: busing figures 
by level before and after desegregation effort; number of students reassigned 
to schools as a result of desegregation plan; and private school enroll­
ment increases as a result of desegregation.
With respect to busing data it was decided to omit questions 35 through 
37 (busing at junior high level) and questions 45 through 47 (busing at 
high school level) and record for questions 25 through 27 (questions 
originally designed to capture busing figures only at the elementary 
level) busing information for the entire district. The exclusion of junior 
high and high school busing questions reduced the total number of survey 
questions to 69.
Using these survey modifications, an item-by-item intercoder agree­
ment analysis was performed. Table 18 shows the number of response
1categories for each question, observed agreement for each question, and
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the number of questions that one or both analyst-readers felt were 
impossible to answer.
As Table 18 shows, the mean level of interanalyst agreement across 
the 69 applicable questions is 86 percent. The table also reveals that 
of the possible 610 questions across the 10 surveys that the analyst-readers 
could have responded to, for 159 (26%) questions either one or both of 
the coders felt the question was impossible to answer. (The total number 
of questions is 10 x 69 or 690 minus 80 questions which were nonapplicable.) 
Of these 159 questions, approximately 53 percent (68 questions) were 
questions concerning busing or student reassignment. Excluding these 
questions the number of impossible to answer questions is 91 or 15 percent.
NOTE
1. For questions which had a response range of 11, agreement was recorded 
if the two analysts' responses were within one code, in either 
direction, of each other. For example, if the initial coder had 
chosen the response of 4, agreement was recorded if the second coder 
chose either a 3, 4, or 5.
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TABLE 18












10 3 80 0
11 3 100 1
12 2 88 2
13 Date 100 0
14 Date 100 1
15a 2 90 0
15b Date 70 0
16 3 68 0
17 3 100 1
18 5 67 0
19 5 89 0
20 5 88 0
21 5 88 1
22 5 89 0
23 5 44 0
24 5 100 0
25a 11 100 9
25b 11 100 9
25c 11 100 5
26a 11 100 9
26b 11 100 9
26c 11 100 5
27a 11 100 9
27b 11 100 9
27c 11 100 4
28 5 100 1
29 5 100 1














31 5 100 1
32 5 100 1




38 5 100 1
39 5 100 1
40 5 100 1
41 5 100 1
42 5 100 1




48 11 100 8
49 11 100 8
50 2 100 0
51 11 57 3
52 11 71 3
53 11 66 7
54 11 80 5
55 11 66 7
56 6 — , 75 2
57 2 90 0
58 8 89 0
59 3 75 1
60 4 78 0
61 3 83 3
62 3 89 0














64 3 100 0
65 11 70 0
66 11 100 0
67 2 100 2
68 11 83 3
69 11 100 2
70 11 88 2
71 11 75 2
72 11 75 2
73 11 67 7
74 5 67 1
75 3 75 2
76 3 100 0
77 11 70 0
X = .86 159
See questionnaire in Appendix A.
^Includes items answered "sure" and "not sure."





YEAR PRIOR TO AND YEAR OF 








Birmingham, AL 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Mobile County, AL 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Pasadena, CA 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Richmond, CA 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
San Francisco, CA 1970 1971 1970 1971 NA*̂ NA^
Stockton, CA 1974 1976^ NA^ NA^ 1974 1976^
Colorado Springs, CO 1969 1970 NA*̂ NA^ 1969 1970
Denver, CO 1973 1976^ 1974 1976^ 1973 1974
Broward County, FL 1969 1971 1970 1971 1969 1970
Dade County, FL 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Duval County, FL 1970 1972 1970 1972 1970 1972
Escambia County, FL 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Hillsborough County, FL 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Leon County, FL 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Orange County, FL 1968 1973 1972 1973 1968 1969
Pinellas County, FL 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Polk County, FL 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Volusia County, FL 1968 1970 1969 1970 1968 1969
Atlanta, GA 1972 1973 1972 1973 1972 1973
DeKalb County, GA 1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Peoria, IL e 1968 e 1968 e 1968
Vanderburgh County, IL 1969 1972 1971 1972 1969 1970
Wichita, KS 1968 1971 1970 1971 1968 1969
Jefferson County, KY 1974 1976^ 1974 1976^ 1974 1976^
Baltimore, MD 1973 1976^ 1973 1974 1974 1976^
Prince George's County, MD 1972 1973 1972 1973 1972 1973
Boston, MA 1973 1976^ 1974 1976^ 1973 1974
Flint, MI 1974 1976 1974 1976 1974 1976
Grand Rapids, MI 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970









Pontiac, MI 1970 1971 1970 1971 NA*̂ NA*̂
Minneapolis, MN 1971 1972 1971 1972 1971 1972
Omaha, NE 1974 1976 1974 1976 1974 1976
Clark County, NV 1971 1972 1971 1972 NA*̂ NA*̂
Forsyth County, NC 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Greensboro, NC 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Mecklenberg County,, NC 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Oklahoma City, OK 1971 1972 1971 1972 1971 1972
Tulsa, OK 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Providence, RI 1969 1971 1969 1970 1969 1971
Greenville County, SC 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970
Memphis, TN 1972 1973 1972 1973 1972 1973
Nashville-Davidson County, TN 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Austin, TX 1970 1973 1972 1973 1970 1971
Corpus Christi, TX 1974 1976^ MD^ MD^ 1974 1976^'B
Dallas, TX 1974 1976 1974 1976 1974 1976
Houston, TX 1974 1976 1974 1976 1974 1976
Newport News, VA 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Richmond, VA 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
Tacoma, WA e 1968 e 1968 e 19682
Milwaukee, WI 1974 1976 1974 1976 1974 1976
Racine, WI 1973 1976 1974 1976 1973 1974
^T-1 is the year prior to major desegregation effort. In cases of "phased-
in" plans, T-1 may be more than one year prior to T.
is the year of major desegregation effort. In cases of "phased-in" plans,
T is the last year of the desegregation effort.
^ear of desegregation is actually 1975. Since the Office of Civil Rights
did not collect data in 1975, 1976 is used as the implementation year.
^District's desegregation actions did not involve this level.
^The Office of Civil Rights began its annual survey of school districts in
1968. Data prior to this year are not available.
^The elementary school desegregation scores (dissimilarity index scores) for 
Corpus Christi are missing for years 1972-76.
^At the secondary level, only middle schools were involved in the desegregation 
process (not high schools). The data available to us, however, exists only 
at two levels— elementary and secondary. Inspection of the codebook supplied 
to us with the data indicates that in preparing the data, the OCR placed
cphnni = in rhf» tîpr-nnHarv 1 pvp 1 raTApnrv.
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TABLE 20
D IS S IM IL A R IT Y  IN D EX  SCORES' 
OVER TIME
District Name T-3 T-2 T-1 T^ T+1 TH-2 T+3
Birmingham, AL - 92.3 90.1 75.6 74.9 76.1 77.5
Mobile County, Ai 88.8 75.7 69.6 51.7 52.5 52.7 55.1
Pasadena, CA - 54.0 50.3 11.6 10.1 10.4 10.6
Richmond, CA - - 50.4 47.0 44.9 44.1 43.0
San Francisco, CA^ 46.6 46.6 44.9 16.2 15.7 15.9 17.4
Stockton, CA*̂ 45.6 43.9 42.8 27.1 - - -
Colorado Springs, CO^ - 48.2 45.3 33.9 29.6 26.0 23.9
Denver, CO 46.8 46.9 46.0 18.3 - - -
Broward County, FL - 81.3 79.4 32.7 30.8 29.4 30.9
Dade County, FL - 67.4 64.5 56.8 55.1 52.2 52.0
Duval County, FL 87.5 81.8 73.4 32.7 34.8 35.5 38.3
Escambia County, FL - - 78.3 50.8 51.1 51.4 51.9
Hillsborough County, FL 67.0 61.9 61.3 18.7 17.9 20.7 23.0
Leon County, FL - 64.4 48.7 22.4 22.8 23.7 24.6
Orange County, FL - - 84.3 51.3 49.9 47.6 -
Pinellas County, FL 78.2 72.4 64.9 25.0 24.3 25.6 25.1
Polk County, FL - - 73.9 47.9 45.1 44.8 44.6
Volusia County, FL - - 74.1 26.5 26.1 25.0 26.4
Atlanta, GA 82.6 82.1 80.2 75.6 75.0 73.3 -
DeKalb County, GA - - 74.7 64.3 64.6 61.8 64.4
Peoria, IL - - - 60.6 52.8 50.8 44.1
Vanderburgh County, IL - 71.2 69.4 26.6 23.8 25.4 24.9
Wichita, KS - - 65.4 18.6 16.9 15.8 16.8
Jefferson County, KY 82.0 80.3 78.2 21.6 - - -
Baltimore, MD 82.2 82.2 81.7 67.1 - - -
Prince George's County, MD 63.5 61.4 60.8 26.2 27.3 28.7 -
Boston, MA 73.5 70.8 70.4 32.8 - - -
Flint, MI 59.9 63.9 64.6 56.7 - - -
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TABLE 20 CONTINUED
District Name T-3 T-2 T-1 T^ T+1 T+2 T+3
Grand Rapids, Ml - 65.8 59.8 57.2 57.3 53.1 53.1
Lansing, Ml 32.5 27.4 28.1 15.8 - - -
Pontiac, Ml^ 72.4 69.3 68.7 18.1 19.8 16.7 16.2
Minneapolis, MN 55.8 55.2 53.0 50.6 47.4 39.1 37.8
Omaha, NE 67.1 66.2 60.0 26.6 - - -
Clark County, NV^ 58.6 54.7 47.4 20.6 20.4 23.2 22.8
Forsyth County, NC 85.2 85.1 ' 65.5 13.6 15.4 17.2 19.5
Greensboro, NC 81.7 80.6 81.4 27.3 14.1 17.2 17.1
Mecklenburg County, NC - 72.6 67.3 16.6 13.1 13.9 13.8
Oklahoma City, OK 71.5 68.5 66.7 26.8 24.4 13.3 22.6
Tulsa, OK 65.3 65.3 67.1 60.7 59.7 57.6 55.6
Providence, Rl - 37.4 37.6 29.5 28.8 27.6 27.4
Greenville County, SC - 85.0 80.3 16.7 12.2 13.9 13.6
Memphis, TN 90.3 88.4 85.5 52.1 51.0 56.3 -
Nashville-Davidson County, 
TN 81.2 79.7 76.7 36.2 37.8 38.4 40.4
Austin, TX 75.5 73.3 71.6 55.2 51.9 46.3 -
Corpus Christi, TX 61.8 60.4 57.4 34.4 - - -
Dallas, TX 70.4 68.5 68.1 55.5 - - -
Houston, TX 72.7 71.3 70.5 68.2 - - -
Newport News, VA 86.6 84.7 80.3 24.5 24.0 23.3 23.9
Richmond, VA 86.3 83.4 58.4 29.1 28.9 28.6 29.0
Tacoma, WA - - - 38.2 34.5 29.1 27.0
Milwaukee, WI 76.1 73.6 72.0 51.3 - - -
Racine, WI 56.5 47.5 44.5 18.2 - - -
Unless otherwise noted, scores are for systemwide level.
T is the year of major desegregation effort. 
'D1 scores are for elementary level only.
D1 scores are for secondary level only.
